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1: Introduction 
1.1 Subject of the Thesis 
Since the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972 an ever-higher number of 
international environmental agreements have been adopted. Lately, scholars of international 
relations have paid particular attention to the role of developing countries in the formation of 
such agreements. Frank Biermann finds evidence for what he terms “Southern eco-power” 
when studying the negotiation outcome of the ozone regime (the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer) (Biermann 2002). Kristin Rosendal concludes that 
the norms and principles in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) represent a moral 
breakthrough for the norms and interests of developing countries (Rosendal 1999). Likewise, 
in the Climate Convention the developed country Parties have a special obligation to help 
developing country Parties with financial and technological resources (Yearbook of 
International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2002). The broad theme for 
investigation in this study is to analyse the influence of developing countries on international 
environmental negotiations. Do they really achieve breakthroughs for their interests and 
proposals?  
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA), adopted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in November 
2001, is among the most recent international agreements. The treaty is part of the work done 
within the FAO system to establish a regime for the management of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture (PGRFA)1. The Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (CGRFA)2 is central in this regime, as it reviews all matters relating to policy, 
programmes and activities of the FAO pertaining to these resources. The CGRFA has 
concentrated on the implementation of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources (1983), the development of the Global Plan of Action (1996) and until quite 
recently the negotiations for the ITPGRFA.3  
Plant genetic resources are a fundamental input in modern as well as traditional 
breeding. The constant evolution of new diseases makes plant breeding an endless activity. In 
essence, plant genetic diversity is a vital precondition for food security. No country is self-
sufficient in PGRFA (Kloppenburg 1988). Moreover, with the rapid developments in the 
biotechnological industry, the demand for a constant flow of genetic resources increased in 
the 1980s (Pistorius 1997; Rosendal 1999). Nevertheless, access to plant genetic diversity is 
also essential for traditional small-scale farming on which 1.4 billion people world-wide 
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depend for their livelihoods (Crucible II Group 2000:1). Despite the acknowledged 
importance of plant genetic resources, food crop genetic erosion is a serious problem in 
almost all countries of the world (FAO 1998b). In China an estimated 90% of the 10,000 
wheat varieties that were grown a century ago have been lost. In Mexico an estimated 80 per 
cent of the maize varieties that were grown in the 1930s are gone. The single most important 
reason for genetic erosion is the replacement of traditional varieties with modern, high 
yielding, and genetically uniform ones (ibid.:33). 
Both traditional farmers in the South and commercial breeders as well as 
biotechnology companies in the North need access to PGRFA. The threat to food security due 
to genetic erosion is a common concern, with a subsequent drive for conservation of PGRFA. 
So, where is the conflict? 
The commercial breeding sector in developed countries desires intellectual property 
protection of their plant varieties. This protection is mainly provided through systems of plant 
breeders’ rights, but in the realm of biotechnology, genetic material is also subject to patents. 
Intellectual property rights negate the principle of free exchange of breeding material because 
the users of the material have to purchase licences from the licence holder. Furthermore, their 
utility is limited to countries of some economic and technological strength (Rosendal 
1999:99). The traditional varieties of farmers in the South do not fulfil the criterion of genetic 
uniformity needed to merit plant breeders’ rights. Neither do they possess the necessary 
technology to develop their varieties into such stable and uniform varieties. Thus, the genetic 
material of the South has throughout history been acquired as a common heritage of mankind 
(meaning open access and free of charge). At the same time, the North can impose exclusive 
property rights on the varieties developed from the same genetic material. This asymmetry 
between improved germplasm and traditional germplasm has led to a sense of unfairness and 
feeling of exploitation among developing countries (Swanson 1997:102).  
This controversy has coloured the debates regarding management of PGRFA in FAO 
since the late 1970s. In 1983, the Member States of FAO adopted the International 
Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR), the objective was to ensure that PGRFA 
would be explored, preserved, evaluated and made available for plant breeding and scientific 
purposes (Article 1). However, a handful of developed countries did not want to consider elite 
breeding lines or patented varieties as material which could or should be freely exchanged 
(Berg et al. 1991:80). As a response to the development of plant breeders’ rights in the North, 
the South started to claim Farmers’ Rights in return. In a compromise, these two sets of rights 
were simultaneously recognised by the FAO Resolution 4/89. Plant breeders’ rights were 
accepted as compatible with the International Undertaking, because it was understood that 
“free access” did not mean “free of charge”. Farmers’ Rights were further defined by the FAO 
Resolution 5/89 as:  
[R]ights arising from the past, present and future contribution of farmers in 
conserving, improving and making Plant Genetic Resources, particularly those in the 
centres of origin/diversity. These rights are vested in the International Community, as 
trustees for present and future generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full 
benefits of farmers and supporting the continuation of their contributions…. 

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With the recognition of Farmers’ Rights in the IUPGR, was the North-South dispute 
regarding the management of PGRFA settled? Due to the complexity and controversy of the 
concept the International Undertaking did not manage to give Farmers’ Rights a proper 
definition (Girsberger 1999:289). Consequently, these rights where never implemented as 
prescribed in the IUPGR, even though an additional resolution was passed in 1991 that stated 
that Farmers’ Rights should be implemented through an international fund. 
1.2 Research questions 
After the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992, the Member 
States of FAO decided that the IUPGR needed revision. Since Farmers’ Rights had never 
been realised, the developing countries wanted these rights to be endorsed by the new 
agreement when the renegotiations of the IUPGR started in 1994. Seven years later, the 
legally binding International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
replaced the non-binding International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. The 
objectives of the ITPGRFA are the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA and the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use – in harmony with the CBD – for 
sustainable agriculture and food security (Article 1). The core of the treaty is a multilateral 
system for facilitated access to a list of 35 specified food crops and 29 forage crops. Hence, 
my first research question is as follows: 
• To what extent did the developing countries have a breakthrough for their demands 
for Farmers’ Rights in the International Treaty?   
My second and last research question is: 
• How can the negotiation outcome regarding Farmers’ Rights be explained? 
The answer to the former question is needed in order to answer the latter, which is analytically 
more interesting. Despite the potential impact of Farmers’ Rights for the conservation and 
sustainable use of these valuable resources, little research is conducted on such rights (Correa 
2000:9).4 I assume that understanding how and why Farmers’ Rights are recognised in the 
International Treaty may reduce the high uncertainty among practitioners regarding how to 
implement these rights.5 
1.3 Choice of Explanatory Framework 
The concept of regimes provides analytical tools to understand international co-operation in 
an anarchic system of independent states (Young 1999). Is the ITPGRFA a regime? 
According to a formal definition of regimes as advocated for example by Keohane (1993), the 
ITPGRFA fulfils the criterion of having explicit rules that are embodied in a treaty to be 
agreed upon by the various parties (see the next chapter for a discussion on regime 
definitions). In a broader sense, the ITPGRFA is part of FAO’s regime for the management of 
PGRFA. Thus, the insight of regime theory will be fruitful when studying the formation 
process of the ITPGRFA. 
Scholars of international relations differ as to how they explain the formation of 
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international agreements. Broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought in regime 
theory (Hansenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997:1-2)6:  
1. The power-based perspective focuses on the exercise of power and interests and is based 
on the assumption that the drive for power is the main motivation for regime formation.  
2. The interest-based perspective focuses on the interplay of institutions and interests and is 
based on the assumption that the defence of interests is the main motivation for regime 
formation.  
3. The knowledge-based perspective highlights the influence of knowledge, norms and ideas 
and is based on the assumption that the diffusion of these factors is the main motivation 
for regime formation.  
Following the different focal points in the various perspectives, I assume that all three may 
add valuable insight to understanding the possible breakthrough for the developing countries 
regarding Farmers’ Rights.  
The general purpose of intensive research strategies such as case studies is to 
thoroughly investigate few subject matters and many factors instead of studying many subject 
matters and few factors (Yin 1994). The ITPGRFA is the subject matter of this study. My 
methodological framework is therefore based on a case study approach, where the degree of 
recognition of Farmers’ Rights is viewed as a case of the developing countries’ potential 
breakthrough in international environmental negotiations. 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
Several of the choices I have made need specification. First, why do I focus only on Farmers’ 
Rights and not on the possible breakthrough of the developing countries’ proposals on all the 
articles and provisions of the ITPGRFA? This is because Farmers’ Rights are the clearest 
“South-issue”. The concept was adopted for the purpose of balancing the rights of traditional 
breeders in the South with those of the plant breeders in the North. Besides, for the other 
issues that were dealt with in the treaty, it is more apparent that the developing countries have 
divergent interests. For example, the developing countries had different views regarding the 
scope and coverage of the Multilateral System.7  
Second, why should I study only formation and not implementation of the 
International Treaty? The lacking realisation of the Farmers’ Rights provisions in the 
International Undertaking illustrates the difference between recognition and implementation. 
Despite this insight, the implementation of the ITPGRFA is outside the scope of this thesis, 
the reason being the novelty of the treaty. It was adopted less than three years ago and will 
enter into force on 29 June 2004. Consequently, it is premature to study any achievements on 
Farmers’ Rights.  
Third, why focus on the ITPGRFA when there are several other agreements affecting 
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the management of PGRFA internationally that have relevance for the realisation of Farmers’ 
Rights? In this regard, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Agreement on 
Trade-related Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs), the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO)8 and the Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of the 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) are the most significant 
arrangements. The ITPGRFA is a legally binding revision of the non-binding IUPGR in 
harmony with the CBD. While the CBD deals with all kinds of diversity in general, the 
Undertaking and the Treaty deal specifically with plant genetic diversity of relevance for 
agriculture. Furthermore, the CBD provides specific rights and knowledge of indigenous 
people, which is related to Farmers’ Rights9. TRIPs establishes a minimum standard of 
intellectual property protection of all inventions for contracting parties to the World Trade 
Organisation. In particular the provision pertaining to living organisms is relevant to the topic 
of this thesis.10 When implementing TRIPs, many countries have enacted a plant varieties 
protection law based on a model of UPOV. Besides, the newest revision of UPOV in 1991 
severely restricted the right of farmers’ to use, sell and exchange farm-saved seed from 
protected varieties.  
 
Table 1.1: The Content of the Main International Agreements.  
 Conservation, Access and 
Benefit Sharing 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Biological Diversity in 
general  
 
CBD TRIPs (§ 27.3.b) 
Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture 
ITPGRFA 
 
UPOV 
Source: Andersen (2004). 
 
Due to the close relationships between all these agreements and organisations, the concepts of 
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regime linkages (Young 1996) and regime interplay (Stokke 2000) are possible points of 
departure for studying the issue area of PGRFA and Farmers’ Rights. When studying the 
international governance of agricultural biotechnology, for example, Coleman and Gabler 
(2002) find evidence for the emergence of two competing regimes: one emphasising trade, 
intellectual property and food security; and the other stressing biological diversity and food 
security. Nevertheless, I will keep a focus on the ITPGRFA. This is the newest agreement and 
FAO is the arena where Farmers’ Rights most significantly have been dealt with. Besides, I 
believe such an approach would have been too comprehensive given the scope of this thesis. 
References to other agreements will be made throughout the thesis, however. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
To briefly go through the structure of this thesis: the next chapter will provide the theoretical 
foundation for the thesis and consists of three parts. First, I will give a general presentation of 
regime theory. Second, I will develop a framework for evaluating the breakthrough of the 
developing countries regarding Farmers’ Rights in the ITPGRFA. Finally, based on the main 
assumptions within each school of regime theory, I will identify explanatory variables that 
will be used to structure my subsequent analysis. Methodological considerations will follow 
in Chapter 3, where I will explain the choice of qualitative case studies as a research strategy, 
and the methods to be applied. In order to broaden our understanding of the empirical 
questions at hand, Chapter 4 will give a brief description of the issue area of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture. Chapter 5 will analyse the degree of breakthrough for 
developing countries regarding their demands for Farmers’ Rights in the ITPGRFA. I will 
then chronologically describe the negotiation process in FAO from 1994 to 2001 in Chapter 6. 
Based on the propositions developed in the theoretical part, in Chapter 7 I will examine which 
mechanisms that can be traced during the negotiation process that can explain the actual 
breakthrough of the South. Finally, I will sum up my findings and draw some conclusions. 
Are there any lessons to be learned regarding the “power” of the South in international 
environmental negotiations?  
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2: Theoretical Approach  
How should I design an analytical framework for explaining the recognition of Farmers’ 
Rights in the ITPGRFA? The first part of this chapter will introduce regime theory as an 
approach for studying international co-operation. In the second part, I will define my 
dependent variable. In order to explain the observations pertaining to the dependent variable, I 
will identify independent variables within the schools of though of regime theory. 
2.1 Regime Theory 
Regime theory arose in the 1970s and gained momentum during the 1980s as a response to 
the intellectual challenge posed by the study of collective-action problems and in part as a 
response to the political challenge associated with an apparent decline in the ability of the 
United States to function as a dominant actor in international society (Young 1999:189). 
Much of the post-World War II period had until then been dominated by the realist school.11 
Their view of the international system as anarchy dominated by national interests and the 
struggle for power provides dim prospects for international co-operation. The notion of 
“hegemony”, i.e. the dominance of one powerful state, or a coalition of such states, was a 
resort of the realists to explain how co-operation could occur and be sustained. Regime theory 
however, addresses the possibility for selfish actors to actually co-operate under conditions 
where there are incentives to cheat and no central political authority that stands over national 
governments. This shift is largely associated with Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984) 
(Rosendal 1999:45).12 
 Stephan Krasner identifies regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations” (Krasner 1983:2). Even though Krasner’s definition is called 
the consensus definition of regimes, critics have attacked it for two main reasons: first, the 
difficulty of differentiating the four components of regimes, and second, its vagueness in 
differentiating between those who study international regimes and those who study other 
features of international relations like international organisations (Levy, Young and Zürn 
1995:270). Levy, Young and Zürn argue, however, that the descriptive richness in the 
components of Krasner’s definition is a major strength of regime theory (ibid.). It makes it 
possible to display different notions of international regimes, as absorbed by their typology: 
Table 2.1: A Typology of Regimes  
Formality 
 
Convergence 
of 
Expectations 
Low High 
Low No regimes Tacit regimes 
High Dead-letter regimes Full-blown regimes 
Source: Levy, Young and Zürn (1995:272).  
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The vertical dimension highlights the formality of a regime. A regime can be associated with 
a highly formalised agreement or even the establishment of an international organisation, or it 
can come into existence without any formal agreements, usually based on precedence. The 
horizontal dimension focuses on the extent to which states expect that their behaviour will be 
constrained by their accession to an implicit or explicit set of agreements. If there are no 
formal agreements or convergence in the expectations that rules will be adhered to, no regime 
exists. On the other hand, even in the absence of formal rules, it can be expected that informal 
rules will be observed, indicating the existence of a tacit regime. By contrast, it is also 
possible to identify situations where formal rules have been brought into existence, without 
any expectation that they will be observed, suggesting the existence of a dead-letter regime. 
Finally, there are full-blown regimes, where there are high expectations that formal rules will 
be observed (Levy, Young and Zürn 1995).   
In order to meet the second objection to the consensus definition, Levy, Young and 
Zürn suggest defining international regimes as “social institutions consisting of agreed upon 
principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in 
specific issue areas” (Levy, Young and Zürn 1995:274). Defined in this way, they claim that 
regimes are distinct from international organisations (which are material entities), broader 
structures of international society (which consists of principles of all issue areas) and world 
order (which encompasses the sum of all the institutional arrangements operative at the 
international level). Still, the question remains: how can one determine the existence of 
regimes? 
The vague reference in Krasner’s definition and in Levy, Young and Zürn’s typology 
to the “convergence of expectations” does not provide explicit criteria for identifying the 
presence of regimes. Over time, three distinct positions have emerged on the subject 
(Hansenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996:180-183). Some analysts argue that state 
behaviour demonstrates that particular injunctions are accepted in a given issue-area, and that 
an international regime thus exists. This behaviour approach is, however, in danger of 
applying circular reasoning when identifying regimes based on observed behaviour and then 
using regimes to explain this behaviour (Levy, Young and Zürn 1995:271). Kratochwil and 
Ruggie (1986) adopt an approach that shifts the emphasis away from behaviour and towards 
inter-subjective meaning and shared understandings –a cognitive approach. Keohane 
criticises this approach, because he claims that the identification of a regime is an issue for a 
descriptive interface based on publicly available texts, rather than psychological insight 
(Keohane 1993:26-29). This has led him to develop a formal definition of regimes, where 
regimes are conceptualised primarily as explicit rules that are agreed upon by actors and 
embodied in treaties or other documents.  
I endorse this formal approach, since I regard regimes as explicit rules (agreements) 
agreed upon by more than one state. Nevertheless, I consider states’ recognition of these 
agreements as still having validity as an essential element of a regime. However, my emphasis 
on the formality dimension of regimes and not the dimension regarding convergence of 
expectations is because the focus of this thesis is the formation of the ITPGRFA. Hence, I will 
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study the process in which the ITPGRFA is created and adopted and not the implementation 
of the treaty or other processes that could give evidence of states’ recognition of the treaty. 
Regime analyses focus on regime formation and regime effectiveness. To analyse the 
processes by which international regimes come into existence, Oran Young suggests 
distinguishing between at least three stages: agenda formation, negotiation and 
operationalisation (Young 1998).13 Agenda formation “encompasses the processes through 
which an issue initially find its way onto the international political agenda and rises to a 
sufficient prominent place on this agenda to justify the investment of time and political capital 
needed to embark on explicit negotiations” (Young 1998:5). In the case of Farmers’ Rights, 
the agenda formation stage began around the FAO Conference in 1979, where debates 
concerning the asymmetric benefits derived by donors of germplasm and donors of 
technology started (Esquinas-Alcázar 1996:4). The phase of negotiations begins with the 
initiation of direct and focused negotiations and ends with the signing of an agreement. The 
negotiations for revision of the IUPGR started formally in 1994 and ended with the signing of 
the ITPGRFA in 2001. The operationalisation stage includes “those steps needed to move the 
provisions of an international regime from paper to practice” (Young 1998:5). National 
ratification of the treaty is such a step, which is a current ongoing process in the case of the 
ITPGRFA.14 Moreover, the operationalisation of several issues is still to be settled by the 
Governing Body before the ITPGRFA fully can be implemented.15 Thus, in terms of regime 
formation, the ITPGRFA is currently in the latest stage. 
 
Table 2.2: The Formation of the ITPGRFA 
Stages of formation Agenda 
formation 
Negotiations Operationalisation 
Time phases of the 
ITPGRFA process 
Ca 1979-1994 1994-2001 2001- 
Object of this 
analysis 
 the agreement: 
ITPGRFA 
 
 
The negotiation phase is the “central and most extensively studied stage” (Young 1998:5) and 
is the subject of this analysis. However, these analytical distinctions are not always easy to 
maintain in practice. Thus, I will notably make references to the agenda formation stage in 
instances when events here have implications for the negotiations to come.16  
Studies of regime effectiveness have mainly concentrated on two aspects: first, 
whether the collective problem in a specific issue-area has actually been solved (in the 
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environmental context this means solving environmental problems) and second, whether the 
regime has affected the behaviour of the actors (Wettestad 1999:8-9). Because the ITPGRFA 
is still in the formation stage, it is premature to study its effects and this will not be covered 
here. My explicit focus is, once again, on regime formation. 
The negotiation stage ended with the adoption of the ITPGRFA, which from now on I 
will refer to as the negotiation outcome. Scholars of international relations differ as to how 
they explain the formation of regimes and their expectations about the negotiation outcome. 
Broadly speaking, the power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based perspectives are the 
main schools of thought in regime theory (Hansenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997:1-2). I 
will use all these perspectives to explain the negotiation outcome. The negotiation outcome is 
therefore my dependent variable, because it is the factor to be explained. A variable is an 
empirical property that appears with two or more values (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
1992:54). Variables indicate that the empirical properties may vary as to extent, strength or 
quality of the empirical property. The variables that are expected to explain change in the 
dependent variable are referred to as independent variables or explanatory variables. I will 
identify my independent variables within the regime perspectives, but must first further 
elaborate on my dependent variable. 
2.2 Dependent Variable: The Negotiation Outcome  
To what extent did developing countries experience a breakthrough for their request for 
Farmers’ Rights? In this section, I will describe the measurement of such a breakthrough.17 
I regard the developing countries’ proposals and expressed will on Farmers’ Rights 
during the negotiation process as highly relevant. The report of the Working Group on 
Farmers’ Rights convened 10-11 December 1996 (FAO 1996b) is the first document from the 
negotiation process to systematically present the views and opinions of different identified 
actors. Three opposing texts are proposed: one from “EC” (the European Community) 
amended by China and Japan, one from “US” (the United States) and one from “developing 
countries”.  
My analysis of the negotiation outcome will consist of a comparison between the 
treaty text and the proposal on Farmers’ Rights presented by the developing countries, as 
reflected in the 1996 report. I assume that the negotiation outcome may vary concerning the 
degree of breakthrough for the developing countries. I have chosen to distinguish between 
three values: strong, medium and weak.18  
• A strong breakthrough implies a high correspondence between the positions of the 
developing countries on Farmers’ Rights and the text on Farmers’ Rights in the treaty. 
Furthermore, there should be compulsory legal obligations for the contracting parties to 
implement these rights.  
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 Such “quantification” of qualitative date is, however, problematic when it comes to how to distinguish the 
different empirical data into what is to be considering weak, medium or strong breakthrough.   
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• A medium breakthrough involves only a partial correspondence between the positions of 
the developing countries on Farmers’ Rights and the text on Farmers’ Rights in the treaty. 
It may still be regarded as a medium breakthrough even though few legal obligations 
follow, provided there is correspondence.  
• A weak breakthrough presupposes that Farmers’ Rights are totally excluded from the 
treaty or that such rights are included to an insignificant extent.  
 
Similar to my regime definition, this is a formal definition of potential values of the 
dependent variable. For example, establishing compulsory legal obligations for the 
contracting parties to implement Farmers’ Rights indicates a strong breakthrough for the 
developing countries. Nevertheless, I want to stress the evident fact that “[n]egotiations that 
do not end in agreement on legal provisions may still establish or reinforce important non-
legal rules” (Malnes 1995:95). Thus, even without a strong recognition of Farmers’ Rights, 
the concept still has the potential to give prominence to certain normative principles that 
many states seriously will consider acting on in most situations where they apply –like a “tacit 
regime”. Similarly, strong recognition in the treaty is insignificant if the provisions are not 
implemented (“dead-letter regime”). The clearly described, but never materialised 
international fund for the realisation of Farmers’ Rights in the International Undertaking 
illustrates the lacking practical significance of a dead-letter regime.19 
In order to broaden the basis for an analysis of the negotiation outcome, I will adopt 
Biermann’s approach (Biermann 2002) as a supplement. Biermann’s proposed method for an 
assessment of the South’s influence on international environmental agreements involves 
comparing the outcome of the negotiations according to three indicators (Biermann 2002:6): 
- Variation in the degree of differentiation of norms among actors; 
- Variation in the degree of international resource transfers among actors required by the 
negotiated regime; 
- Variation in the degree of participation of actors in decision-making under the negotiated 
regime, as evidenced for example by voting rights or the legal force of the decision-
making powers of different bodies. 
 
While the different responsibility between the North and South for implementing Farmers’ 
Rights may possibly be found in the negotiated text, the next two indicators could be harder to 
evaluate at the present stage of the ITPGRFA. The financial mechanism is still subject to 
negotiation and will be discussed by the Governing Body as soon as the treaty enters into 
force. It is therefore not possible at present to precisely decide the degree of potential resource 
transfer from the North to the South. In addition, I consider these indicators to be more useful 
when analysing the whole agreement. For example, I do not expect a provision on Farmers’ 
Rights to describe decision-making procedures for the regime. Therefore, I consider 
Biermann’s method less appropriate for assessing the degree of breakthrough for the 
developing countries when only focusing on Farmers’ Rights. However, the content of the 
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rest of the treaty may be significant for understanding the recognition of Farmers’ Rights. 
Hence, I will provide tentative estimates of the indicators suggested by Biermann to get a 
more general understanding of the influence of the developing countries in the ITPGRFA.  
2.3 Independent Variables: Power, Interests, Institutions and Knowledge  
The aim of this section is to identify independent variables within the schools of thought in 
regime theory. Within each perspective, I will start with a general view and go on to detect 
basic variables. In conclusion, I will make specific propositions regarding the degree of 
breakthrough to expect for the developing countries. This will later guide my analysis of the 
negotiation process in order to understand the negotiation outcome. 
2.3.1 Power-based Explanations of Regime Formation 
The power-based explanation builds on the neo-realist assumptions that states are the central 
actors in international relations and that they can best be described as unitary, rational actors, 
seeking to maximise their own self-interests. “Rational” means that the actors have complete 
information about their own and others’ preferences and their options for action. According to 
Underdal (1998a:7) the rational actor model builds upon three basic assumptions: 
1. States are unitary, rational actors. 
2. Decision-makers evaluate options in terms of costs and benefits to their nation, and 
only in those terms, and choose whichever option (is believed to) maximise(s) net 
national gain. 
3. States are in full control of “their” societies.  
The distribution of power is the major variable for neo-realists. States deploy power resources 
in pursuit of their preferences. Furthermore, neo-realists assume an international condition of 
anarchy due to the lack of a central authority. Under anarchy, each state bears exclusive 
responsibility for safeguarding its own survival and independence. States must therefore 
protect their capacity for self-help, and this capacity is a function of their relative power 
capabilities. The strength of one state is measured in relation to the strength of other states. 
The general content of the national interest is thus determined deductively; it is inferred from 
the anarchic, self-help character of the international system (Weldes 1996:277). Concerns 
about relative gains affect the utility functions of states, so that the gains of another state 
detract from one’s own level of satisfaction (Griceo 1988:500). Together with the notion of 
distributive bargaining20, the concern for relative gains makes international co-operation 
difficult. 
Following these assumptions, the power-based explanation predicts that the interests 
of dominant state actors will determine international agreements between highly asymmetric 
actors in high-salient issues. As Waltz (1979:131) writes:  
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[t]he theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great 
powers of an era. …In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of 
greatest capabilities set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves. 
This assumption has given rise to the hegemonic stability theory, i.e. the view that the 
presence of a hegemon (a single power or a powerful coalition that includes most great 
powers) is necessary in order to create and maintain a regime.21 The dominant regime member 
cannot only use power capabilities to pursue narrow self-interests, but also to accept 
disproportional costs in order to obtain a public good.  
Stephan Krasner has specified ways by which state power can be exercised to produce 
international co-operation, inter alia a state with more military and economic resources can 
use threats or promises to manipulate others’ preferences in order to achieve the result 
favoured by the more powerful actor (Krasner 1991:340; see also Young 1991:289). 
Bargaining leverage may also be derived from unequal opportunity costs of change, given the 
possibility of the strongest actor (usually the one with the greater overall capabilities that is 
not so dependent on co-operation) to get his way by credibly threatening to walk away from 
the table if the other side fails to be more forthcoming (Krasner 1991:363).   
As a general theory of regimes, the notion of hegemonic stability has had little 
empirical support (Hansenclever, Rittberger and Mayer 1997:198; Levy, Young and Zürn 
1995:284). Besides, high politics, like security, is the main concern for scholars within this 
approach. They have thus largely ignored international environmental co-operation (Mitchell 
2002:504). The issue of Farmers’ Rights is far from high politics, since it is about the 
conservation of PGRFA, food security and small-scale farmers in developing countries. Even 
so, I will also apply a neo-realistic approach when analysing the negotiation process in FAO, 
because it will draw my attention to the role of the most powerful states.22 In this context, I 
understand power in the sense of relative position in world politics. In the post-World War II 
period, the United States23 has been the major superpower and the only superpower after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The European Union and other members of G-724 –Japan and 
Canada– also have a strong influence on world politics. I assume that the powerful states’ 
ability to influence politics increases with a higher convergence of their interests.  
Following the assumptions within the power-based explanations of regimes it is very 
difficult to reach an agreement between competing states. Structurally powerful states can 
gain bargaining power as they have less to lose if agreement is not reached. These states can 
also pursue their interests during the formation phase through coercion and positive 
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 The G-7, also known as the Group of Seven, is comprised of the seven industrialised democracies of the 
world: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The G-7 was formed 
in 1975 when the heads of state of six leading industrial nations met in Rambouillet, France to discuss issues of 
global concern such as world economic stability, international trade, and economic development in the poorer 
regions of the world. Russia joined the group in 1998. 
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incentives. Hence, I will present the following proposition: 
 
P1: The international negotiation outcome will reflect the interests of the dominant regime 
members. By definition, developing countries are not such members. Thus, they can get their 
interests through if the dominant regime members want to. Otherwise, a weak breakthrough 
for the developing countries - either an exclusion of Farmers’ Rights or a diluted recognition 
as a lip service - is the most likely outcome.  
2.3.2 Interest-based Explanations of Regime Formation 
Interest-based approaches constitute the main approach among theories of regimes. Among 
the most important theories is Keohane’s functional or contractualist regime theory 
(Hansenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 1997). He builds on the neo-realistic assumption of 
states being unitary, rational actors, but his original objective was “to show, on the basis of 
their own assumptions that the characteristic pessimism of Realism does not necessarily 
follow” (Keohane 1984:67). A central premise in Keohane’s theory is the fact that states in 
several issues have common interests that can only be realised through co-operation. 
International politics is not necessarily considered a zero-sum-game; it is also possible to 
create win-win-situations. The assumption that states are only concerned about absolute gains 
and not about what other states may gain from the co-operation further increases the prospects 
for co-operation.  
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that states are assumed to pursue their self-
interests when co-operating with other states. Keohane draws heavily on modern economic 
theories and uses rational choice models like the Prisoners’ Dilemma in his analysis. The 
point of departure in this dilemma is two actors who prefer to co-operate rather than refrain 
from co-operation, but both actors will gain more if only the other actor co-operates. The 
result of the game is that both actors refrain from co-operating: no matter what the other actor 
does, it will be beneficial not to co-operate. Thus, individual rationality often results in 
collective sub-optimal outcomes due to problems of co-ordination and fear of cheating. This 
fear is created by an uncertainty about other states’ objections and commitment. The 
contractualist theory sees international regimes as an essential instrument that states can use to 
overcome this dilemma and achieve common gains. Regimes function in this way by 
providing information (Keohane, 1984:97). For example, monitoring arrangements make 
information about others’ compliance available and thus reduce uncertainty and reduce the 
fear of cheating.   
While Keohane’s and other game theory approaches to international co-operation deal 
with negotiated regimes, they pay little attention to the bargaining process itself 
(Hansenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 1997:193). Oran Young, on the other hand, has 
developed a model of regime formation that he refers to as “institutional bargaining”25. 
Young’s perception of states as selfish actors is in line with general interest-based 
perspectives, though his model does not fit neatly into this category as it includes elements 
closer to the knowledge-based perspective. One of his assumptions is that parties in 
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institutional bargaining regularly act under a “veil of uncertainty” regarding their own future 
positions and interests. Uncertainty is thus central to both Young’s and Keohane’s theories of 
regime formation, but the meaning and role of uncertainty is quite different (Hansenclever, 
Meyer and Rittberger 1998:73). While Keohane refers to an actor’s uncertainty about what his 
counterparts will do (Will they keep their promises?), Young stresses a more fundamental 
uncertainty (What can we do and what can they do? What may result?). The effect of 
Keohane’s account of uncertainty is to motivate states to create regimes that serve to reduce 
uncertainty. In Young’s model, however, uncertainty is a condition that enables actors to form 
regimes (ibid.). 
Institutions may help overcome obstacles to international co-operation and help to 
utilise the integrative potential among selfish states. Thus, the interest-based perspective looks 
at the interplay between interests and institutions. Arild Underdal has categorised major 
institutional factors into institution-as-arena and organisation-as-actor (Underdal 1997b). 
Based on this definition, I will differentiate between arena and actor, but will link actor to 
leadership rather than solely to organisation because various actors –not necessarily connected 
to organisations– may affect agenda setting (given a flexible agenda). 
 
Institution-as-arena 
An important effect of institution-as-arena is the facilitation of meetings between the 
different states, where they learn about each other’s interests. Factors associated with arena 
are primarily associated with how the formal rules and procedures may affect the parties’ 
rational choices in negotiation games. In line with Krasner’s definition of regimes, this can 
also include the influence of underlying norms and principles on actors’ perceptions of their 
cost-benefit calculations. Important here are the decision-making rules, with a distinction 
between majority voting and consensus rules. International negotiations on environmental 
issues operate in general on a consensus basis; hence, this factor cannot explain variation in 
results in international environmental agreements (Rosendal 1999:69). However, the one-
country one-vote principle in the agencies of the United Nations, gives “meat power” to the 
numerous developing countries. Furthermore, rules also include formal and informal codes for 
conducting the negotiations. For example in FAO, it is common to discuss one article at the 
time, and when consensus is reached on one article, the issue is usually settled. Another factor 
associated with arena is the inclusion of all relevant parties, which affects the political 
feasibility of finding a solution, leading to what Arild Underdal has called the law of the least 
ambitious program (Underdal 1980:36).26 The more parties, the harder it is to find a solution. 
The goal is to circumvent this law, and leadership may be helpful in this regard. 
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Entrepreneurial Leadership 
Young regards leadership as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for regime 
formation (Young 1991). Among his three models of leadership, entrepreneurial leaders are 
associated with the interest-based perspective (Rosendal 1999:71).27 To Young, such a leader 
is “an individual who relies on negotiation skill to frame issues in ways that foster integrative 
bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants” (Young 
1991:293). Such framing can be accomplished in many ways, through skilful agenda setting, 
popularisation of issues and the construction of inclusive package deals (Young 1991:294). I 
understand package deals as different from compromises in that compromises generally are 
about giving and taking on one issue, while package deals involves several different issues. 
Discussing several issues at the same time increases the possibility of reaching an agreement 
because different issues often are interlinked. 
The entrepreneurial leader resembles what Raino Malnes calls a problem-solving 
leader (Malnes 1995:100). However, the two differ in that the former focuses only on 
strategy, while the latter also includes a dimension of motivation. A problem-solving leader 
does not negotiate with the view to maximise returns for him-or herself, as “…their activity 
qualifies as leadership only if self-interest takes second place to collective goals” (Malnes 
1995:94). The label given to an individual attempting to alter institutions and the texture of 
negotiations is of minor importance for my purpose. In my analysis it is important to know 
what the actors have done, not what their motivations were for acting as they did.28 Hence, I 
will stick to the term entrepreneurial leader.  
Different actors such as individuals, the secretariat, NGOs or formal delegates can act 
as entrepreneurial leaders (Underdal 1991; Young 1991). Secretariats are believed to often 
have the best qualifications for fulfilling the role as entrepreneurial leader since they are the 
only actors that are independent of national interests with an institutional role and memory 
(Andresen and Skjærseth 1999:7).29 There are at least three requirements for fulfilling this 
role: first, the secretariat must be able to develop and maintain good relations with member 
countries (for example ensure credibility both in the North and South); second, there must be 
a mandate that opens for an active role for the secretariat and finally, the secretariat should 
also have sufficient funding to carry out its tasks properly (ibid.). Nevertheless, an actor does 
not have to hold a formal position in an organisation to be such a leader, informal status may 
also be a source of legitimacy and respect that paves the way for leadership (Underdal 
1991:147). Informal status is partly a matter of personal reputation, seniority etc, but can also 
depend on the political orientation and the prestige ascribed to the government he or she 
represents. As entrepreneurial leadership is largely based on individual skills and status, it is a 
role to which also representatives of small countries can aspire. In case of mediation, 
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representatives from small countries may even find themselves in an advantageous position 
compared to their great power colleagues (Underdal 1998b:107). The potential of NGOs to 
play a leading role in this sense is limited by the fact that they only take part in international 
negotiations as observers. Still, depending on personal skills and status, representatives from 
NGOs could potentially act as entrepreneurial leaders. 
 
Issue-specific power 
Keohane’s optimistic argument for international co-operation builds on the notion of complex 
interdependence. The point of interdependence is that unilateral efforts are insufficient, 
making State A dependent on co-operation with one or more other states in order to maximise 
its welfare. This creates an integrative potential. However, interdependence is not only 
situations of evenly balanced mutual dependence (Keohane and Nye 1977:10). There are also 
asymmetries in dependence in specific areas, which can provide sources of influence for 
actors in their dealings with one another. This gives rise to the idea of issue specific power, 
i.e. a kind of power that is not defined or limited by overall material capabilities (which is the 
kind of power that is central in power-based perspectives). Underdal divides issue specific 
power into two components (1997a:17): 
• basic game power: parties’ control over the resources in question as well as their 
economic and technological capacity to make use of the resources (bargaining 
leverage).  
• negotiation power: capabilities based on strengths in numbers, coalitions and 
leadership. 
Basic game power is a source of power that is independent of the negotiations, in contrast to 
negotiation power, which is a potential strength only during the negotiation stage. Frank 
Biermann’s notion of a Southern eco-power in situations of ecological interdependence 
(Biermann 2002) can be divided into these two components. He claims that Southern eco-
power gives developing countries bargaining leverage in negotiations of international 
environmental agreements because Northern governments believe that the South’s 
participation in the regime is necessary to solve the environmental problems (basic game 
power), but this is only a source of power if Southern governments adopt a coherent 
negotiation strategy that is fronted by effective leadership (negotiation power). Such group 
leaders differ from entrepreneurial leaders. While the latter strive for consensus, the former 
promote the interests of the group. 
Biermann makes an interesting observation when he states that Northern governments’ 
perception of the necessity of Southern participation depends on their perception of political 
vulnerability rather than ecological vulnerability (Biermann 2002: 19). This is based on his 
assumption that the main concern of Northern governments is to stay in power, and solving 
environmental problems comes second. In evaluating basic game power, control over plant 
genetic resources as well as biotechnological capacity to utilise these resources is relevant. 
Following Biermann’s argumentation, however, an assessment of basic game power also has 
to be sensitive to perceptions and concerns for scientific facts as well as the scientific facts 
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per se.30  
 
Summing up 
Institutional factors mentioned here may align or alter the interests of the parties, by changing 
their cost/benefit estimate in order to maximise their own returns. This may increase the 
feasibility for reaching common solutions. According to Oran Young, interests and 
institutions are the driving forces that dominate the negotiation stage (Young 1998:21). This 
is also the stage of regime formation where entrepreneurial leadership is assumed to loom 
large. Hence, I present the following proposition: 
 
P2a: When arena mechanisms of an institution facilitate the development of an agreement 
between self-interested countries, it usually involves giving and taking by all parties. 
Presumably, the developing countries will gain something during such a process. Hence, 
there is a potential for a strong breakthrough for them.  
P2b If entrepreneurial leaders frame issues in such a way that the demands of developing 
countries are addressed in a favourable way for them, a strong breakthrough for developing 
countries is possible. 
P2c If developing countries have issue specific power, they have a chance to get their 
interests reflected in the negotiation outcome. Thus, a strong breakthrough is possible. 
 
All these propositions are formulated in a positive way as regards the potential reflection of 
the developing countries’ proposals in the outcome. However, predictions from assumptions 
within the interest-based perspective are not as explicit as those of scholars within the power-
based perspective. Therefore, I use the words “potential” and “possible” instead of “likely”, 
because the effect of the institutional factors may be a modification of developing countries’ 
initial positions as a correction of the positions of the powerful countries. 
2.3.3 Knowledge-based Explanations of Regime Formation 
Cognitivists are critical to rationalist theories of international politics, both neo-liberal and 
realist. The common flaw of these theories, from a cognitivist’s point of view, is that they 
treat states’ identities and interests as exogenously given, i.e. not as explanatory variables. 
Proponents of knowledge-based approaches argue that the processes that produce the self-
perceptions of particular states (i.e. their identities) as well as the objectives which they 
pursue in their foreign policy (i.e. what they perceive to be in their interests) are shaped by the 
normative and causal belief systems held by decision makers and that consequently changes 
in belief systems can trigger changes in policy (Hansenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 
1997:136).  
Ideas and knowledge play a role in shaping the perceptions and preferences of actors 
involved in international co-operation. If interests are unknown or incompletely specified, 
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consensus about policy-relevant understanding can contribute to shaping regimes. States are 
still seen as central actors in international relations, but domestic and trans-national actors 
must also be included in an explanation of regime formation. According to knowledge-based 
perspectives, a cost-benefit analysis is not the only basis for predicting state interests and 
actions. Norms and knowledge may also affect the negotiation outcome through learning and 
norm diffusion. This may take place through the activities of intellectual leaders.  
 
Intellectual Leaders 
Intellectual leaders are defined as individuals engaged in dissemination of new ideas about 
the desirability of certain arrangements (Young 1991: 288; Malnes 1995:101). Motivated by 
collective goals, their strategies are attempts to influence national objectives and beliefs. 
Intellectual leaders may confine their efforts to the generation of ideas rather than to the 
application of these ideas, therefore “they generally have little ability to control the uses that 
others make of their ideas” (Young 1991:301). Hence, ideas and intellectual leadership are 
particularly prominent during agenda formation (Young 1998:21). At an early stage of the 
regime formation phase, states may not have clarified their interests yet, and consequently 
may be more susceptible to the influence of ideas and scientific knowledge.  
A wide range of actors can act as intellectual leaders, for example representatives from 
epistemic communities, national delegations or NGOs. Epistemic communities are “networks 
of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within their domain of expertise” (Haas 1993:179). Peter Haas and other scholars have 
focused on the process by which the views of scientists gain acceptance among, and are acted 
upon by, decision-makers. They argue that epistemic communities are crucial “channels 
through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to 
country” (Haas 1992:27). Under conditions of complex interdependence and generalised 
uncertainty, specialists can play a significant role in attenuating such uncertainty for decision-
makers. Scientists and the epistemic communities they constitute can play significant roles 
during the period of agenda setting, by raising concerns, clarifying environmental impacts and 
proposing solutions (Haas 1990:224).  
According to Haas (1992:3) epistemic policy co-ordination is only likely to occur in 
the presence of (1) a high degree of uncertainty among policymakers, (2) a high degree of 
consensus among scientists, and (3) a high degree of institutionalisation of scientific advice. 
Considering the first condition, Peter Haas argues that the increasing complexity of global 
problems give rise to demands for scientific understanding. His notion of uncertainty is 
therefore more similar to Young’s perception of uncertainty than Keohane’s. However, while 
Young assumes that high uncertainty about the consequences of different arrangements 
improves the prospects for states to come to an agreement, Haas presumes that the reduction 
of scientific uncertainty improves such prospects. With regard to the second condition, 
scientists or other experts with knowledge relevant to the issue-area have to organise 
themselves as an epistemic community to share beliefs about causal relationships and 
appropriate means to solve the problems at hand. Finally, the members of an epistemic 
community must gain political legitimacy by becoming part of the bureaucratic apparatus.  
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There are limitations to the theory of epistemic community, since they emphasise large 
homogenous communities of experts (Andersen 1999:23). In reality, other actors than 
professionals also influence policy, not least among the Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). Furthermore, these actors may be divided into more fragmented groups than the 
large homogenous communities which are referred to as epistemic communities.31 For 
instance, international NGOs like GRAIN32 and RAFI, (now ETC group)33 can be viewed as 
part of a coalition working in favour of an international recognition of Farmers’ Rights, while 
the UPOV-secretariat and the International Association of Plant Breeders (ASSINSEL) can be 
viewed as part of a competitive coalition working against such recognition. Other individuals 
taking part in the negotiations, such as national delegates, can also act as intellectual leaders. 
This diversity of potential intellectual leaders stresses the fact that science, knowledge and 
ideas are not devoid of values or interests. Such leaders may use the scientific term for what 
they propose in order to increase its credibility or legitimacy, but the policy advocated by for 
example epistemic communities may also be the reflection of some specific interests. 
Moreover, NGOs usually have a clearly defined policy and specific preferences that may 
differ from what can be called science. 
 
Norm Diffusion  
International negotiations can be an arena for learning and internalisation of norms. The 
nature of environmental politics makes it sensitive to cognitive factors such as scientific 
knowledge, exchange of ideas and processes of argumentation (Litfin 1994:3). Proposing to 
reconstruct processes of regime formation and change in terms of learning, this approach 
seeks to illuminate how new knowledge can influence the demand for rule-based co-operation 
among states (Hansenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 1997:139). One definition of learning is if 
changes in beliefs induce behavioural change, this process can be referred to as learning (ibid. 
1997:145). The idea is that convergent expectations and recognisable norms are generated 
through repeated interaction and learning. A common acceptance of international norms and 
rules within issue-areas may affect state behaviour.  
This process of learning is, however, very difficult to trace empirically and hard to 
separate from the result of repeated interaction, which may also influence actors’ cost-benefit 
calculation. The latter would imply a strategic adoption of the idea, rather than a normative 
one. In an attempt to distinguish between these two reasons for adopting an idea, I will label 
adoption of the norm as knowledge and the inclusion of the idea in one’s cost-benefit 
calculation as the result of information. 
Oran Young has seemingly contradictory assumptions regarding which stage of 
regime formation that the cognitive perspectives have greatest explanatory power. On the one 
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hand, he argues that ideas are particularly prominent during agenda formation (Young 
1998:21). On the other hand, when looking at norm diffusion through interaction in specific 
arenas, ideas seem to play a role during the negotiation stage as well, as he puts it: “it is 
apparent that the power of ideas (..) and the concerns they engender are likely to loom larger 
and larger in institutional bargaining processes at the international level” (Young 1991:300). I 
think that these two predictions can be combined through the activities of entrepreneurial 
leaders. While ideas may highly affect agenda setting, ideas may also play a major role when 
entrepreneurial leaders use and amplify these ideas during the negotiation stage. In addition, 
events in other arenas, like in CBD, WTO and UPOV, may also be important for norm 
diffusion.  
 
Summing Up 
The main complementary contributions from this perspective are the focus on how interests 
and ideas are formed and the more specific inclusion of other actors than states. In sum, 
intellectual leaders such as representatives of epistemic communities, national delegations and 
NGOs may teach state actors about new ideas such as Farmers’ Rights and scientific 
knowledge about agro-biodiversity. Through learning and norm diffusion new ideas may 
obtain increased legitimacy. Hence, I present the following proposition: 
 
P3 If intellectual leaders advocate knowledge and ideas that are favourable for developing 
countries claims on Farmers’ Rights, and diffusion of these norms takes place, a strong 
breakthrough is possible. 
 
This proposition is formulated in a positive way regarding the potential reflection of the 
developing countries’ proposals in the outcome. However, there is also the potential existence 
of for example intellectual leaders who advocate knowledge and ideas contradictory to what is 
favourable for developing countries. This will logically reduce the possibility of a strong 
breakthrough.  
2.4 Three Perspectives – One Model 
The three approaches outlined here, neo-realism, institutionalism and the cognitive approach, 
have different explanations for the formation of regimes. Realists emphasise how power and 
considerations of relative power positions affect the content, and circumscribe the 
effectiveness and robustness of international regimes. Neo-liberals stress (self-) interests as a 
motive for co-operation among states and likewise for the creation of international regimes. 
Cognitivists point out that both the perception of interests and the meaning of power 
capabilities is dependent on actors’ causal and social knowledge (Hansenclever, Meyer and 
Rittberger 1997:211).34 Still, they are regarded as more complementary than incompatible 
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(Haas 1995:200, Jønnson 1993:203, Keohane 1993:30).35 Young, for example, stresses the 
importance of studying the interplay between different kinds of leaders (Young 1991). The 
influence of the ideas of an intellectual leader will be minimal if there are no entrepreneurial 
leaders to put the ideas into action. Different theoretical perspectives are useful to highlight 
different aspects of the case, as Allison made a big point of in his classical article about the 
Cuba missile crisis:  
…our understanding of such events depends critically on more self-consciousness 
about what observers bring to the analysis. What each analyst sees and judges to be 
important is not only a function of the evidence about what has happened, but also of 
the ‘conceptual lenses’ through which he looks at the evidence (Allison 1969:689).  
Even though I have derived different hypothesises about the value of my dependent variable 
based on the various schools of thought, I assume that all three schools will help me explain 
the degree of breakthrough for the developing countries. 
  These perspectives may illuminate different aspects of international relations. 
Furthermore, they may be “activated” at different phases of the processes of regime formation 
(Rosendal 1999:50). For example, Young’s (1998) assumption, modified by Andresen and 
Agrawala (2002), can be summarised as follows: ideas and intellectual leadership are 
particularly prominent during agenda formation; institutional factors and entrepreneurial 
leadership loom large during the stage of negotiation, material conditions become 
increasingly significant in the transition between negotiation and operationalisation. 
Despite the assumed complementarity of these perspectives, I do not consider them to 
have equal explanatory power. After all, the interest-based perspective makes up the main 
approach among theories of regimes, largely because such a viewpoint has proven fruitful 
when analysing the phenomenon of regimes. Some scholars within this tradition (e.g. 
Keohane) even started out by showing the infirmity of the power-based perspective. In 
addition, other scholars (e.g. Young) pay great attention to the very bargaining process. Since 
I have an explicit focus on regime formation and particularly the negotiation stage, I assume 
that the interest-based perspective will have highest explanatory power. Inasmuch as the 
perspectives are complementary, I also include the power-and knowledge perspectives. 
Although they may have less explanatory power, I assume that they shed light on aspects of 
the negotiation process that are important for understanding the specific breakthrough for the 
developing countries and which are ignored or insufficiently captured by the interest-based 
perspective. 
In a multivariate analysis, Young and Osherenko add context to the power, interests 
and knowledge factors (Young and Osherenko 1993:239). They claim that the most 
illuminating insights into the process of regime formation are revealed when studying the 
interactions of all these factors at the same time. Even so, I will study the explanatory 
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perspectives one at the time. According to Rosendal one obvious rationale for drawing such 
an analytical distinction between the three perspectives rather that lumping all explanatory 
factors together in one mega-model, is to gain greater clarity in the analysis and presentation 
of the case (Rosendal 1999:50). I will follow the advice provided by Rosendal. However, I 
have to be aware of the limitations of this model. 
 
Table 2.3: Analytical Model  
 
Explanatory Perspectives 
 
Causal Mechanisms 
 
Effect on Negotiation 
Outcome 
Power-based • Coercion and positive 
incentives 
• Weak breakthrough for 
developing countries 
likely 
Interest-based • Entrepreneurial 
leadership 
• Strategic modification 
of cost/benefit calculus  
• Strong breakthrough 
for developing 
countries possible 
Knowledge-based • Intellectual leadership  
• Learning and norm 
diffusion  
• Strong breakthrough 
for developing 
countries possible 
 
It is not hard to think of other variables not covered by the three explanatory perspectives that 
may have influenced the formation of the International Treaty. Economic and technological 
development and external shocks are sometimes pointed out as explanatory variables not 
covered by the three schools of thought.36 Nor does the model deal with the role of other 
international agreements. As elaborated on in Chapter 1, these variables are not included in 
this analysis in order to reduce the complexity.  
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3: Methodology 
The aim of a research design is to link the data to be collected to the initial questions of a 
study. Interesting research questions have little value alone, if the search for answers is not 
well guided. Two issues will be discussed in this chapter: the case-study approach and the 
choice and use of sources. 
3.1 Case-study Approach 
3.1.1 Designing a Case-study 
The general purpose of case studies is to analyse few subject matters in order to study the 
material in-depth (Andersen 1997:121). Yin (1994: 13) defines the use of a case study 
approach as appropriate for the study of “[…] a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”. The research questions I have proposed demand an intensive research design in 
order to be answered, making the case-study approach appropriate. Furthermore, this is an 
interpretative case study as it is chosen due to an interest in the case per se, rather than for the 
purpose of theory building (Lijphart in Andersen 1997). I use theory to organise and 
understand a complex real world situation with many data available. Theory should not be too 
general as the link between theory and data will be unclear (Andersen 1997:70). The 
theoretical perspectives have helped me to systematise these data.  
I have used contributions from a general theoretical tradition within international 
relations: regime theory. However, instead of giving an outline of all aspects of this grand 
theory, I have focused on elements that I believe shed light on what has been important during 
the negotiations for the International Treaty. I have strived to produce propositions that are as 
precise as possible in order to approach the ideal of designing falsifiable hypotheses. For 
example, if the US intensely resists the developing countries’ proposals for Farmers’ Rights, 
and the concept nevertheless is strongly recognised in the treaty, the explanatory power of the 
power-based perspective is weakened. Similarly, I have investigated the assumptions derived 
from the other perspectives.  
My use of three explanatory perspectives is an example of theoretical triangulation. 
Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods to gather in-depth knowledge of different 
dimensions of a research question. As Sauvè and Watts (2003:312) put it: “What is not seen 
using one method, can be revealed by using one or more other methods to examine the same 
issue.” Triangulation by methodology when studying international negotiations can involve 
process tracing and counterfactual analysis (Betsill and Corell 2001). Process tracing (or 
“detailed case-study”) is an approach in which the researcher looks at the decision process by 
which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994:226). Instead of treating the ultimate result (i.e. the final text of the ITPGRFA) as the 
dependent variable, new dependent variables are constructed, for example each decision in a 
sequence, or each set of measurable perceptions by decision-makers of the actions and 
intentions of others, becomes a new variable. What was for example Ethiopia’s perception –a 
%&$
  
*
developing country actively promoting Farmers’ Rights– of the intentions of the powerful 
states? Did NGOs support the developing countries’ proposal for Farmers’ Rights? By tracing 
what happened during the negotiation process, starting at the “end” with the negotiation 
outcome, and moving back in time to the start of the negotiations, I have tried to identify the 
causal relationship of my variables. 
The internal validity37 is also strengthened counterfactually when I study the 
difference between the real negotiation outcome given the actual value of the independent 
variables and an expected negotiation outcome when one examined independent variable was 
removed from the chain of events (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:81). Is it possible to 
imagine that the Farmers’ Rights Article would have been different had I not studied the 
organisation of the negotiations (‘institution-as-arena’)? Thus, a counterfactual analysis is a 
useful way of ruling out alternative explanations.  
 
A Remark on my Dependent Variable 
As the operationalisation of my dependent variable is not obvious, I will now give a thorough 
explanation of it. Initially, I was interested in studying the degree of recognition of Farmers’ 
Rights, but was soon faced with the problem of operationalisation. How can one determine 
the extent to which these rights actually were recognised? The lack of a clear-cut universally 
accepted definition of Farmers’ Rights before the negotiations started made this a difficult 
task. One option was to use the proposal of developing countries as comparison, i.e. the 
theoretical dependent variable (recognition of Farmers’ Rights) is made measurable by using 
the developing countries’ proposal on Farmers’ Rights as an empirical dependent variable. 
This could be justified by the fact that Farmers’ Rights have always been associated with the 
interests of the South in the FAO discussions. Thus, I would have assumed that the Farmers’ 
Rights proposal from the developing countries and an a priori meaning of Farmers’ Rights 
were synonymous. However, during the negotiation of the International Treaty, several of the 
elements of Farmers’ Rights suggested by developing countries were perceived to represent a 
too comprehensive understanding of these rights (Crucible II Group 2000). Hence, this 
operationalisation would imply severe validity problems because measuring the degree of 
breakthrough of the developing countries’ proposal does not necessarily mean measuring the 
degree of recognition of Farmers’ Rights. In an attempt to circumvent this operationalisation 
problem, I have therefore specified my dependent variable to be the breakthrough of the 
developing countries’ request for Farmers’ Rights. 
Solving one problem, creates another, however: how is it possible to look upon 
developing countries as one group? Among the former colonies of the Western powers there 
is a great diversity regarding size, political systems, economic structure and culture. Despite 
this diversity, the developing countries have since their independence mainly collaborated in 
the United Nations under the umbrella of Group of 77 Developing Countries (G-77). This 
group is still frequently referred to as G-77 even after the number of developing countries 
joining the group has increased. Furthermore, the seeds issue has a historical background as a 
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North-South conflict area (see for example Fowler 1993). Thus, the inclusive term, 
“developing countries”, seems the most simple, broadly used, and intuitive suitable term 
available (Rosendal 1999:5).38 Finally, the developing countries presented a common 
proposal on Farmers’ Rights in 1996. This fact has been crucial when I decided to apply the 
breakthrough for the developing countries as my dependent variable. 
When defining the value of the dependent variable, I compare the negotiation outcome 
with the proposal on Farmers’ Rights presented by the developing countries in 1996. The 
rationale behind this choice is first, to create a clear basis for comparison and second, to avoid 
the enormous task of categorising every single intervention by the developing countries 
during the discussions on Farmers’ Rights. Besides, before 1996 the positions of the different 
countries were generally not well worked out, and therefore not accurately reported in FAO 
documents. One apparent weakness of this operationalisation, however, is the fact that various 
countries’ positions on an issue may change, especially during such a long negotiation 
process, as was the case for the ITPGRFA. Nevertheless, the three proposals on Farmers’ 
Rights from 1996 (from the developing countries, the EC and the US) constituted the 
negotiation text for the next years to come, until 1999 – the year when the Farmers’ Rights 
Article was agreed on. By adding Biermann’s method for assessing the influence of the South, 
I hope to balance for this weakness of my approach. In summary, I will argue that my 
operationalisation and measurement of the dependent variable are pragmatic and workable 
rather than perfect. 
3.1.2 A Case of “Southern Power”? 
The objective of selecting a case-study approach is to gain more insight into the formation of 
the ITPGRFA. However, political science is a nomotetic discipline with the ambition to make 
generalisations. Hence, a typical criticism of case studies is the lacking potential to draw 
conclusions from one case to a universe of cases. Obviously, case-studies are not appropriate 
for such statistical generalisation, no matter whether it is a single case-study or a multi-case 
study. Rather, the use of theory to facilitate the data collection phase opens a possibility for 
analytical generalisation (Yin 1994:30). In an analytical generalisation, a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study. Regime theory is my point of departure, but what is my study a case of more precisely? 
I will base my answer on Frank Biermann (2002). 
When studying the role of developing countries in international environmental 
negotiations, he claims that the South has gained a new form of power vis-à-vis the North 
which he terms “Southern eco-power” (Biermann 2002). Biermann finds evidence for such 
power when studying the negotiation outcome of the ozone regime (ibid.). The issue of agro-
biodiversity is closely related to environmental questions as it concerns loss of biodiversity 
(genetic erosion). Besides, the aim of renegotiating the International Undertaking was to bring 
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it into harmony with the CBD, which arguably is an international environmental agreement.39 
However, the issue of agro-biodiversity far exceeds the scope of being merely of 
environmental concern. Management of PGRFA includes topics like ownership of genetic 
resources, food security, trade in agriculture goods, access to traditional and enhanced 
PGRFA and benefit sharing (see next chapter). Thus, to talk about potential eco-power in this 
case is deceptive. Instead, I will skip the “eco” prefix, and talk about “Southern power”. 
Developing countries presented Farmers’ Rights as a symbolic “South-issue” during the 
negotiations. Thus, the extent to which the concept is recognised in the International Treaty 
could therefore be regarded as evidence of Southern power.  
The forum where state actors meet and negotiate is not irrelevant for the power 
relation between them. Regarding the issue of genetic resources, Fowler (1994:206) writes:  
Different arenas can facilitate the framing and linkage of issues. The United States 
could not easily link intellectual property rights issues with trade sanctions at FAO. It 
could and does at GATT. Thus, the choice of arenas (…) can virtually determine who 
will be able to frame or define the issue and how – a very useful position for an actor. 
FAO is hence a relatively favourable arena for the developing countries. The study of their 
breakthrough in this UN forum is therefore a most likely case, with high probability of finding 
evidence of Southern power. If it does not happen here, it is also less likely to occur in other 
situations. The breakthrough for developing countries in the ITPGRFA negotiations could in 
this sense be used to confirm, challenge or extend theories of regime formation with regard to 
the role of developing countries. 
3.2 Sources of Information 
I have gathered data from a variety of sources which can be categorised in primary and 
secondary textual documents and interviews. The aim has been to pick sources that have 
different biases, and strengths, so that they can complement each other. Primary documents 
include the final text of the ITPGRFA, drafts negotiated along the way toward the final 
version, the official FAO reports of each negotiation session, country statements and NGO 
lobbying materials. I have accessed a main group of primary sources from the archival records 
of the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture. These documents are mainly internal reports of the 
negotiation sessions, and were classified as confidential. I consider these documents to be 
very reliable in the sense that they were written just after the sessions with a fresh recollection 
of what had happened and because they were written off the record without being limited by 
diplomatic concerns. The fact that the documents are written by highly involved actors in the 
process and represent the opinions of Norway, reduce their reliability. However, given that 
Norway was widely perceived as a trustworthy “bridge builder” (Stannard 2003 [interview]), 
justifies my use of these sources.  
Secondary documents have also been useful, such as the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
which contains detailed daily and summary reports from several of the negotiation sessions, 
as well as media reports and press releases. The media coverage of the negotiation process 
was scarce and I have press releases mainly from NGOs. The NGOs involved in the 
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negotiation process have an outspoken agenda. I must therefore be aware of potential biases in 
these press releases. Other literature has also been helpful, for example Swaminathan (1996), 
Girsberger (1999) and Crucible II Group (2000) .  
In addition, I have conducted several interviews. The interviews produced specific 
data on the perceived importance of different factors for the recognition of Farmers’ Rights 
and the perceived recognition of such rights. The selection of respondents should ideally be 
based on two main criteria: (1) involvement in the entire decision-making process, and (2) 
position as a decision-maker or as a stakeholder (Arts and Verschuren 1999). However, due to 
practical reasons, availability for interviews had to be my most important criterion. I have 
interviewed people in Oslo, Trondheim40, Tromsø41 and Rome42. Some were followed up by 
subsequent e-mail correspondence. 
The high rate of “negotiator turnover” makes it difficult to find negotiators who have 
participated in the entire process of revising the IUPGR (Sauvè and Watts 2003:313). Despite 
this fact, several of my informants, like Jan Borring, Cary Fowler and Brad Fraleigh, score 
highest on longevity throughout the entire negotiation process. Besides, my interviewees 
cover national delegates from the main regions (Latin America, North America, Africa, 
Europe and Asia). Additionally, I have interviewed observers of the negotiations, like the staff 
at the secretariat of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.43 Thus, 
considering my interviewees in retrospect, they were among the most central actors during the 
negotiations. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to interview any NGO 
representatives. It is possible that this could have made up for a potential bias, since 
“delegates can be expected to understate NGO influence” (Betsill and Corell 2001:81). I 
expect on that the written comments by NGOs can compensate for this shortcoming. 
Qualitative interviews permits the interviewer to ask specific questions that could be 
difficult to answer through written documentation alone. Thus, they complement the other 
sources. On the other hand, using interviews as a source of information raises methodological 
questions regarding validity and reliability. The information is likely to be biased, particularly 
when dealing with such politicised topics as agro-biodiversity and Farmers’ Rights. Arguably, 
“[t]he politicization of the genetic resources issue has mainly become apparent in the 
discussions on Farmers’ Rights and Plant Breeders’ Rights” (Pistorius 1997:93). This is partly 
balanced when I interviewed persons from different positions, though - according to one of 
my informants – I had to keep in mind that everybody I talked to could have strong opinions.  
I conducted the interviews with an open interview guide in order to have the necessary 
flexibility when talking to different persons. I used notes to record the information. Several of 
the interviewees have read the parts of this thesis where they are quoted, and have corrected 
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misinterpretations and misunderstandings. I use names when referring to the interviews, apart 
from a few exceptions when the interviewees specifically asked for confidentiality.  
3.3 Summing Up 
This thesis is a detailed study of the breakthrough for the developing countries’ request for 
Farmers’ Rights in the ITPGRFA. In a broader sense, it is a case of Southern power and could 
add to our general understanding of regime formation. Among the main challenges has been 
to judge the reliability of my sources due to the highly politicised character of the topic. I 
have attempted to make regular references to the sources to make the thesis transparent and 
possible for the readers to judge the reliability for themselves. I have summarised my 
methodological framework in the table below. The strength and weakness of each method and 
source is in this way sought to balance each other.  
 
Table 3.1: Methodological Framework: Triangulation by Methodology, Data Source and 
Theory in order to gather Evidence on Breakthrough for the Developing Countries 
Methodology Process Tracing  
What are the causal mechanisms 
linking the independent variables 
to the recognition of Farmers’ 
Rights? 
Counterfactual Analysis 
What would have happened if  
I had excluded one of the 
independent variables? 
 
Data Source Primary text  
(e.g. country position 
statements, the final 
agreement, NGO 
lobbing material, 
archive records) 
Secondary text  
(e.g. Earth 
Negotiations 
Bulletin, media 
reports, press 
releases) 
Interviews 
(government 
delegates and 
observers) 
Theory Power-based  
Impact of powerful 
states 
Interest-based  
Impact of 
institutional factors 
Knowledge-based  
Impact of ideas and 
norms 
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4: Farmers’ Rights and the Issue Area of PGRFA 
What is the relationship between the concept of Farmers’ Rights and the issue area of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture? PGRFA are defined in the International Treaty 
(Article 2) as “any genetic material of plant origin of actual and potential value for food and 
agriculture”. In this chapter, I will relate the concept to the issue area in three steps: first, I 
will elaborate on farmers and their acquisition of PGRFA; second, I will specify different 
ownership of PGRFA; and third, I will connect Farmers’ Rights to acquisition of and rights to 
PGRFA. The last part will briefly outline the background for the renegotiations of Farmers’ 
Rights that started in 1994. 
4.1 Farmers and Seed Acquisition 
The crucial role of PGRFA in plant breeding makes these resources an essential prerequisite 
for food security.44 For the farmer, PGRFA are materialised as seeds and other forms of 
propagating material. A farmer is a person cultivating the land, but how this is done, however, 
differs largely –from the highly industrialised large-scale farms in the North to small-scale 
traditional farming in the South. While the former mainly get propagating material from the 
formal breeding sector, the latter usually get seeds from own holding or neighbouring farmers. 
De Boef, Berg and Haverkort (1996) describe two independent yet complementary systems of 
crop development as follows: 
The formal system consists of private and public sectors. The profit-oriented private 
sector concentrates on yield-increasing technology, often coupled with the use of agro-
chemicals. It caters mainly to the needs of larger farmers living in higher-potential (usually 
irrigated) areas, who can afford such inputs. The public sector also produces crop varieties for 
use in high-potential areas, but also caters to the needs of resource-poor farmers living in 
more marginal rain fed areas, where the conditions for production are less predictable. In both 
sectors, seeds are multiplied by the seed industry. The private sector now predominates in the 
industrial countries of the North, after political decisions made by governments in the 1970s 
to reduce public spending on agricultural research.45 In the South, governmental institutions 
and the international centres of the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research 
(CGIAR) are the main actors. The CGIAR-system consists of 16 International Agricultural 
Research Centres (IARCs) and has contributed significantly to strengthening agricultural 
research in developing countries. The IARCs were the driving force behind the green 
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revolution in the 1960s and 1970s and are still important actors in agricultural research that 
aims at contributing to food production in developing countries.  
In the informal (local) system farmers acquire seeds by saving them on his or her own 
farm or from other farmers who have done so. The system relies on the skills of farmers in 
maintaining, enriching and utilising crop diversity. The main selection criteria used are yield 
and yield stability, risk avoidance, low dependence on external inputs, and a range of quality 
factors associated with storage, cooking characteristics and taste. Albeit the former system 
dominates in the North and the latter in the South, the distinction is not so clear in the real 
world. In Norway, for example, approximately 25% of yearly produced seeds are grown from 
farm-saved seeds (Norwegian Agricultural Inspection Service 2003).46 One general 
distinction between seed saving practices, is that in the North farmers usually only use farm-
saved seeds from own holdings, while seed saving in the South is part of an informal seed 
distribution system. Nevertheless, the trend is a shift from seed saving to seed buying together 
with the rise of commercial agriculture and scientific plant breeding.47 
The breeding strategies in the two systems differ. In farms the strategy is normally to 
meet the immediate demands related to cultivation, storage, processing and consumption 
(Berg et al. 1991:16). Being able to maintain several varieties, the farmers sometimes select 
different varieties for different fields or for different uses. This results in specific adaptation to 
micro-level agro ecological niches and to cultural, economic and social needs (ibid.). In 
formal plant breeding, the strategy is the opposite. The breeding- and seed industry cannot 
economically handle a great number of varieties. The breeders therefore have to opt for 
stability in order to produce varieties which can be used by as many farmers as possible. The 
strive for stability is also based on the desire for plant variety protection, which requires 
stability as one of the conditions for receiving such protection. Thus, the informal system of 
crop development produces genetically diverse farmers’ varieties (traditional varieties), while 
the formal system contributes genetically homogeneous cultivars (high-yielding varieties). 
Genetic erosion - the process of the rapid loss of genetic diversity – is reported to be a 
serious problem in most countries (FAO 1998b). The single most important reason for the 
loss of PGRFA is the introduction of high-yielding varieties that replace traditional varieties 
(FAO 1998b: 33). While the green revolution in the 1960s drastically increased production in 
areas suited for irrigation, it also contributed to the massive loss of traditional varieties (Berg 
et al 1991:56). Fowler (1994:242) describes the process as follows:   
The genetic erosion caused by the green revolution was impossible to ignore. Over 
100 million acres of new, uniform rices and wheats were soon being grown where tens 
of thousands of farmer varieties had once been found. The modern varieties were 
replacing the resources upon which they were based and upon which their continued 
existence depended. 
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Thus, the problem of genetic erosion highlights the difficulty of balancing the need for yield 
augmentation and long term food security. When farmers shift from seed saving of farmers’ 
varieties to seed buying of cultivars, the speed of genetic erosion escalates. 
4.2 Ownership to PGRFA 
The importance of PGRFA for plant breeding makes access to these resources highly 
desirable. Various types of ownership to PGRFA affect access differently. In the following 
section, three broad categories of ownership will be briefly presented and discussed 
concerning their impact on access. 
4.2.1 Common Heritage of Mankind 
Extensive exchange of PGRFA has taken place throughout history. As a consequence, it is 
today difficult to decide where agricultural plants originated.48 Furthermore, an estimated two 
thirds of all PGRFA held in gene banks do not originate from the same country where the 
gene banks are located (Crucible Group 1994: xvii). For example, about seventy percent of 
the PGRFA collected in developing countries are stored in gene banks of developed countries 
or of the International Agricultural Research Centres (Girsberger 1999:71).  
National and international gene banks were set up after World War II after calls from 
FAO and European and US breeders’ organisations (Pistorius 1997:18). The emphasis in 
1950s and 1960s was on developing germplasm collections for availability to those who could 
use them. Conservation became a major aspect only from the late 1960s onwards. When the 
risks of crop uniformity were felt in the early 1970s “collecting missions were organised and 
gene banks established in an atmosphere of crisis with little contemporaneous thought to legal 
issues of ownership and control” (Bragdon 2003:20). The uncompensated appropriation of 
PGRFA was justified by regarding germplasm as the common heritage of mankind; “a public 
good for which no payment is necessary or appropriate” (de Sande, Ruivenberg and Malo 
1996:190). Nevertheless, farmers in developing countries generally did not have any sense of 
ownership for the genes in their plants and gave samples of their seeds freely away to 
collection missions.49 This is how a gradual transfer of the genetic resource base has taken 
place from the farm sector in the South to the formal breeding sector in the North (Berg et al 
1991:18). 
The International Undertaking from 1983 was “based on the universally accepted 
principle that plant genetic resources are heritage of mankind and consequently should be 
available without restriction” (Article 1). This category of ownership ensures open access to 
PGRFA. 
4.2.2 Private Property 
Private property is the situation when an individual or corporation has the right to exclude 
others from using the resources. In the realm of plant genetic resources, intellectual property 
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rights (IPR) such as plant variety protection and patents are relevant examples. Systems of 
IPRs are adopted in order to give incentives for breeding and research. 
Plant Breeders’ Rights provide intellectual protection of distinct, uniform and stable 
plant varieties (the so-called DUS-criteria). For this purpose, a certificate is issued describing 
the new characteristics of the new variety. The certificate acknowledges the work of the 
breeder and states the name of the new variety. Anyone who wants to multiply the variety 
specified in the certificate has to be licensed by the holder of the certificate and has to pay a 
fee. Farmers’ varieties do not fulfil the DUS-criteria. There are usually two important 
modifications of the breeders’ rights (de Sande, Ruivenberg and Malo 1996:193): To 
encourage further breeding, other breeders are allowed to use the protected material of their 
competitors free-of-charge as starting material for their own improved varieties. This 
constitutes what is known as the breeders’ exemption. Similarly, farmers are allowed to 
withhold part of their crop of a protected variety as seed material for the next crop without 
having to pay additional fees to the breeder. This is known as the farmers’ privilege. 
Most national systems of plant breeders’ rights comply with the provisions of the 
Convention of the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). The UPOV 
Convention was adopted in 1961 to provide standardised principles for the protection of plant 
breeders’ rights. It was later revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991. The main difference between the 
latest and earlier versions is that UPOV 1991 restrict the usual modifications of the breeders’ 
right (Crucible II Group 2000:119). The provision for breeders’ exemption is restricted 
because the holder of rights in a variety is granted control over the marketing not only of that 
variety but also of essentially derived varieties. The most important consequence of this 
amendment is that an UPOV-protected variety, into which for example another breeder has 
inserted a frost resistant gene, can no longer be marketed without the permission of the 
original certificate holder. Furthermore, Member States of UPOV wishing to do so may now 
restrict the “farmers’ privilege” by forbidding the sales of the seed saved on-farm. Hence, 
UPOV 1991 provides a model for legislation that is less flexible and adaptable to the needs of 
developing countries, where the majority of the farmers rely on local seed supply systems 
than UPOV 1978 (Correa 2000:32).  
Patents protect new inventions. With the breakthrough of modern biotechnology, 
living materials such as plants and plant material such as genes have also become subject 
matter of patents. Patents limit the rights of farmers to sell or reuse seed they have grown and 
the rights of breeders to use that seed for further research and breeding purpose (Bragdon 
2003:22; Correa 2000:38). For smallholder farmers it is important to note that if a plant 
protected by plant breeders’ right is mixed with a farmers’ variety, the result is not covered by 
the intellectual protection. However, if a plant with genes that are patented is mixed with a 
farmers’ variety, the patent may cover the result if the patented genes are in the new 
seedling.50 Thus, patents restrict access even more than plant breeders’ rights (Andersen 2003; 
Bragdon 2003; Correa 2000; Falcon and Fowler 2002).  
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Both patents and plant breeders’ rights are territorial rights, in the sense that they are 
only valid in those countries where registration has been obtained (Correa 2000:30). This may 
change if a present negotiation round in the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents in the 
UN World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) opens for “world patents”, making it 
sufficient to apply for a patent once and get coverage in all WIPO member countries. Member 
States of the WTO have to comply with the minimum standards of IPR as specified in the 
Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). The states must either grant 
patents on plants or provide for an effective sui generis system51 for the protection of plant 
varieties, or a combination of the two (Article 27.3 b). While mostly developed countries have 
had IPR legislation, an increasing number of developing countries are adopting such 
legislation, partly due to their TRIPs’ obligations.52 This trend is amplified by the growing 
numbers of bilateral “TRIPS plus” agreements that go beyond TRIPs between the US, the EU 
or the EFTA and a developing country (Bjørnstad 2003; Wolff 2004:32). The former demand 
of the latter to implement the highest international standards in intellectual property, including 
patent protection of plant and animal varieties. At the same time, the development of the 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation is being pushed. The draft treaty not only strives for minimum standards (like 
TRIPs) but it defines both the top and the bottom line of IPR standards (ibid.). 
4.2.3 State Sovereignty and Domestic Regulations 
Due to their obligations to UPOV, a handful of developed countries were reluctant to include 
their modern varieties as common heritage in the 1980s (FAO 1998b: 271). Therefore, they 
adhered to the International Undertaking only with modifications.53 Thus, while farmers’ 
varieties were regarded as common heritage, modern varieties become private property 
through intellectual property rights. This asymmetry between improved germplasm and 
traditional germplasm led to a sense of unfairness and feeling of exploitation among 
developing countries (Swanson, 1997:102). Rosendal (1999:99) sums up the central conflict 
line in the biodiversity issue-area as: 
• Intellectual property rights negate the principle of free exchange of breeding 
material, and their utility is limited to countries of some economic and 
technological strength.  
• There was a growing tension in the South about their genetic material being 
acquired as a common heritage of mankind (meaning open access – free of 
charge), at the same time as the North could impose exclusive property rights to 
the varieties developed from the same genetic material. 
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In response to Northern IPR regimes, Southern states started to claim national sovereignty 
over the genetic resources in their territories. State sovereignty gives the authorities the 
mandate to define specific rights to PGRFA or to prevent that such rights are granted. This 
principle was emphasised by the twenty-sixth Session of the FAO Conference in 1991 
through the Resolution 3/91. The resolution reads that “the concept of mankind’s heritage, as 
applied in the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, is subject to the 
sovereignty of the states over their plant genetic resources”.54 
The principle of sovereignty is also asserted in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD). The CBD establishes international rules on access to all kinds of biological diversity, 
which is made subject to the principles of prior informed consent and the sharing of benefits 
(articles 3 and 15). This means that the recipient of biological resources needs to obtain 
consent by the source country of the resources before permission for access is granted. Such 
permission is dependent on promises that the benefits arising from the use of the resources 
will be shared with the source country. When implementing the CBD, several developing 
countries have developed legislation regulating access to plant genetic resources. With an 
emphasis on conditions enabling benefit sharing, these provisions proved in many cases to be 
bureaucratic, overly restrictive, and time-consuming (ten Kate and Laird 1999:17-33, 293-
312). So far, these regulations have restricted access to plant genetic resources without 
providing much in monetary benefits for developing countries (FAO 1998b:290). 
In sum, the commercial breeding sector in developed countries desires intellectual 
property protection of their varieties, mainly systems of plant breeders’ rights. As a response 
to the development of intellectual property regimes of the North, the South claims benefit 
sharing in return. Both the access legislation following from the implementation of the CBD 
and the legislation on intellectual property rights following from the implementation of the 
TRIPs create legal restrictions on access to PGRFA for both modern and traditional breeding. 
4.3 Farmers’ Rights 
There is no consensus among the Member States of FAO on what kind of property rights, if 
any, Farmers’ Rights represent concerning PGRFA. As a political idea, Farmers’ Rights dates 
back to the political work by NGO-activists Pat Mooney and Cary Fowler in the early and 
mid-1980s (Fowler 1994:192).55 During the FAO debates in the 1980s, Third World delegates 
argued that if industrialised countries demanded recognition of plant breeders’ rights; they 
should be prepared to recognise farmers’ rights as well.56 In a compromise, plant breeders’ 
rights and Farmers’ Rights were simultaneously recognised by the FAO Resolution 4/89. 
Plant breeders’ rights, as provided for under UPOV57, were accepted as compatible with the 
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International Undertaking. Farmers’ Rights were further defined by the FAO Resolution 5/89 
as: 
“[R]ights arising from the past, present and future contribution of farmers in 
conserving, improving and making Plant Genetic Resources, particularly those in the 
centres of origin/diversity. These rights are vested in the International Community, as 
trustees for present and future generations of farmers, for the  
purpose of ensuring full benefits of farmers and supporting the continuation of their 
contributions…”. 
This was the first international definition of Farmers’ Rights. The concept was adopted with a 
view to realising the objective of balancing the rights of traditional breeders and those of plant 
breeders, while allowing the farmers to benefit, in some way, from the value that they have 
contributed (Correa 2000:4). While plant breeders’ rights are legal rights, Farmers’ Rights 
were introduced as political and moral rights. However, the concept was only defined in a 
broad, imprecise manner, and its adoption fostered an intense debate on the ways to recognise 
and reward traditional farmers. FAO had established an international fund for PGR in the 
1980s and Resolution 3/91 decided that Farmers’ Rights should be realised through this fund.  
Due to the complexity and controversy of the concept, the International Undertaking 
did not manage to give Farmers’ Rights a proper definition (Girsberger 1999:289)58. 
Nevertheless, Correa has identified the rationale of Farmers’ Rights to be based on three sets 
of considerations: the need to ensure conservation of PGRFA; the establishment of barriers to 
IPR that may restrict farmers’ practices with respect to saving, selling and exchanging seeds; 
and equity (Correa 2000:9-14).   
There are two main forms of conservation of agricultural varieties: in situ and ex situ 
conservation. In situ conservation here refers to the growing of varieties in farmers’ fields, 
(i.e. on-farm conservation), whereas ex situ conservation pertains to gene banks storage. 
When ex situ conservation strategies were given priority in the 1960s, critics were worried 
that crop development and conservation would become too separated, bearing the risk that 
locally improved crops (farmers’ varieties) would lose their adaptive complexes and therefore 
become more susceptible to pests and pathogens (Bennett in Pistorius 1997:24). As a solution 
to this problem, Altieri and Merrick in 1987 proposed a strategy for in situ conservation 
through conservation of traditional farming systems and a continuation of old farming 
systems in selected gene rich areas by means of subsidies (Berg et.al. 1991:19). 59 Since the 
main reason for genetic erosion is the replacement of farmers’ varieties, the concept of 
Farmers’ Rights could be a useful tool to support conservation activities undertaken by 
traditional farmers. Meanwhile, the rationale for Farmers’ Rights is that “unless a share of 
benefits reach small farmers maintaining landraces, they will have no incentives to continue 
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to maintain them” (Esquinas-Alcázar 1996:3), but how Farmers’ Rights could be such a tool 
for conservation is not described properly.60  
Evidently, the introduction of plant breeders’ rights in a country encourages the sales 
of improved varieties. In Brazil, for example, the multinational company Monsanto increased 
its share of the maize seed market from zero to 60 per cent, following the adoption of plant 
variety protection (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002). This is one of the 
forces that conservation efforts are confronted with. Another element underlying the concept 
of Farmers’ Rights is the need to counterbalance IPR in order to ensure farmers’ use and 
improvement of plant genetic resources. Conservation and continuous development of 
farmers’ varieties is dependent upon the possibility of saving and exchanging seeds, 
particularly within their communities. Thus, Farmers' Rights may be understood as customary 
rights arising from the practice of farmers during the past 10.000 years to reuse and exchange 
seeds from their harvests. 
Equity is the third component for the rationale of Farmers’ Rights. Huge areas of crop 
diversity are located in the South (Berg et al 1991:7) and all the 30 plant species that make up 
95% of human food consumption are originally from developing countries (Kloppenburg 
1988). Under the PGRFA regime of the common heritage of mankind, modern breeders have 
had free access to the food crops cultivated by farmers throughout centuries and millennia. 
They could only add a last little chain in the development of a new variety and claim 
intellectual property rights for it, while the farmers in the South had no rights to their farmers’ 
varieties. This created a perception that a lot of money was generated from the use of PGR 
stemming from the South. Pat Mooney (1997:53-54) claims that “the conclusion is 
inescapable; the North is benefiting handsomely from Southern farmers”. In this context, 
Farmers’ Rights are the result of equity considerations: “there is a moral obligation to ensure 
that traditional farmers receive a fair share of the benefits arising from the use of plant genetic 
resources that they conserve and improve” (Correa 2000:11).  
The rationale behind Farmers’ Rights differs from the logic of plant breeders’ rights. 
First, due to the conditions for protection (i.e. uniformity), PBR only covers plant varieties 
resulting from systematic breeding. Farmers’ Rights on the contrary, explicitly recognise the 
unsystematic breeding work of farmers all around the world, but particularly in the centres of 
origin or diversity.61 Second, while plant breeders’ rights stimulate the spread of high-yielding 
varieties, Farmers’ Rights promote the conservation of farmers’ varieties. Third, plant 
breeders’ rights can restrict the right of farmers to save, use and sell farm-saved seed, while 
Farmers’ Rights endorse the importance of this practice for the maintenance of traditional 
farming communities and sustainable use of PGRFA.  
Despite the apparent conflict between Farmers’ Rights and plant breeders’ rights, 
Esquinas-Alcázar (1996:11) claims that the former should be considered complementary, and 
not opposed to the latter. In a sui generis system, Farmers’ Rights and plant breeders’ rights 
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could for example be combined if the former is granted to those who provides agro-
biodiversity as input and the latter to those who adapt biotechnology as an instrument to 
process that input (Esquinas-Alcàzar 2003 [interview]). Such a sui generis system could 
harmonise the need for genetic homogeneity and uniformity to meet the needs of TRIPs and 
UPOV recognition, with the need to maintain genetic diversity and heterogeneity as stressed 
in the CBD (see for example Swaminathan (ed.) 1996).  
4.4 Background for the Renegotiations of Farmers’ Rights 
In 1991, the IUPGR was amended by the Resolution 3/91, which stated that the best way to 
implement Farmers’ Rights was through an international fund already established by FAO. 
This fund never materialised. Hence, the recognition of Farmers’ Rights in the International 
Undertaking was never implemented. The IUPGR may therefore be summed up as “a moral 
victory for the South, but lacking material implications” (Rosendal 1999:109). The perception 
of a moral victory is enhanced when looking at the international developments on intellectual 
property rights. The UPOV Convention was again revised in 1991, strengthening the rights of 
modern breeders at the expense of other breeders and farmers. In addition, the domestic 
implementation of TRIPs enhances the process of granting patents on PGRFA and plant 
breeders’ rights in developing countries.  
According to Correa (2000) the adoption of the CBD in 1992 supports the 
international recognition of Farmers’ Rights (2000). Although the Convention does not 
explicitly address the issue, he considers it to be a relevant framework for the implementation 
of some components of such rights, like the sharing of benefits and funding (Articles 15.7 and 
20) (Correa, 2000:6). Still, resolution 3 of the Nairobi Conference for the Adoption of the 
Agreed Text of the CBD in May 1992 identified the realisation of Farmers’ Rights as one of 
the “outstanding issues” for further negotiation “within the Global System for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Sustainable 
Agriculture”. This was supported by Chapter 14.60 (a) of the UNCED Agenda 21, adopted 
June 14, 1992. This subparagraph states that the appropriate United Nations agencies and 
regional organisations should "strengthen the Global System on the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of PGRFA by…taking further steps to realise Farmers’ Rights”.  
In following up on these matters, the FAO Conference, at its twenty-seventh session, 
in November 1993, adopted Resolution 7/93, “Revision of the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources”. The resolution requested the Director-General to provide a forum 
for negotiations among governments for: 
• the adoption of the IUPGR in harmony with the CBD; 
• consideration of the issue of access on mutually agreed terms to PGR, including ex situ 
collections not addressed by the CBD; and 
• the issue of realising Farmers’ Rights. 
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This resolution initiated the renegotiations of the International Undertaking. Farmers’ Rights 
were explicitly included in the mandate for these renegotiations that started in 1994.  
 
   1961:   1972:            1978:    1991:        1994: 
   UPOV              UPOV           UPOV              UPOV     TRIPs
  
                                                                                                                                              
 
          1983-1989-1991: 1992:      
       IUPGR   CBD     
Figure 4.2: Relevant Agreements for the ITPGRFA on a Time-scale          
  Source: Andersen (2004) 
 
Picture 4.1: Spanish melon farmer 
 
 
the seeds, and it turned out that they were resistant to a particular type of fungus. These seeds 
became the basis for creating resistance to that specific type of fungal disease for many melon 
producers around the world. 
Source: Esqunias-Alcàzar 2003 [interview] 
 
 
 
 
 
This Spanish melon farmer is one of the 
numerous farmers who have conserved and 
enhanced plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture throughout the history of 
agriculture. Secretary of the Commission for 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
José Esqunias-Alcàzar, met him in 1970. At the 
time, Esqunias-Alcàzar was active in a field 
research project involving collecting all the 
varieties of melons present in Spain. The 
farmer appeared in front of him on his donkey 
during one of the young student’s seed 
collecting trips. The farmer asked him what he 
was doing. Esqunias-Alcàzar told him, and the 
farmer said: “Even if a disease comes along 
that kills all the melons, mine will still be 
here”. Esqunias-Alcàzar asked him if he could 
have some seeds and the farmer said, “Sure, 
it’s near here”. ‘Near here’ meant a three and 
a half-hour ride with him on his donkey, but in 
the end, Esqunias-Alcàzar got the seeds. Back 
in his laboratory, Esqunias-Alcàzar analysed    
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5: Breakthrough for the South? 
The aim of this chapter is to define the value of my dependent variable. First I will present the 
proposals on Farmers’ Rights. Then the content of the article on Farmers’ Rights in the 
International Treaty will be introduced, before the proposal and the article will be compared 
to evaluate correspondence and divergence. Finally, some tentative assessments on the 
South’s influence on the treaty in general will be made.  
5.1 Proposals for Farmers’ Rights 
Following discussions, the Working Group on Farmers’ Rights at the Third Extraordinary 
Session in December 1996 retained three consolidated proposals, submitted by the United 
States (US), the European Community (EC) (and amended by China, Japan and Australia), 
and the developing countries (DCs) respectively (FAO 1996b). 
The US proposal does not mention the term Farmers’ Rights, but affirms that states 
and regional economic integration organisations (REIOs) “shall take measures to promote the 
efforts of their farmers to conserve and use sustainable plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture”. All the mechanisms it suggests for such promotion are related to conservation: 
strengthening national germplasm systems; programs which preserve and improve native 
germplasm; promotion of and research into crops that are not widely used; and activities that 
help to control the erosion of arable land. No references are made to whether conservation by 
farmers has benefited agricultural production. The states and REIOs are responsible for 
realising these mechanisms, which may be financed by “any benefits they [states and REIOs] 
receive from contractual arrangements relating to access” to PGRFA.62 This is the only place 
where benefit is mentioned. Otherwise, the states and REIOs should use national, bilateral and 
multilateral funding sources and involvement of the private sector, including NGOs. 
Moreover, this proposal stresses that the support to farmers’ activities to conserve and use 
sustainable PGRFA should take place “without restricting or disturbing trade”.  
The first paragraphs of the EC and DC texts are almost identical, both recognise the 
enormous contribution made by farmers of all regions of the world, particularly those in the 
centres of origin and crop diversity, for the conservation and development of PGR, which 
constitute the basis for food and agriculture production throughout the world. These texts in 
turn, form the basis for appropriate measures necessary for farmers to continue to conserve, 
manage and improve PGRFA.  
The European proposal suggests that contracting parties, “for the purpose of 
strengthening the role of farmers in conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA and ensuring 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits, shall as far as possible and as appropriate” inter alia 
“subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain the knowledge, innovations 
and practices of farmers relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of [PGRFA]”. 
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Benefits to be shared with the provider of PGRFA are “results of research and development 
and benefits arising from the commercial and other use of genetic resources”. 
The text from the developing countries states that the responsibility for realising 
Farmers’ Rights at the national level rests with both the national governments and the 
international community. 15 legislative measures are suggested. 
 
Box 5.1: Main Ideas of the Developing Countries’ Proposal 
• Protect and promote the collective rights of farmers with respect to their innovations, 
knowledge and cultural diverse systems; 
• Assist farmers in different regions of the world, especially in areas of origin/diversity of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, in the evolution, conservation, 
improvement and sustainable use of PGR; 
• Promote the establishment and advise on the elaboration, in each country, of sui generis 
systems pertaining to the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilisation of plant genetic resources; 
• Promote the establishment and advise on the development of an international sui generis 
system for the recognition, protection and compensation of knowledge, innovations and 
practices of farmers and traditional communities; 
• Recognise and ensure the rights of farmers, in fully sharing the benefits arising from the 
use of plant genetic resources on a fair and equitable basis, and as mutually agreed, 
including through transfer of technology, participation in research, and access to its 
results, derived at present, and in future, form the improved use of plant genetic resources 
through plant breeding and other modern scientific methods, as well as from their 
commercial use; 
• Establish and implement an international fund; 
• Ensure that the prior informed consent of the concerned farmers and local communities is 
obtained before the collection of plant resources is undertaken; 
• Recognise and protect traditional rights of farmers and their communities to keep, use, 
exchange, share and market their seeds and any other plant reproductive material, 
including the right to re-use farm-saved seed; 
• Take the necessary measures to ensure that farmers and local communities fully 
participate in the definition and implementation of the measures and legislation on 
Farmers’ Rights at national and international levels; 
• Review, assess and, if appropriate, modify intellectual property rights systems, land 
tenure, and seed laws in order to ensure their harmony with the provisions of this Article. 
 
Several of these measures have clear links to other agreements. The term “prior informed 
consent” is a concept from the CBD’s provisions on access to genetic material. “Sui generis” 
refers to the sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties all WTO Member States 
have to establish, if they do not accept patents for plants and animals (TRIPs Article 27.3b). 
The rights of farmers to keep, use, share and market their seeds, including re-use of farm-
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saved seed, are challenged in several countries by seed and IPR legislation, for example in 
those countries that adhere to UPOV’91. Additionally, the last suggested measure directly 
disputes other arrangements. 
In sum, the three proposals could be spread over a continuum of what Farmers’ Rights 
could entail. The American proposal is close to a kind of “minimum” definition of Farmers’ 
Rights, while the DC text establishes a wide-embracing definition. The EC text is somewhere 
in between these two. 
 
Minimum FR                                                   Maximum FR
  
 
 US     EC     DCs 
Figure 5.1:  The Proposals on Farmers’ Rights (FR) on a Continuum from no Farmers’ 
Rights to a Comprehensive Definition of such Rights. 
 
5.2 Presentation of the Negotiation Outcome 
The International Treaty on PGRFA was adopted at the FAO Conference in November 2001. 
Farmers’ Rights are mentioned in the preamble and constitute Part III, Article 9.  
The preamble affirms “that the past, present and future contributions of farmers in all 
regions of the world, particularly those in centres of origin and diversity, in conserving, 
improving and making available these resources, is the basis of Farmers’ Rights”. 
Furthermore, the preamble affirms the rights recognised in the treaty to save, use, exchange, 
and sell farm-saved seed and other propagating material. To participate in decision-making on 
plant genetic resources and in the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
use of PGR for food and agriculture are considered fundamental for the realisation of 
Farmers’ Rights, and the promotion of Farmers’ Rights at national and international levels. 
In Article 9 (see Annex 1) “[t]he Contracting Parties recognize the enormous 
contribution that the local and indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of the 
world, particularly those in the centres of origin and crop diversity, have made and will 
continue to make for the conservation and development of plant genetic resources which 
constitute the basis for food and agriculture production throughout the world.” The article 
continues by stipulating that responsibility for realising Farmers’ Rights rests with national 
governments, which should adopt, according to their needs and priorities, and subject to 
national laws, measures to protect traditional knowledge, benefit-sharing and to ensure the 
participation of farmers in decisions on PGRFA. The article also says that nothing in the 
article will be interpreted as restricting the rights of the farmers to conserve, use, exchange 
and sell propagating material held on their farms, in accordance with national legislation. The 
question now is whether this recognition of Farmers’ Rights is a breakthrough for the 
developing countries. 
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Box 5.2: A Comparison between Article 9 and the Annexes to the Undertaking Adopted 
through FAO Resolutions 4/89, 5/89 and 3/91  
• The article recognises the “enormous contribution” that has been made for the 
“conservation and development” of PGRFA, thus closely following point 3 of FAO 
Resolution 4/89.  
• While only “farmers” where mentioned in the annexes to the IUPGR, the article alludes to 
“the local and indigenous communities and farmers”, in line with the terminology of the 
CBD.  
• The article states that the responsibility for realising Farmers’ Rights rests with national 
governments. This is a major difference compared with the original FAO text, which had 
emphasised the global nature of farmers’ contributions and the primary role of the 
international community in realising Farmers’ Rights (Correa 2000:26). Resolutions 4/89 
and 3/91 had, in this regard, established that Farmers’ Rights would be implemented 
through an international fund.  
• The right of farmers to use, exchange and sell farm-saved seeds was not explicitly 
mentioned in any of the annexes, but the article does. 
5.3 Analysis of the Negotiation Outcome 
I will conduct this analysis in two steps, by first comparing the developing countries’ proposal 
and the treaty and second, give some tentative answers to the indicators of the South’s 
influence. 
5.3.1 Correspondence or Divergence? 
The first paragraph of Article 9 recognises the “enormous contribution” that farmers of “all 
regions, particularly those in the centres of origin and crop diversity” have made and will 
continue to make for the conservation and development of PGRFA. The DC text does not in 
this connection include local and indigenous communities, but refers to local communities in 
its suggestion for legislative measures. Thus, there is high correlation between the DC text 
and the article on this aspect. It is therefore also high correlation between the EC text and the 
article, since the first paragraph of the European proposal and the DC text were almost 
identical. The US text did not contain this aspect of Farmers’ Rights.  
An international fund was part of the International Undertaking, and a purely national 
implementation of Farmers’ Rights as prescribed in the article is arguably a move away from 
the original idea (Engels 2003 [interview]). Why is this? First, PGRFA do not respect 
boundaries between states. In every country most of the germplasm used in agriculture comes 
from other countries (FAO 1994). Thus, differing national systems of Farmers’ Rights render 
the sharing of benefits and enforcing of such rights among different geographic origins of 
PGRFA difficult or even impossible (Girsberger 1999: 277). Furthermore, plant breeders are 
primarily interested in PGRFA already collected and characterised, that is, PGRFA stored in 
ex situ facilities (ASSINSEL 1996). Consequently, this form of PGRFA is more likely to be 
commercialised in the future than PGRFA from in situ conditions. If Farmers’ Rights are to 
cover PGRFA stored in ex situ collections, it is necessary to realise these rights at the 
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international level. Moreover, in the process of improving modern plant varieties, formal plant 
breeders can use PGRFA from different regions. In these cases, the improved modern plant 
varieties have pedigrees from different geographic areas, but to calculate the share of each 
pedigree used is very difficult. If the sharing of benefits is to be co-ordinated through an 
international fund, such a calculation is not necessary (Girsberger 1999: 277). However, it is 
needed when Farmers’ Rights are realised at the national level. 
The national responsibility entails that the developed countries are not obligated to do 
anything for realising Farmers’ Rights in developing countries. They do not have to 
compensate farmers in the South when receiving materials from the international gene banks, 
nor do they have to receive a prior informed consent before collecting PGRFA in the South, 
or inform about the origin of the material when applying for patents. Consequently, Article 9 
does not prevent corporations of the North from patenting plant material that stems from the 
South without sharing the benefits (Evjen 2002 [interview]). However, the preamble of the 
treaty affirms the promotion of Farmers’ Rights at both the national and international levels, 
hence opening for implications as to who should share the responsibility of realising these 
rights (Esqunias-Alcàzar 2003 [interview]). In sum, the lack of an international dimension is a 
clear divergence from the proposal of the developing countries, but is in accordance with the 
EC and US views. 
Besides the international fund, the developing countries proposed the establishment of 
an international sui generis system, which could design intellectual property rights for 
farmers’ varieties. They also pushed for revision of the existing IPR legislation in agreement 
with the provisions on Farmers’ Rights in the International Treaty. None of these claims are 
reflected in Article 9. Since the TRIPs Agreement regulates geographic indications, patents 
and trade secrets and UPOV Conventions regulates plant breeders’ rights internationally , 
Farmers’ Rights should be regulated at this level as well if they are to be considered to be 
parallel rights of the South against IPR of the North (Girsberger 1999: 279). The Farmers’ 
Rights Article does not modify or complement existing IPR legislation. Clearly, the 
developing countries did not have a breakthrough on these positions either. 
On the other hand, convergence is traced in the measures to protect and promote 
Farmers’ Rights. These included the right to equitable participation in sharing benefits, 
protection of traditional knowledge and the right to participate. Besides, the paragraph 
provides only an illustrative list of the measures that could be adopted. Consequently they do 
not exhaust the list of modalities under which Farmers’ Rights may be realised (Correa 
2000:27). This means that developing countries may include legislative measures not 
mentioned in the article like the establishment of national sui generis systems. “The African 
Model Law: The Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and 
for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources” by Ekpere (2001) provides an example 
of how this can be done. The objective is after all to provide a model for African countries 
when developing national sui generis systems as required by TRIPs. The Model Law for 
instance recommends the intellectual protection of farmers’ varieties. According to Egziabhar, 
who drafted the Model Law, this legal protection of farmers’ varieties is intended to be a 
defensive right to prevent others from patenting the varieties or charging anybody for using 
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them, rather than a new set of exclusive rights (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]). He considers the 
implementation of such rights as compatible with Article 9. Thus, the illustrative list in the 
article enables countries to interpret and implement Farmers’ Rights nationally in an 
extensively way.  
The illustrative list arguably also retains the possibility to nationally grant the right to 
use, sell and exchange farm-saved seeds. However, critical objections are also made 
concerning the formulation of these rights as the article does not give a positive recognition of 
them. It is neutral in that respect, since it cannot constitute a sufficient legal basis for claiming 
rights in relation to saving, using and exchanging seeds. At the same time, the article does not 
restrict the options that may be adopted by national governments in that regard. “Clearly, the 
agreed text does not exclude the possibility that national laws (including PBRs and seed 
legislation) limit farmers’ rights in relation to saving, using and exchanging seeds/propagating 
materials” (Correa 2000:27). Therefore, NGOs warn that the article establishes the primacy of 
national patent laws over Farmers’ Rights (Crucible II Group 2000:59). The concern is that 
the article will allow national governments to use intellectual property laws to prevent farmers 
from saving and exchanging seed. However, the preamble affirms “the right recognized in this 
Treaty to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and other propagating material”. I 
think this strengthens an interpretation of the article towards granting this right. In addition, 
some plant breeders and governments in the Crucible Group63 warn that the article does not 
explicitly exclude plant varieties protected either by patents or by plant breeders’ rights when 
farmers are allowed to use, sell and exchange farm-saved seeds (Crucible II Group 2000:60). 
This also indicates that one possible interpretation of the Farmers’ Rights article is that 
farmers do have the right to continue their traditional uses of seeds also when planting 
protected varieties. 
Why is recognition of the right to use farm-saved seeds important? All Member States 
to WTO have to implement a sui generis system, but what such a system is has never been 
defined, however. The UPOV secretariat and several OECD countries - fronted by the US – 
have suggested it means legislation along the lines of UPOV 1991 (Andersen 2003:44). 
UPOV 1991 restricts farmers from using farm-saved seeds in their traditional way. If the 
ITPGRFA had provided a strong formulation on farmers’ right to reuse seed, it would have 
been easier for developing countries to resist the pressure from the UPOV-friendly countries 
and to implement this right in their development of national sui generis system when 
implementing TRIPs.  
Farmers’ rights to use, sell and exchange seeds were not mentioned in either the 
European or the American proposals on Farmers’ Rights. In summary, this points to a 
breakthrough for developing countries. However, the equivocal manner in which the right is 
formulated earns only the characteristic of medium breakthrough. 
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In addition, the language of Article 9 is important when evaluating the degree of 
breakthrough. In general, the weak formulations establish few, if any, legal obligations on the 
contracting parties. According to the article, Farmers’ Rights are to be established in 
accordance with “the needs and priorities” of each Party “as appropriate, and subject to its 
national legislation”. Governments should, not shall take certain measures. This means that 
the implementation will be largely dependent upon each government’s judgement on what is 
appropriate in the light of its own priorities and consistent with its national law. Given the 
flexibility offered by the agreed text, some countries may even opt not to implement this 
provision (Correa 2000:27). After all, you do not need an international treaty to state that 
countries have the right to prepare their own legislation (Fowler 2002 [interview]). On the 
other hand, it is not possible to say that the article is without obligations, although they are 
watered down (Borring 2002 [interview]).  
5.3.2 Influence of the South? 
The partial correspondence between the developing countries’ proposal and the Farmers’ 
Rights Article indicates a medium breakthrough. I will now give a tentative assessment of the 
South’s influence, viewing the treaty in more general terms. Are there any indications of a 
differentiation of norms between the North and the South, any resource transfers from the 
North to the South, or a variation in the degree of participation of actors in decision-making 
between the North and the South? 
As regards norms, the national responsibility to realise Farmers’ Rights implies that all 
actors have the same duties. Furthermore, the general language throughout the treaty is “each 
Contracting Party shall”, which does not differentiate between the developing countries and 
the developed countries. However, Article 18 on financial resources places more 
responsibility on the North for the implementation of the treaty in the South (Article 18 (b)):  
The extent to which Contracting Parties that are developing countries and 
Contracting Parties with economies in transition will effectively implement their 
commitments under this Treaty will depend on the effective allocation, particularly by 
the developed country Parties. 
In summary, there is not a case of maximum differentiation where the North has undertaken 
all obligations while the South has only rights; nor is it a situation of no differentiation at all. 
As concerns resource transfers, several provisions of the treaty specify the allocation 
of resources. The benefits shared under the Multilateral System “should flow primarily, 
directly and indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing countries, and 
countries with economies in transition” (Article 13.3). Capacity-building should take “into 
account the needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition” 
(Article 13.2 (c)). Also technical assistance to Contracting Parties favours developing 
countries and economies in transition (Article 8). Thus, the resource transfers that the 
negotiated regime intends to facilitate will be mainly allocated to the South (and to economics 
in transition). This makes the distinction between the national and international 
implementation of Farmers’ Rights to some extent superficial (Borring 2002 [interview]). But 
where will the resources come from and how large will they be? 
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The provision of benefit sharing in the Multilateral System will to a large extent 
decide the degree of international resource transfer in the negotiated regime. A general 
Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) will regulate the terms for access to the crops and 
forages covered by the system, and a Panel of Experts is set up to examine the issues involved 
with the MTA. Payments to the international fund, which is established as part of the 
Multilateral System, are compulsory when seeds received from the system are 
commercialised. When the seeds are not commercialised or still freely available, the payments 
are voluntary. What constitutes commercialisation in terms of Article 13.2d (ii) of the Treaty 
is, however, one of the questions for the Panel to answer.64 Most likely, commercialisation 
and degree of availability is connected to intellectual property rights. According to Susan 
Bragdon, “patenting will likely trigger the benefit-sharing mechanism; plant breeders’ rights 
probably will not” (Bragdon 2003:21, see also Falcon and Fowler 2002:211). Since the 
capacity to patent living material is concentrated in the developed countries, the resources in 
the system are likely to come from them.  
No resources have yet been transferred from the North to the South as the Multilateral 
System is still in the pipeline. However, Falcon and Fowler believe that the amount of money 
to flow to the international fund is not going to be considerable (Falcon and Fowler 
2002:211): 
If our interpretation is correct, the multilateral provision is unlikely to generate 
substantial funding. Royalties will be assessed as percentage of profits from seed sales 
of particular new varieties, which is not a particularly large base. Moreover, the two 
countries where such patenting is available and most widely used – the US and Japan 
– are unlikely to ratify the treaty. 
Thus, the prospects for resource transfers from the North to the South are dim. The 
Contracting Parties recognise that facilitated access to PGRFA, which is included in the 
Multilateral System, constitutes a major benefit (Article 13.1). In this sense of benefit, 
developing countries have an advantage since they are net recipients of improved germplasm 
from in particular the international agricultural research centres (Fowler, Smale and Gaiji 
2001). 
By degree of participation, Biermann refers to the difference between the general 
United Nations system with the one country – one vote rule in comparison with economic 
policy institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (Biermann 
2002). In the latter institutions, votes are weighted by contributions, thus guaranteeing the 
decisive influence of Northern governments in these bodies. Therefore, it does not come as a 
surprise that the Governing Body in the ITPGRFA –negotiated under a UN special agency for 
agriculture – is composed of all Contracting Parties and that all decisions shall be taken by 
consensus (Article 19). 
  Taking Biermann’s criteria together, they reflect only modest Southern power 
particularly because the North does not have the responsibility to realise Farmers’ Rights, and 
because the resources to be transferred are likely to be limited. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The viewpoints and satisfaction regarding the recognition of Farmers’ Rights in the ITPGRFA 
vary between different actors. A FAO legal paper argues that the formal endorsement of 
Farmers’ Rights by a legally binding instrument “represents a major step towards wider 
acknowledgement and genuine implementation of the rights conferred to informal innovators 
(“traditional farmers”), on equal footing with the rights already granted to formal breeders 
(“modern breeders”)” (Mekoaur 2002:6). The final article on Farmers’ Rights has found broad 
support among FAO member countries, including developed and developing countries alike 
(Correa 2000:26). Both one of the strongest adherents (Tewolde B. G. Egiziabhar from 
Ethiopia) and one of the strongest opponents (Brad Fraleigh from Canada) of Farmers’ 
Rights, were satisfied with the recognition (Egiziabhar; Fraleigh 2003 [interviews]). However, 
another spokesperson from developing countries that promoted Farmers’ Rights, Rene Salazar 
from the Philippines, considered the recognition a mistake and fought to reverse it (ETC 
group 2001; Fowler 2002 [interview]). Salazar is supported by Jan Borring from Norway, 
who also considers the agreed text to be watered down (Borring 2002 [interview]). Comments 
from NGOs clearly show their discontent with the output. Via Campesina describe the text as 
a step back and a bleak lip service to what these rights should entail, in their opinion (Via 
Campesina 2001).65  
Based on my discussion of the negotiation outcome, I argue that these rights are 
sufficiently included in the International Treaty so that the option of a weak breakthrough is 
ruled out. On the other hand, no international responsibilities for implementation of Farmers’ 
Rights apart from the reference in the preamble are established. Besides, no legal obligations 
are placed on the contracting parties to put into practice the provisions of the article. Thus, the 
International Treaty also does not represent a strong breakthrough for the developing 
countries as regards Farmers’ Rights. Regardless of lacking legal obligation, a normative 
agreement and a process of learning can give greater legitimacy for local and regional claims 
for Farmers’ Rights. The provision of Farmers’ Rights has arguably significant implications 
for the recognition of group rights and represents a precedent in recognising the contributions 
of farmers and indigenous and local communities (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2001:12). In 
addition, several of the positions of the developing countries are included in the article, which 
is far more comprehensive than the modest American proposal from 1996. Moreover, the 
optional list offered by the article makes the national implementation flexible and gives room 
for an extensive interpretation. Besides, the wording of the treaty in general is strong 
compared to the weak formulations of Article 9. Since other parts of the treaty point in the 
same direction as the Farmers’ Rights article, the strongly formulated treaty may be beneficial 
for the realisation of Farmers’ Rights (Borring 2002 [interview]). My conclusion is therefore 
that the negotiation outcome represents a medium breakthrough for the developing countries. 
The tentative assessment of Biermann’s indicators of the South’s influence supports this 
judgement.
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6: The Long Negotiation Process 
This chapter provides a chronological description of the re-negotiation process of the 
International Undertaking. The process started in 1994 and ended with the adoption of the 
International Treaty in 2001. Such an outline is necessary to find explanations for the medium 
breakthrough of the developing countries. 
The Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA) was the 
sole forum for the negotiations. The CGRFA holds regular sessions every two years. At the 
plenary meetings of the Commission, delegates from all the member states sit around the table 
with board cards in front of them, indicating which country they represent. The procedures at 
the plenary sessions follow formal patterns, with first the election of Chair and Vice-Chairs, 
then the adoption of the agenda, before more substantial discussions start. The Chair presides 
over the sessions, and the representatives take the floor by raising their respective board cards. 
As of February 2003, 165 countries and the European Community were members of the 
Commission. Representatives from Non-governmental organisations and Intergovernmental 
organisations took part as observers during the negotiation process.  
6.1 First Extraordinary Session (1994): ‘Brainstorming’ 
In 1993 the FAO Conference set up a working group of 14 countries representing different 
regions with the task to prepare the work of the Commission. The Working Group had nine 
sessions and one extraordinary session before the First Extraordinary Session of the CPGR in 
November 1994. The Working Group proposed a three-stage process for the revision of the 
International Undertaking: Stage 1 would be consolidation of the Undertaking by 
incorporation of its annexes and its harmonisation with the CBD. This would result in the first 
consolidated text for negotiations. Stage 2 would be a process of adjusting the IUPGR to also 
address the issues of access on mutually agreed terms to PGR, including ex situ collections 
not addressed by the CBD, and the realisation of Farmers’ Rights. As these are complex 
issues, the working group provided a more technical analysis of some of the essential 
questions (FAO, 1994c). The third and last stage would be consideration of the possible legal 
and institutional status of the revised IUPGR.66 According to the working group, questions 
regarding Farmers’ Rights that needed to be resolved included (ibid.): 
i) the nature of the funding to the international fund (voluntary or mandatory) 
ii) the linkage between the financial responsibilities and the benefits derived from 
the use of PGR 
iii) who should bear the financial burdens (countries, users or consumers) 
iv) how the relative needs and entitlements of beneficiaries, especially developing 
countries, were to be estimated 
v) how farmers and local communities would benefit from the funding. 
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The Working Group stated in their report that the implementation of Farmers’ Rights needed 
international action because in every country most of the germplasm used in agriculture 
comes from other countries (FAO, 1994c). Furthermore, it stated that the issues of access to 
germplasm and realisation of Farmers’ Rights are not independent.  
The Vice-Chairs, Mr. B. Fraleigh (Canada) and Mr. R. S. Rana (India) alternated in 
chairing this session of the Commission. The Commission reviewed and commented on the 
first negotiation draft, which incorporated the three annexes, and provided a more rational 
structure by dividing it into 14 articles. During its first extraordinary meeting it did not have 
the time to negotiate further. It was reaffirmed that it would be desirable if the process of 
revising the International Undertaking could be completed in time for the 1996 International 
Technical Conference, so that the revised Undertaking become available together with the 
report on the State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources and the Global Plan of Action 
(GPA) 67. Four background study papers had been prepared at the request of the Secretariat of 
the CPGR to provide a theoretical and academic background for economic, technical and 
legal issues related to the revision of the IUPGR. Among these papers was one on Farmers’ 
Rights: “Providing Farmers’ Rights through in situ conservation of crop genetic resources” by 
Stephen B. Brush.68 
The Working Group did not have the mandate to negotiate, but at its 10th Session in 
May 1995 it discussed various aspects of Farmers’ Rights, including whether they are 
collective or individual rights; the need to develop the International Fund to finance the in situ 
and ex situ conservation, compensate farmers and raise the living standards of farmers and 
agricultural communities; and whether Farmers’ Rights are socio-economic rights such as the 
access by farmers to new technologies (FAO, 1995). The working group pointed out that the 
concept of Farmers’ Rights had several operational dimensions. In order to avoid confusion it 
suggested that these dimensions be dealt with separately, perhaps in the form of three articles 
dealing with the following points: 
i) restating and balancing the concept of Farmers’ Rights against the concept of 
Plant Breeders’ Rights; including the acknowledgement of the right to “the 
farmers’ privilege” 
ii) linking Farmers’ Rights to the funding mechanism, which would not only 
make it possible to compensate and provide incentives for farmers to 
contribute to the conservation and development of PGR, but would also lay the 
foundations for just and equitable sharing of the benefits deriving from PGR 
iii) establishing the rights of traditional farmers and communities in the national 
context, as custodians of indigenous knowledge and PGR (in line with Article 
8(j) of the CBD).  
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6.2 Sixth Regular Session (1995): Fumbling   
The Commission took into account the recommendations of the Working Group at its Sixth 
Regular Session in June 1995, but it generated considerable controversy when the 
Commission undertook its first reading of the preamble and discussions of the articles on 
scope, access and Farmers’ Rights (FAO 1995). Several formal written proposals on Farmers’ 
Rights were made during the session, but no agreement on how to approach the issue was 
reached. Some countries therefore suggested that each member should prepare short 
statements of its views on the main issues of scope, access and Farmers’ Rights, which would 
facilitate the discussions of the Commissions on these points. Much time was spent discussing 
the possibility of, and the need for holding one or more extraordinary sessions in 1996. The 
Commission also reiterated the need for funds to be made available to facilitate the 
participation of developing countries in the negotiation process (ibid.). 
6.3 Second Extraordinary Session (1996): Polarisation 
The Secretariat reviewed the proposals made so far and integrated them in a consolidated text, 
which was presented at the Second Extraordinary Session of the Commission in April 1996 
(FAO 1996a). The Commission did not, however, have the time to negotiate the revision of 
the IUPGR because the meeting was dominated by long discussions on financial questions 
related to the implementation of the GPA. This happened at the initiative of G-77, which was 
strongly influenced by attitudes of the Latin American group, headed by Brazil (The 
Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1996). The OECD countries, except for Mexico, 
stressed the need to do things in a different order: first there was a need to discuss the content 
of the GPA, and only then would it be possible to discuss financial questions. The battle on 
this issue created a bad atmosphere and led to a strong polarisation of the Commission 
between the OECD and G-77 countries (ibid.). This bad atmosphere led to resigned 
statements by the NGOs and industry representatives present, who urged the Commission to 
go back to discussions on the very content of the GPA.  
Cary Fowler presented the secretariat’s draft report on the State of the World’s 
PGRFA. The work by the secretariat on this report and their draft for a GPA was positively 
received among the delegates. In situ and on-farm conservation were new elements in the 
GPA. USA and Canada expressed their scepticism about this and some countries said that 
support to on-farm conservation could be trade distorting, as the support would function as 
subsidies. Malaysia replied that since the expensive and well-developed gene banks in 
Western countries could be viewed as insurance for food security, then it is unreasonable to 
claim that support for on-farm conservation is subsidies.  
During the meeting it became apparent that several developing countries had stronger 
regional interests than common interests with the rest of the G-77 (The Norwegian Ministry 
of the Environment 1996). For example large forest countries like Brazil, Indonesia and 
Malaysia strongly opposed the inclusion of forest genetic resources in the GPA, while African 
countries supported the EU proposal on such an inclusion. After the session, it was uncertain 
whether Brazil wanted progress in the renegotiations, even though the Commission agreed 
that forestry would not be included in the GPA. The US was very sceptical to the whole 
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concept of Farmers’ Rights and showed very little willingness to discuss anything that could 
moderate their strong demand for the protection of IPR (ibid). 
 
The Leipzig Conference: Farmers’ Rights in the Global Plan of Action 
When representatives from 150 countries met for the Fourth International Technical 
Conference on Plant Genetic Resources in Leipzig, Germany (the so-called Leipzig 
Conference) in June 1996, the work on revising the IUPGR still had a long way to go. Thus, 
the proposed schedule for completion of the revision was exceeded. The first comprehensive 
Report on the State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was 
presented by FAO. It was the first world-wide assessment of conservation and sustainable 
utilisation of the world’s PGR. It concluded that genetic resources are being lost, and that, 
while farmers and genetic resources programmes are helping to conserve diversity, there are 
insufficient links between farmers and plant breeders (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996).  
           More than 200 NGOs attended the Leipzig Conference. According to GRAIN they 
made Farmers’ Rights the major topic at the governmental meeting (GRAIN 2000). The 
central objective for the organisations was to secure control over and access to agro-
biodiversity by local communities, so that they could continue to develop and improve their 
farming systems. Rather than a simple financial compensation mechanism, the NGOs pushed 
for Farmers’ Rights to be socio-economic rights, including the right to land, to appropriate 
agricultural research, to decent livelihoods, and the protection of their knowledge systems. 
Farmers’ Rights were also projected as a struggle against privatisation and IPRs on 
biodiversity. Farmers’ Rights were among the crosscutting issues in the GPA that were 
closely scrutinised (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1996). The US outlined several legal 
problems associated with Farmers’ Rights and the lack of internationally accepted “normative 
standards”. Therefore the US emphasised that “the concept” of Farmers’ Rights was the only 
acceptable formulation (ibid.). Several developing countries sought removal of “the concept 
of”. Sweden, supported by Norway, noted that Farmers’ Rights as a legal mechanism had not 
been agreed upon internationally and the proper place for such consideration was within the 
revision of the IUPGR in harmony with the CBD.  
            Noting the polarised positions on the issue, the Chair established a small contact group 
on Farmers’ Rights, but it did not achieve any real agreement. Remaining differences over 
language were resolved through informal consultations by the “Friends of the Chair” (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin 1996). The final language on Farmers’ Rights read “to realize Farmers’ 
Rights, as defined in FAO Resolution 5/89”, rather than realise “the concept of” Farmers’ 
Rights. 
At the end of the conference, the representatives adopted the Leipzig Declaration and 
the GPA. The adoption of the Leipzig Declaration was the Conference’s key political 
statement, which restated the objectives of the IUPGR. The countries acknowledged inter alia 
the "roles played by generations of men and women farmers and plant breeders, and by 
indigenous and local communities, in conserving and improving plant genetic resources". The 
adoption of the Global Plan of Action was the Conference’s main substantive output. It is a 
rolling plan that is to be periodically updated. The Plan aims to promote the conservation, 
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sustainable use and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits flowing from plant genetic 
resources. While the IUPGR dealt with ex situ conservation, the GPA incorporated priority 
activates for in situ conservation as well. Farmers’ Rights are included in the GPA under 
long-term objectives for in situ conservation.69 The USA was upset by this paragraph as they 
did not want Farmers’ Rights at all (Fowler 2002 [interview]). The GPA is now part of the 
FAO Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable Utilisation of PGRFA. 
6.4 Third Extraordinary Session (1996): Positions on Farmers’ Rights 
The Working Group set up in 1993 held its eleventh session ahead of the Third Extraordinary 
Session of the CGRFA. 
6.4.1 Eleventh Session of Working Group: Proposals on Farmers’ Rights 
The discussions on scope, access and Farmers’ Rights continued at the 11th Session of the 
Commission’s Working Group in December 1996. Brazil, France and USA had made written 
submissions to the Working Group (FAO 1996b). Only the American submission dealt with 
Farmers’ Rights as well, and this submission was the most comprehensive and concrete one. 
The Americans stressed the conservation aspect of Farmers’ Rights. Furthermore, the US 
believed that it is the responsibility of national governments to determine how to best 
encourage farmers’ efforts to conserve and use sustainable PGR. The US also submitted a 
proposal for a framework to focus the discussion of the Commission, where they specified 
several questions that they found relevant. 
The secretariat had provided a “non-paper” for informal discussion purposes only. It 
included an extensive comment on Farmers’ Rights and provided possible elements for a 
Simplified Text. This text concretised the international fund for the implementation of 
Farmers’ Rights, suggested measures for ensuring benefit sharing (including identification 
and recording of varieties of PGR provided by farmers); and a requirement to disclose the 
origin of PGR utilised in the development of protected varieties; and recognition and 
protection of traditional rights of farmers and their communities to keep, use, exchange, share 
and market their seeds and plant reproducible material, (including the right to re-use farm-
saved seed under the UPOV) (FAO 1996b).  
A number of countries wanted their comments on the report of the Working Group to 
be reflected in the record (ibid.). Brazil, for example, believed that there had been no general 
agreement concerning scope, and no broad agreement on access, while Ethiopia stated that 
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Farmers’ Rights should not be regarded just as a concept, as they were a reality, being 
implemented in a number of countries.70  
6.4.2 Third Extraordinary Session: Three Stands on Farmers’ Rights 
The Third Extraordinary Session of the CGRFA took place in mid-December 1996. The 
meeting heard a number of general statements by countries regarding their positions on the 
matters under negotiation, before it decided to constitute two open-ended working groups.71 
Mr. José Miguel Bolìvar from Spain chaired the Working Group on scope and access, while 
Mr. R. S. Paroda chaired the Working Group on Farmers’ Rights.  
Chair Bolìvar established a “Friends of the Chair’s Contact Group”, which agreed to 
use as a basis for discussion the Ethiopian proposal of developing a matrix based on the scope 
of access and on the level of facilitation to access. However, the Group realised that these 
subjects were very complex, and agreed that it would be useful to develop a study for the 
Commission to facilitate its preparations for the next meeting. IPGRI presented a study on 
access under the title: “Options for access to plant genetic resources and the equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from their use” (FAO 1996c). In contrast to a previous document presented 
at the Second Extraordinary Session, which favoured one specific solution, this document 
elaborated several options as well as information on transaction costs under a variety of 
options. 
Following the discussions in the Working Group on Farmers’ Rights, three 
consolidated proposals were retained, submitted by the EC, US and developing countries 
respectively. As elaborated on in chapter 4, the EC text stressed conservation and sustainable 
use of PGRFA and benefit sharing, and suggested measures “subject to its national 
legislation”. The US text outlined the measures to be taken by states and regional economic 
integration organisations to promote the efforts of their farmers to conserve and use 
sustainable PGRFA. The text of the developing countries consisted of the highest number of 
measures (a total of 15) and resembled the secretariat non-paper from the last session of the 
Commission’s Working Group, but went even further.  
Representatives from the WTO, UPOV, GRAIN and Via Campesina provided inputs 
during the discussions in the Working Group. A number of countries considered it crucial that 
countries and regions should clarify and define their positions prior to the Commission’s next 
session, particularly with respect to scope, access and Farmers’ Rights (FAO 1996b). 
6.5 Seventh Regular Session (1997): Approach between the Developing Countries and 
Europe 
The situation before the Seventh Session of the Commission in May 1997 was very difficult 
and polarised (The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1997a). Brazil wanted a very 
narrow definition of scope, while African countries had a restrictive proposal on access with 
complicated arrangements for benefit sharing. At the same time, they continued to state in 
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more general terms that they were in favour of an open access regime if benefit sharing 
provisions were developed in a satisfactory way. US and Australia wanted more or less to 
skip the whole concept of Farmers’ Rights. At the same time, the effects of the CBD started to 
be more evident. The CBD establishes the principle that states have national sovereignty over 
their biological diversity. Several developing countries implemented the CBD provisions on 
prior informed consent and on mutually agreed terms into restricted access regimes as a 
response to their perception of the effects of extended patenting practices in developed 
countries.72 Thus, CBD had started to become a tool for “bilateralisation” of access to plant 
genetic resources. Some Latin American countries were positive to this trend, as they believed 
they could benefit from it. 
The Commission elected Mr. Fernando Gerbasi (Venezuela) as Chairman (FAO 
1997a).73 During the first day, regional groups met to prepare regional positions on the 
revision of the IUPGR, which was followed by inter-regional contacts on these positions. 
Afterwards, the negotiations were split into two Ad hoc Working Groups, one considered 
access and scope, and the other considered Farmers’ Rights.  
Mr. Fernando Gerbasi chaired the first Working Group. The European region 
advocated a free access regime, opposed by the US and Brazil. A background study paper on 
germplasm transfers had showed that all countries are dependent on PGR from abroad, and 
that developing countries today are net recipients of PGR from the international gene banks.74 
After this paper, Brazil became more flexible on the issue of access (Borring 2002 
[interview]). The G-77 stressed the need to connect access to benefit sharing. The African 
countries proposed strict access and complicated benefit sharing mechanisms. The Asian 
countries, headed by Malaysia, on the other hand, could accept broader access as long as 
satisfactory benefit sharing mechanisms were assured. 
It was widely recognised that the EU had a good proposal on access. However, 
internal divisions and co-ordination problems related to this made it difficult for them to 
present and defend their positions in a forceful way (The Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment 1997b). The NGOs lobbied the Africans heavily, and moderated their views. 
Nevertheless, as time passed, the positions of the EU, the rest of Europe and G-77 came closer 
to each other. An agreement on the broad picture for access and scope was reached and at the 
end of the meeting Malaysia, on the behalf of G-77, clarified its positions, which was close to 
what had already been agreed on. As a reaction to this, however, the USA withdrew its 
support to the text. Many were of the opinion that the USA only used Malaysia’s speech as an 
excuse, because they did not want the agreed text (ibid.).  
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Gert Kleijer chaired the Working Group on Farmers’ Rights, which began to move 
beyond the entrenched positions of the OECD and G-77 blocks to clarify positions (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin 1998:2). In particular, a convergence of positions between a number of 
EU countries and most of the G-77 countries took place, in that both recognised Farmers’ 
Rights as more than a concept. Overall, however, the debate remained rhetorical and a precise 
definition of Farmers’ Rights remained elusive. The formal output on Farmers’ Rights was 
still a heavily bracketed text.  
There were important remaining problems regarding Farmers’ Rights (The Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment 1997b): First, the very use of the concept was still controversial. 
Particularly the US, Canada, Japan and Australia had problems with the concept as they 
thought it implied acceptance of some sort of legal rights. Therefore, they only accepted 
references to the concept of Farmers’ Rights. Norway said several times that they regarded 
Farmers’ Rights as a goal and principle and not as a legally binding form of rights. Norway 
had informally shown a text proposal to some central delegates, which they believed could be 
accepted by the opposite poles of USA and Ethiopia.  
Another remaining problem was the level of implementation. The Western countries 
that had accepted Farmers’ Rights as being more than a concept, considered the 
implementation of Farmers’ Rights as primarily a national responsibility. Most developing 
countries could accept formulations that made the implementation a national responsibility as 
long as there would be some implications at the international level. Brazil could not. A third 
problem was related to the degree of obligations in the tools for implementing Farmers’ 
Rights. This included the relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and the interests of 
local communities. Fourth, the question of reference to other agreements was outstanding. 
Australia’s proposal which stated that measures for realisation of Farmers’ Rights should be 
non-discriminatory and not trade distorting, only got support from the US. Finally, a limited 
number of countries had problems with formulations that obliged them to implement Farmers’ 
Rights. The US was in a particular position and argued that any agreement it was to ratify 
would carry the same weight as the rest of the American Constitution. Hence, they argued that 
they had to be careful with binding formulations.  
After the Seventh Session of the Commission, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Japan and the US were the countries that had problems with the text on Farmers’ Rights (The 
Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1997b). There were also some outstanding questions 
regarding access. The mutual approach between Europe and the developing countries was 
apparent. There was a polarisation between two groups of countries: those who wanted even 
stronger patenting and IPR regimes on genetic material (particularly the US) and those who 
wanted to restrict by law the traditional free access to genetic material (developing countries). 
The states had the option either to continue to work towards full consensus or to work towards 
a solution the majority could accept. The EU was considering isolating the US (ibid). All in 
all, this session had provided a much better understanding of each other’s positions, though 
the need for high-level political involvement in the negotiating process was highlighted (FAO 
1997a).  
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6.6 Fourth Extraordinary Session (1997): Stand Still on Farmers’ Rights 
The negotiations at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Commission in December 1997 
were organised in one closed Contact Group and one open-ended Working Group (FAO 
1997b). The Commission decided that access, scope, Farmers’ Rights and financial security 
should be discussed in the Contact Group chaired by Mr. Gerbasi. Due to the lack of time, 
however, Farmers’ Rights were discussed in the Working Group, chaired by Mr. Kleijer, 
together with the other remaining articles.  
The Contact Group made good progress since it was now clear that there would be a 
multilateral system for the exchange of PGRFA. Australia, Canada, the US and Switzerland 
opposed this system, hence keeping possibilities open for bilateral arrangements for the 
exchange of PGRFA (The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1997c). G-77, headed by 
the Asian Group, supported a multilateral system on the condition that satisfying mechanisms 
for benefit sharing were put in place and that Farmers’ Rights were realised. Some developing 
countries like Angola, Colombia and Ethiopia made unclear statements, but they were 
believed to support the opinion of G-77 (ibid.). Some OECD countries were of the opinion 
that the advantage of an open multilateral system was benefit sharing enough. 
The Working Group made progress in drawing the general picture for further 
negotiations, but there was little development in the discussions on Farmers’ Rights. There 
were various statements during the discussions with direct reference to other forums (FAO 
1997b, Appendix E). First, FAO’s Legal Counsel Gerald Moore said that the system proposed 
by the developing countries for the recognition, protection and compensation of knowledge, 
innovations and practice of farmers and traditional communities undoubtedly was compatible 
with the sui generis system of plant variety protection of the TRIPs Agreement. Second, the 
observer from UPOV stated that UPOV is only designed to protect plant varieties and is not 
adapted to the protection of indigenous knowledge, while a programme of WIPO included 
examining the possibility of protecting such knowledge. The TRIPs Agreement on the other 
hand, he continued, does not require or forbid the protection of traditional knowledge. 
Two NGOs also made statements. RAFI referred to several countries exploring sui 
generis systems for the protection of Farmers’ Rights both within the framework of IPR law 
and outside patent-like regimes in the realm of “collective rights”. Based on its monitoring 
through 20 years, RAFI concluded that IP systems are not appropriate “[g]iven that the 
average cost of defending a patent is approximately US$ 250,000, a farming community 
would have to have its own lawyers in at least Tokyo, Washington and Munich in order to 
protect its interest” (FAO 1997b, Appendix E). The Gaia Foundation urged the negotiators to 
speed up the process of developing and implementing collective Farmers’ Rights in order to 
correct the asymmetry of rights that existed. According to the organisation, the CBD and FAO 
had to strengthen their capacity as a counterbalancing force to the power of corporations, 
which asserted their commercial rights through the WTO. 
In sum, considerable progress was made during this session but not on Farmers’ 
Rights. The text on Farmers’ Rights still included several options and was among the most 
difficult issues that now remained (The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1997c). 
Outstanding questions included also financing. Developing countries wanted an international 
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fund to have a central role in the new treaty, as they were concerned with the 
commercialisation through IPR of genetic resources stemming from resources that used to be 
freely available. Developed countries, on the other hand, stressed that IPRs can only be 
awarded for new inventions. The US was still creating uncertainty about whether it would be 
possible to reach consensus even if Europe and G-77 would agree on a compromise (ibid). 
The negotiating process started to become more intense and resource demanding and several 
developed countries therefore increased the size of their delegations. 
 
Box 6.1 Illustration of the Controversy Created by the Concept of Farmers’ Rights 
Neither Farmers nor Rights 
During a session when Farmers’ Rights were discussed, the discussion stagnated due to the 
incompatible interests of the delegates. Cary Fowler, senior adviser at IPGRI, is sitting on the 
podium next to Chairman. In front of them are the delegates, sitting in alphabetic order: Angola, 
Australia…. etc. Fowler does not think the delegates will manage to reach an agreement with the 
current atmosphere that is in the room. Thus, he suggests to the chairman to collect a smaller group 
of countries, a so-called friends of the chair, to continue the discussion backstage. Fowler proposes a 
number of countries that can be part of the group: India, US, Brazil, Angola, EU... The chairman 
follows the advice of Fowler. While the plenary session is decomposed and the countries of the 
friends of the chair are leaving the room, the Australian delegate approaches Fowler, red in the face 
with anger. Sitting close to the podium, he had observed Fowler given the advice to the chairman, 
and suggesting which countries that should be included. The Australian delegate is furious because 
Australia is not part of that group, thus, he claims, the interests of Australia are not attended to. 
Fowler replies that the main objective of friends of the chair is to reduce the number of participants, 
thus all countries cannot take part, but the US is part of the group. The US is also opposing the 
recognition of Farmers’ Rights, so the interests of Australia are attended to, says Fowler. The 
Australian delegate replies (still red in the face): But the US is against “rights” and we are against 
“farmers”!  
Source: Fowler (2002 [interview]). 
6.7 Fifth Extraordinary Session (1998): Further Polarisation 
Developing countries had high expectations before the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the 
Commission in June 1998 (The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 1998). The negotiations 
continued in the Contact Group, still chaired by Mr. Gerbasi, discussing access and benefit 
sharing, and in the Working Group on Farmers’ Rights, chaired by Mr. Kleijer.  
The texts from the developing countries, the EU and the US from the Third 
Extraordinary Session still formed the basis for negotiations on Farmers’ Rights. The 
document was heavily bracketed, and the Working Group managed to remove a few, but 
several of the subparagraphs were left unamended. The questions on legal aspects and 
farmers’ privileges again took much of the time. Australia, Canada, Japan and the US still 
wanted to avoid the whole idea of Farmers’ Rights, but should it be used they insisted that it 
should be addressed as the “concept of Farmers’ Rights”. Canada said its farmers had rights 
because of their citizenship, not because they were farmers. Canada proposed a definition on 
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Farmers’ Rights: “Farmers’ Rights are those rights which Member States may wish to apply 
to their farmers, and are applied at the national level” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998). 
Most of the developing countries, on the other hand, wanted a development towards legal 
rights as they regarded the establishment of Farmers’ Rights as a way of balancing Intellectual 
Property Rights. Therefore, the developing countries used formulations such as “recognising” 
Farmers’ Rights. During the meeting, Ethiopia suggested a formulation that circumvented the 
definition problem by avoiding the controversial words of both “concept” and “recognition”.75 
After regional consultation, the European Region accepted this proposal without brackets, 
while Australia and the US still had to make reservations.   
Distinct positions dominated also the discussion on the subparagraph of legislation 
that addressed the protection and promotion of farmers’ and farming communities’ 
knowledge. Ethiopia underscored the importance of this subparagraph, while developed 
countries referred to other forums like WIPO and UNESCO as more appropriate arenas to 
discuss this issue (FAO, 1998c). On behalf of several NGOs, the Gaia Foundation emphasised 
that Farmers’ Rights are a priori rights, and that the role of the Commission was to defend the 
rights of the weak and not to collude with the strong (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998). 
  When the countries that had made reservations could not compromise further even 
after consultation with their capitals, there was a clear opinion among the developing 
countries that there was no point in continuing negotiations (The Norwegian Ministry of 
Agriculture 1998). Several small contact groups composed of key regional representatives 
were established throughout the week to clarify text. Still, the negotiations came to a grinding 
halt on the fourth day.  
It was evident that some delegations, particularly several developed countries with 
indigenous populations, were profoundly nervous about conceding to any principles on 
Farmers’ Rights, fearing that it would trigger commensurate rights for local and indigenous 
communities under the CBD (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998:10). The US wanted weaker 
language in the article on Farmers’ Rights, for example to alter “ensure their participation” to 
“arrangements in which they may participate”. It was not even clear whether Farmers’ Rights 
would be included in the treaty at all (ibid.). The African and Latin American Regions 
expressed their appreciation to the European Region for its willingness to negotiate and reach 
a consensus. Albeit the lack of progress on the issue of Farmers’ Rights, the European Region 
believed that after this session there was a much better common understanding of what 
Farmers’ Rights meant in the context of PGRFA and the aspects of particular importance to 
the different regional groups (FAO 1998a). Norway confirmed its willingness to look into any 
option for financial arrangements, which should be predictable, transparent and also 
mandatory. Such options could be explored in a Secretariat document. Norway also confirmed 
its commitment to a solution for Farmers’ Rights that would clearly express the rights of 
farmers to re-use farm-saved seed in traditional ways. 
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In contrast to the lack of progress in the Working Group, the strong Chair in the 
Contact Group and a smaller gathering of delegates led to greater flexibility and clarification 
of positions. It seemed possible for Europe, Africa and Asia to reach an agreement, while 
Latin America’s position was unclear. The JUSCANZ countries76 had completely divergent 
attitudes, stressing that the questions of access and benefit sharing should not be mixed. They 
insisted that that benefit sharing should not be dependent upon individual access transactions 
of germplasm. In the discussions on access and IPR, some delegates were keen to investigate 
the possibility of modified IPR regimes that give confessional arrangements to countries of 
origin. These initiatives were met with a stone wall response from TRIPs-friendly countries 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998:9). Developing countries wanted the three main questions 
of access, benefit sharing and Farmers’ Rights to be seen in context.  
During a side event at lunchtime, the International Association of Plant Breeders 
(ASSINSEL) presented its willingness to engage in financial compensations for patented 
material. The private seed industry appeared thus to sidestep government negotiations on 
financial arrangements and going directly to countries of origin to negotiate access 
arrangements (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998). The explanation of the industry’s move was 
partly that their proposal is a form of benefit sharing and partly that patenting, unlike 
traditional plant breeders’ rights, reduces access to further breeding due to the restrictions of 
the use of farm-saved seed (The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 1998). 
In general, some developed countries, particularly the JUSCANZ countries, blocked 
the negotiations to a large extent. They had so far in the negotiation process kept their cards 
close to their chest and had shown little willingness to really negotiate (The Norwegian 
Ministry of Agriculture 1998). The process had, however, come so far, that this was no longer 
possible. Tewolde Egiziabhar from Ethiopia had a closing remark where he saw considerable 
asymmetries since the international agreements protecting Western industry through IPR 
regimes were so easy to develop, while at the same time it seemed impossible to shape 
international frames that protect the traditional knowledge in developing countries on the use 
of genetic resources. He made an appeal to listen to the developing countries and take the 
issues of benefit sharing and Farmers’ Rights seriously. The speech from Ethiopia was 
representative of the disappointment among the developing countries (ibid.). 
The climate was further polarised due to several current developments (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture, 1998). First, the EU’s patent directive was adopted, 
paving the way for stronger intellectual property rights on genetic material in the European 
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Region.77 Second, recent examples of patents based on material from the CGIAR-system 
reinforced the perception of biopiracy78 of the South’s resources. Third, the new 
developments of ‘Genetic Use Restriction Technologies’ (GURTs)79 represent a threat to 
farmers’ traditional practise of saving seeds. In addition, the developing countries feared that 
the on-going review of TRIPs would put extra pressure on them to introduce strict IPR 
regimes. Regarding the next meeting, the US proposed continuing negotiations at the eighth 
session of the CGRFA in May 1999 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998:9). Norway supported 
convening an extraordinary session in autumn 1998 and requested the Secretariat to prepare a 
document for exploring options for financial arrangements. 
In August 1998 Mr. Gerbasi embarked on a series of consultations, particularly to 
countries belonging to the Chairman’s Contact Group and members of the Bureau as 
representatives of their regions and for active involvement in the whole negotiation process 
(FAO, 1999a). Gerbasi asked them “if they thought the conditions existed for a compromise 
to break the deadlock that had befallen the negotiations” (FAO 1999a:2). In general terms, the 
delegations needed more time so they could conduct consultations both within their respective 
countries and between countries. Mr. Gerbasi continued his consultations at the 115th Session 
of the Council in November 1998 and the Council unanimously supported his proposal to 
convene an informal meeting.  
 
Informal meeting in Montreux: A turning point? 
In January 1999 Chair Gerbasi invited 21 countries and the European Union to an informal 
expert meeting in Montreux in Switzerland. The experts represented the various regions and 
positions. Switzerland and the United States facilitated the participation of developing country 
participants (FAO 1999a). FAO staff and IPGRI representatives also participated. The experts 
addressed in their personal capacity issues such as benefit sharing, Farmers’ Rights, financial 
mechanisms and the legal status of the revised IUPGR. During the week, there was progress 
from the well-known repetition of old views via good dialogue to a closure, which Chair 
Gerbasi summed up as “progress, but still too big distances to reach an agreement” (ibid.). 
The result of the meeting was summed up in “The Chairman’s Elements for a Draft Text”.  
Most of this document reflected a broad consensus, with some clear exceptions, 
particularly Australia but also the US. However, regarding Farmers’ Rights there was no 
broad consensus. The ETC group strongly criticised the behaviour of Australia at the 
Montreux meeting: “Australia’s participation in recent CGRFA meetings has been marked by 
discord and the Down Under delegation’s increasing isolation from the vast majority of 
countries. Australia’s is an outsider because of its implacable opposition to Farmers’ Rights 
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and delaying tactics perceived by most observers to reflect a questionable commitment to 
abandoning the status quo under which Australia has granted so many suspect PBR claims on 
foreign germplasm” (ETC group 1999). The problems regarding Farmers’ Rights thus 
reflected the real conflict between the wish to establish the importance of intellectual property 
rights within this sector and the wish to stress the possibilities and traditional practice of 
smallholder farmers to conduct breeding activities, among others through the freedom to use 
seeds from own harvest, even when they have bought protected varieties (The Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment 1999a). Due to Australia’s lack of co-operation, Montreux 
apparently did not change the polarised condition. 
 
Box 6.2: The Chairman’s Elements for a Draft Text on Farmers’ Rights (FR) (FAO 
1999a). 
• Recognition of the enormous contribution that farmers of all regions of the world, 
particularly those in the centres of origin and crop diversity, have made and will continue 
to make for the conservation and development of plant genetic resources which constitute 
the basis of food and agriculture production throughout the world. 
• The responsibility for realising FR, as they relate to PGRFA, rests with national 
governments. In accordance with their needs and priorities, each Party should, as 
appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote 
FR, including: 
• The right to use, exchange, and, in the case of landraces and varieties that are no longer 
registered, marked farm-saved seeds; 
• Protection of traditional knowledge 
• The right to equitable participation in benefit sharing 
• The right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to 
the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA. 
 
Since there was no clear breakthrough at the January meeting, there were rumours that 
Gerbasi would withdraw as Chair of the negotiations. Individuals usually chair the 
Commission for only one session, and Gerbasi’s normal term was now completed. According 
to the Norwegian representative at the meeting, it would be very unfortunate for the 
negotiations if Gerbasi withdrew. Through the Norwegian Embassy in Rome, the Norwegian 
Authorities sent a letter to Gerbasi to encourage him to continue as Chair (The Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). At an OECD-meeting 18th of March, there was agreement 
to support the sitting bureau and Gerbasi as chair. However, if Gerbasi resigned or if the G-77 
wanted to change Chair, Canada said it would provide a candidate for the leadership of the 
Commission (The Royal Norwegian Embassy, Rome 1999). 
6.8 Eighth Regular Session (1999): The Breakthrough  
It turned out that the OECD countries did not have to worry since Gerbasi was re-elected at 
the Eighth Regular Session of the CGRFA in April 1999 (FAO 1999c). The Chairman’s 
Elements were incorporated into the appropriate articles of the “Composite Draft Text for the 
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revision of the International Undertaking incorporating the Chairman’s Elements”. The 
Commission established a Contact Group to continue the negotiations using this Composite 
Draft text as the basis for discussions (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2000:2-3). The Contact 
Group was “closed” meaning that only the countries in the group could participate. All other 
countries and non-state actors were excluded. Nevertheless, international organisations 
presented reports on their policies, programmes and activities on agro-biodiversity (FAO 
1999b). For example ASSINSEL mentioned their activities in conservation and increasing the 
genetic diversity available to farmers. Furthermore, the FIS and ASSINSEL Members from 
developing countries warned delegates at this session that in the absence of a multilateral 
agreement, plant-breeding activities in developing countries would be endangered. The 
organisations particularly pointed out the need to: (i) promote the use of modern technologies, 
including biotechnologies, (ii) create incentives for plant breeding while protecting 
intellectual property, (iii) favour access to PGRFA and (iv) set up a simple and efficient 
system for benefit sharing (FAO, 1999b). RAFI informed about its analysis of so-called 
Terminator (seed sterilisation/GURTs) technology and of 147 possible abuses of Plant 
Breeders’ Rights and patents around the world. 
Regular co-ordination took place in the European Region, but there was a problem 
with this co-ordination as it took place after the EU’s internal co-ordination meetings (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 1999a). The EU’s positions were not very flexible due to 
the many internal compromises they already had made. The other European countries partly 
had to accept this, and the positions of the European Region at times greatly reflected the 
views of the EU. When issues were raised during the negotiations that the EU had not 
discussed, however, it occurred that the EU had problems in fully participating in the debate. 
An important condition for progress was met when the Commission agreed on using 
the text from Montreux as basis. However, the real progress at this session was the agreement 
on the article on Farmers’ Rights! Based on the Chairman’s Elements, the approved text was 
proposed by the US and amended by Ethiopia. When they realised at the end of the session 
that they had achieved this breakthrough, the delegates started to applaud (Fraleigh 2003 
[interview]). 
At the Eighth Regular Session the US and Canada were perceived to be constructive (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 1999a). During the meeting, the opposite poles were 
mainly developing countries/ Brazil versus the EU, while the US and Canada were 
compromise suppliers. Despite the constructive behaviour of the Americans, however, it was 
still uncertain whether they really wanted an agreement soon, because they had showed little 
willingness to co-operate during the recent biosafety negotiations in Cartagena (ibid.). 
The Commission recognised the very significant progress that had been made during 
this session, and expressed great appreciation for the commitment and skilful leadership of the 
Chairman (FAO 1999c). The Commission decided to continue the negotiations for the 
revision of the IUPGR, and the old deadline of November 1999 was altered to November 
2000. It also decided to establish an intersessional Contact Group to continue the negotiations 
and authorised the Chairman to convene sessions of this group. 
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Box 6.3: The Unbracketing of the Farmers’ Rights Article. 
The Decisive Moment 
At the Eighth Regular Session, Farmers’ Rights were on the agenda of the Contact Group. 
During a meeting in the German room – which is without windows like many other of the 
rooms in the pale buildings of the FAO headquarters – Ms Cathleen Enwright from the 
American delegation started saying: “For proposing this I will probably lose my job”. Then 
she continued to present a proposal that resembled the Chair’s Element on Farmers’ Rights. 
Listening to her, Mr. Cary Fowler, representing CGIAR, was stunned because he believed 
the proposal was not in the interests of the USA. However, Mr Tewolde Egiziabhar from 
Ethiopia immediately reacted negatively because there was a lot of mistrust between the 
actors, and then proposed an amendment to the American proposal that actually diluted it. 
The Americans, now realising that they had given much in the first place, accepted the 
amendment. When both the USA and Ethiopia, the two counterparts on the issue of Farmers’ 
Rights, had come to an agreement, everybody should apparently have been satisfied. Ms 
Grethe Evjen’s comment on the proposals was, however, “That’s horrible!” Norway was 
sceptical about both the national responsibility for the implementation and the ambiguous 
formulation on farmers’ right to use, sell and exchange farm-saved seeds. Thus, Norway 
together with Poland and Malta –which were sitting next to Norway – opposed. Upon this, 
the Chairman addressed them saying: “Everybody else in the room seems ok with the text, 
only the three of you disagree. Can you withdraw your objections?” So they did, and the 
agreed text of this meeting became Article 9 of the final version of the International Treaty. 
Just a few minutes too late, Rene Salazar from the Philippines realised what had happened 
and went up to Fowler and asked: “Did we just make a mistake here?”, whereupon Fowler 
replied: “From your perspective, I would say yes”.  
Source: Evjen; Fowler 2002 [interviews] 
 
6.9 Chairman’s Contact Group (1999-2001): Back and Forth   
6.9.1 First Meeting: Stand Still on Benefit Sharing 
The Contact Group consisted of 40 countries representing the different regions.80 The First 
intersessional meeting of the Contact Group in September 1999 focused on benefit sharing in 
the Multilateral System on the basis of a submission by the developing countries (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin 2000).81 The meeting was only open to members of the Contact Group 
and representatives of CGIAR, CBD and UPOV as resource persons. This was the first time 
that the article on benefit sharing was thoroughly discussed. Many delegates believed that a 
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solution to this question was necessary in order to achieve an agreement. Norway got a very 
positive response from the developing countries for its positions during the negotiations, and 
the EU and some other countries signalled that Norway was respected as a compromise 
supplier (The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 1999b).  
The EU delegation was troubled with internal disagreement and poor leadership (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 1999b). It also suffered from a lack of continuity and 
ability to present its positions. Jan Borring was, however, more optimistic after an informal 
meeting in Denmark in February 2000 (Borring 2000). A group of negotiators had met to 
discuss outstanding issues at the initiative of the Nordic countries. Before the next meeting of 
the Contact Group, Norway suggested to Vice-Chair Kleijer that it was possible to improve 
the potential for reaching a solution by using some strategies like changing topics when the 
negotiations get stuck; announcing breaks more frequently; asking a few delegates to meet 
and see if they can agree on something; by jumping a little more back and forth between 
subjects; and by imposing time limits on discussions (ibid.). 
6.9.2 Second Meeting: The ‘Gang of Six’ Blocking Progress82 
At the Second Intersessional Meeting of the Contact Group in April 2000 the Brazilian 
delegation dropped a bombshell by presenting a proposal limiting the coverage of the 
Multilateral System, which led to a breakdown in the negotiations. Brazil had counted on 
support from other developing countries. But after a long, tense day of regional consultations, 
all other participants, North and South alike, came out against Brazil (GRAIN 2000). 
The NGOs were at this time organising a campaign to pressure governments to come 
to an agreement (ibid). They demanded that the industrialised countries come up with 
concrete commitments (money to implement the Global Plan of Action); no Intellectual 
Property Rights on genetic material; implementation of Farmers’ Rights; and expanded 
representation, because a high level of representation is necessary to make decisions and 
commitments.  
The Contact Group made only moderate progress in clarifying positions (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin 2000:3). The Brazilian delegation stated that it was the first country to 
make a concrete, balanced proposal on access to PGR, but was still missing a clear and 
meaningful reaction concerning finance and benefit sharing (FAO 2000a). The European 
delegation remarked that informal consultations had shown to their regret, lack of clarity of 
certain proposals and mistrust, which had resulted in a slowdown of the negotiation process. 
The Europeans welcomed the proposals tabled by Norway and Japan to the effect that when 
PGRFA obtained under the Multilateral System results in commercial benefits, those benefits 
should be shared. 
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6.9.3 Third Meeting: Progress on Benefit Sharing 
At the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Contact Group in Teheran, Iran, August 2000 the 
delegates continued negotiations on the Consolidated Draft Text, specifically on access, 
benefit sharing and financial resources. An initial round of discussions was also held on the 
countries’ consultations with their private sectors regarding commercial benefit sharing, and 
regional groups presented their proposed list for crops covered by the Multilateral System. 
This was yet the most successful of the Contact Group sessions. The compromise was fuelled 
by pressure from the Chair to break the stalemate on benefit sharing by forcing a closed 
session to resolve the issue. Gerbasi impressed upon the group that this was the last chance to 
move forward, and the threat of negotiations being terminated by the FAO Council for lack of 
progress placed additional pressure on the participants (ibid.). 
6.9.4 Fourth Meeting: Breakdown 
There was some progress at the Fourth Intersessional meeting of the Contact Group in 
Neuchatel, Switzerland in November 2000, but the negotiations almost broke down when 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US could not accept the compromise suggestion on 
benefit sharing that was agreed ad referendum83 in Teheran (The Norwegian Ministry of 
Agriculture 2001a). The JUSCANZ countries feared a possible incompatibility with TRIPs if 
benefit sharing was made mandatory when patenting plant genetic material. Chair Gerbasi 
regarded the situation as very difficult and announced that he did not want to call more 
meetings in the Contact Group until he had reported to and obtained a new mandate from the 
Commission. Gerbasi got new confidence at the 119th Session of the FAO Council (November 
2000) as long as the negotiations would be finished by November 2001.  
Remaining questions included the number of crops to be covered by the Multilateral 
System (regional proposals ranged from 9 (Latin American proposal) to 287 (European 
proposal) crops) and whether genetic material in the international gene banks (CGIAR) 
should be covered by the Multilateral System (The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 
2001a). G-77 wanted to limit the list of crops. The reasons were believed to be: first, that the 
developing countries thought they could use the list as a trading card; second, that several 
developing countries didn’t see the value of developing new varieties; and third, that many 
countries, particularly the Latin-American countries feared losing the potential to earn money 
on their own genetic resources if the list became too comprehensive (ibid.). The CGIAR has 
in an agreement with FAO committed itself to managing the genetic material in its gene banks 
on behalf of humanity.84  
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6.9.5 Fifth Meeting: The ‘Gang of the Six’ strikes back 
The article on Farmers’ Rights was finalised in 1999, but some thought that the developing 
countries had given too much and that the article should therefore be reopened for 
negotiations. In January 2001 there were few indications that this was a relevant approach, 
however (The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 2001a). 
The Fifth Intersessional Meeting of the Contact Group in February 2001 somehow 
became a repetition of previous sessions. The JUSCANZ countries did not want to make any 
commitments on benefit sharing even though their contribution to the fund did not seem large. 
As a response, the developing countries –Argentina, Brazil and Colombia–- reduced the list of 
crops included in the Multilateral System for facilitated access. Australia, Canada, EU and 
USA wanted the opportunity to patent materials received from ex situ collections and to have 
a long list of crops included in the Multilateral System. However, in the long run, their 
practice of patenting genes may reduce access to important genes in the Multilateral System 
(Evjen 2003 [interview]). According to Pat Mooney from RAFI –the only NGO allowed to 
participate in the talks– if it had not been for the “gang of six” there probably would have 
been an agreement by now (Wertheim 2001).  
The lack of progress in February provoked the NGOs to take action. Greenpeace 
together with more than 100 other organisations wrote an open letter to the delegates at the 
next meeting of the Contact Group, demanding that patents on seeds and plants as well as 
food made from them should be forbidden (Greenpeace 2001). Via Campesina also wrote an 
open letter to the Contact Group, demanding that the negotiators respect Farmers’ Rights and 
fully incorporate them into any agreement, and to avoid any incorporation of IPR on plant 
genetic resources. Via Campesina regarded the current proposed text on Farmers’ Rights as a 
step backwards compared to earlier recognition of these rights, and “a bleak lip service to 
what these rights entail” according to them (Via Campesina 2001). 
 Norwegian government ministers also felt the need to act. The Minister of 
International Development, the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of the Environment 
sent a letter to all members of the Contact Group, urging them to work for a fair and workable 
system for the continued open exchange of PGR between countries (The Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2001). They feared that long-term food security was at stake. 
6.9.6 Sixth Meeting: Approach between Europe and Developing Countries 
Chair Gerbasi prepared in consultation with the rest of the Bureau, a Chair’s Proposal for a 
Simplified Text, which was consistent with the Chairman’s Elements from Montreux and 
which suggested a revised structure of articles. In doing so, he removed brackets and provided 
a single text where it appeared to him that consensus might be possible, seeking to balance the 
expressed opinions of the regions (FAO 2001a). The Sixth Intersessional Meeting of the 
Contact Group that met in Spoleto in Italy, April 2001, decided to use Gerbasi’s simplified 
text as a basis for negotiations.  
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After the first three days of totally blocked negotiations, the Chair called the group to 
order and insisted that they should either admit failure and go home, or get serious and move 
on. European donors threatened there would be no money for a further meeting unless 
substantial progress could be shown (Civil Society Organisations 2001). That sent 
repercussions and pushed the process forward. The increased presence of civil society also 
helped to keep up pressure as delegations felt they were being watched. 
What was the status after the sixth meeting? The relationship between Europe and G-
77 had improved; Australia, Canada and the US were isolated in several issues; the US had 
announced that it could not accept obligations to share benefits derived from the use of PGR; 
the destiny of the CGIAR centres was still uncertain (a solution to these questions had to 
include Colombia); and there was no solution to the IPR question regarding materials from 
the Multilateral System, even though a compromise was reached between G-77 and Europe 
(The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 2001b). The USA reinstated an old proposal that 
would render the entire IUPGR useless (GRAIN 2001a). It consisted of letting each country 
decide which germplasm of each crop was to be included in the Multilateral System, based on 
the argument that governments cannot control what private companies collect, store and 
exchange. The NGOs had increased presence at the negotiations of late, but their demands for 
no IPRs on PGRFA and stronger Farmers’ Rights had not really been dealt with (ibid.). 
The Farmers’ Rights text was not discussed during the Spoleto meeting, but 
informally there had been some talk about the possibility flagging it as an outstanding issue in 
a separate resolution to come with the new treaty and committing countries to deal with at a 
higher level (Civil Society Organisations 2001). Furthermore, RAFI announced that NGOs 
and farmers’ organisations would go to Rome in June to re-open the negotiations on Farmers’ 
Rights (RAFI 2001). If the negotiations could not be reopened, they would call for an 
extraordinary resolution from the Commission to send Farmers’ Rights to the UN High 
Commissioner on Human Rights. RAFI hoped for progress there, since they believed that the 
US had little influence on the High Commission. 
6.10 Sixth Extraordinary Session (2001): Towards Conclusion of the Negotiations 
There was no time scheduled for renegotiating Farmers’ Rights at the Sixth Extraordinary 
Session of the CGRFA in June 2001. Nevertheless, the issue was discussed when all the issues 
suppressed in the Eighth Commission meeting resurfaced in “an attack led by Canada and the 
US” (UKabc 2001). The debate focused in particular on the paragraph in the preamble 
affirming farmers’ rights to save, use and exchange PGRFA, and the purpose of preamble 
paragraphs in general, and the paragraph’s consistency with Article 9 (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin 2001). Canada proposed deleting one of the two paragraphs on Farmers’ Rights, but 
this was opposed by Ethiopia, Zambia and India, among others, who all stressed the 
importance of Farmers’ Rights in the International Undertaking. Africa’s work on The 
African Model Law on Community Rights had ensured that the region was well prepared and 
made their negotiation positions particularly strong in comparison to earlier processes. 
Ethiopia, on behalf of most of the G-77, defended the proposed paragraphs on Farmers’ 
Rights in the Preamble. This contributed to the difficulty in reaching agreement (ibid.). 
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To illustrate the implications of global IPR systems at the farm level, NGOs at the 
CGRFA invited all delegates to a side event during lunchtime on June 29 (NGO release 
2001). The NGO claimed that a Canadian judge dealt a crushing blow on Farmers’ Rights by 
ruling that farmer Percy Schmeiser must pay the biotech company Monsanto thousands of 
dollars for violating the company’s patent on genetically modified canola. According to the 
NGOs, the patent legislation not only deprives farmers of their right to seed saving, but may 
also force them to pay royalties on genetically modified seeds found on their land, even if 
they do not buy the seeds or benefit from them.  
Beyond the lengthy discussion of Farmers’ Rights in the preamble, the most 
contentious issues, in particular the functioning of the Multilateral System, were negotiated by 
a “Friends of the Chair” contact group (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2001). Informal working 
groups negotiated the list of crops to be covered by the Multilateral System; and the use of 
terms and resolutions. The Report of the Expert Panel commissioned during the sixth meeting 
of the Contact Group in Spoleto was an extremely valuable addition to participants’ 
understanding of various food crops and forages relevant to world food security. 
The Netherlands requested that the working groups should be open to observers. This 
was granted by the Chair, which made the work of the Commission more transparent. The 
“Friends of the Chair” meeting, however, was less publicised and some delegations wondered 
what schemes were being hatched by these “unknown” friends (UKabc 2001). The key 
process was being conducted behind closed doors, with rumours and counter-rumours leaking 
out. For most delegates, this lack of transparency led to a lack of trust in the whole process 
(ibid.). The group of Friends of the Chair was constituted to create flexibility and ensure 
inclusion of interests from key developed countries without alienating developing countries 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2001:13). A recurring problem in Plenary was however 
delegations involved in closed-door negotiations re-opening discussions over their own 
agreements. 
In the end, the Commission “adopted the text of the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources” and “requested the Director-General to transmit it, through the 
Seventy-second session of the Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters (8-9 October 
2001) and the Hundred and Twenty-first session of the Council (30 October-1 November 
2001), to the Thirty-first session of the Conference (2-13 November 2001), for its 
consideration and approval” (FAO 2001b). 
Despite the conclusion of the negotiations, there were some outstanding issues. The 
most worrisome subject was the IPR question regarding materials from the Multilateral 
System. USA did not want restrictions in their IPR practice, while the developing countries of 
Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, India and Iran argued that the risk of “draining” out materials 
originally in the open system must be prevented. The others did not accept the American 
stand, because after all, the “yellow bean” case was going on (The Norwegian Ministry of 
Agriculture 2001c).85 Norway was head of the European Region from July on. Norwegian 
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initiatives included e-mail contact with Barbara Tobias, head of the American delegation; they 
sent a letter to the FAO Director-General and stressed the need to promote increased political 
awareness during the limited time left; they had contact with Beijing to ensure China’s 
acceptance of the treaty and urging it to include soybeans on the list of crops for the 
Multilateral System; there was contact with the CGRFA secretariat and Chair Gerbasi. 
Presumably, other informal intersessional discussions took place, helping countries to further 
define and clarify their positions on what constitutes genetic material and whether it can be 
patented under the Multilateral System (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2001:13). 
6.11 121st Session of the FAO Council (2001): Adoption of the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
Informal negotiations started at the Italian Ministry of Agriculture on 25th of October (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture 2001c). In addition to the outstanding issues from the last 
session, the US had a new proposal on a “security clause”, which none of the other countries 
supported (ibid.). Even the name of the treaty was subject to discussion, where some Latin 
American countries favoured its long and complicated name, hoping that this would 
contribute to reduce the significance of the treaty (Evjen 2002 [interview]). During the Open-
ended Working Group on the International Undertaking from 30 October till 1 November 
2001, the last remaining questions were settled. And finally, the FAO Conference adopted 
through Resolution 3/2001 the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture on 3rd November 2001. The adoption was unanimous, with two states abstaining 
(Japan and USA).86 
6.12 Summing Up 
The negotiations included 3 regular sessions and 6 extraordinary sessions of the Commission 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, an informal expert meeting and 6 
intersessional meetings of the Chairman’s Contact Group. The treaty is described as “the 
result of a laborious and lengthy, hard-fought seven-year negotiation process” (Mekoaur 
2002:3). For most of the 1990s the negotiations seemingly dragged on in every direction 
except forward. By 1998, negotiations had come very close to a total standstill, having 
produced an “overly long, unreadable and almost completely bracketed (i.e. not agreed) 
negotiation text” (GRAIN 2000). Progress was relatively considerable since 1999, and the 
April 1999 meeting of the Commission produced only moderated bracketed text for three 
central articles, including an entire unbracketing of Farmers’ Rights. The Contact Group 
negotiated most of another key article, benefit sharing, in September 1999. During the 
remaining meetings of the Contact Group, the “gang of six” alternated in halting progress. 
Finally, the FAO Conference adopted through Resolution 3/2001 the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture on 3rd November 2001. 
The acrimony and distrust that characterised the discussions during the meetings held 
by FAO between 1981 and 1983 continued to influence the negotiations to revise the IUPGR 
(Bragdon 2000:1). Experienced FAO diplomats had said that this had been the most difficult 
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negotiation process they ever had attended (Borring 2002 [interview]). Farmers’ Rights were 
one of the most contested issues with highly divergent positions. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of the Negotiation Process 
 Session Main Outcome 
1994 • 1st Extraordinary • Incorporation of the three 
annexes in the IUPGR to 
the 1st Negotiation Draft 
1995 • Several sessions of the 
Working Group 
• 6th Regular 
• Examined articles on 
scope, access and FR 
• Some proposals on FR 
1996 • 2nd Extraordinary 
• Leipzig Conference 
• 11th session of Working 
Group 
• 3rd Extraordinary 
• Adoption of GPA 
• Proposals on FR that 
subsumed into 3 distinct 
stands on the issue 
1997 • 7th Regular 
• 4th Extraordinary 
• Heavily bracketed text on 
FR, but Europe and G-77 
agreed that FR are more 
than a concept 
1998 • 5th Extraordinary • Proposal on benefit 
sharing from ASSINSEL 
1999 • Montreux meeting 
• 8th Regular 
• 1st session of Contact 
Group 
• Chairman’s Elements 
• Adoption of FR Article 
2000 • 2nd –4th session of 
Contact Group 
• Near at hand agreement 
on benefit sharing 
2001 • 5th –6th session of Contact 
Group 
• 6th Extraordinary 
• 121st session of FAO 
Council 
• Chair’s proposal for a 
simplified text 
• FR in the Preamble 
• Adoption of the ITPGRFA 
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Minimum FR                      Maximum FR  
 
 
    JUSCANZ             Latin America        EU          Europe (except EU)         Asia         Africa 
                   (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay)                (Norway, Poland)    (Philippines, India) (Angola, Ethiopia) 
 
Figure 6.1: Various regions’ position on Farmers’ Rights (FR) on a continuum from no 
Farmers’ Rights to a comprehensive definition of such rights. The most active countries 
on the issue are highlighted as several countries in each region were bystanders. 
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7: Analysis of the Negotiation Process  
In the following, general observations based on the theoretical framework will be evaluated 
against the factual observations from the negotiation process, in order to come closer to an 
explanation for the medium breakthrough of the developing countries’ proposal on Farmers’ 
Rights. For reasons of clarity, I will adopt the perspectives one at a time. 
7.1 Dominance of Powerful Actors? 
Based on the main assumptions of the power-based perspective, I assumed that the 
international negotiation outcome would reflect the interests of the dominant regime member. 
Developing countries can get their interests through if the dominant regime members want to. 
Otherwise, a weak breakthrough for them is the most likely outcome.  I have concluded that 
the developing countries experienced a medium breakthrough for their interests regarding 
Farmers’ Rights. Does this apparent divergence between the prediction of outcome and the 
actual outcome disprove the explanatory power of the power-based perspective in this case? 
One obvious advantage for rich countries is that they can afford to attend international 
negotiations. During the negotiations of the International Treaty, they could increase their 
delegations when the process became more demanding. Furthermore, they could spend money 
on thorough preparations ahead of the negotiation processes. Generally, most developed 
countries were better prepared than their less advanced counterparts. Since their policy goals 
were more clearly defined, it was easier to strive for their achievement as well.  
 
The JUSCANZ Countries  
The two coalitions of powerful actors had different positions regarding Farmers’ Rights, the 
EU being more favourable than the JUSCANZ countries. Why did the latter so strongly 
oppose the international recognition of Farmers’ Rights? In general, they believed that such 
recognition could have inverse effects on their general policy and interests in the issue area of 
PGRFA. Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and (to a lesser extent) New Zealand are in the 
forefront in research and use of modern biotechnology, IPR legislation pertaining to living 
material and their industrialised agricultural sectors produce surpluses that they are eager to 
export. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are members of the Cairns Group87 and therefore 
sceptical of support to national agriculture. They stressed that the realisation of Farmers’ 
Rights should not be trade distorting agricultural subsidies (see for example the American 
proposal on Farmers’ Rights: FAO 1996b). The JUSCANZ countries also grow the most 
GMOs88 and Australia, Canada and the US are for example members of the so-called Miami 
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Group89. That group lobbied against international restrictions on trade of GMOs during the 
negotiations for a biosafety protocol to the CBD.90 They were concerned that the 
precautionary principle would be included in the protocol and thus give environmental 
concerns precedence compared to trade. Another condition that affected the JUSCANZ 
countries’ negotiating positions concerning Farmers’ Rights is the presence of indigenous 
populations (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1998:10). The special role of indigenous people was 
recognised in the CBD, in particularly in Article 8 (j). An additional recognition of such rights 
in a FAO treaty would make central governments even more responsible for implementing 
these rights. Particularly Australia and US were sensitive to this concern. 
Initially, the JUSCANZ countries were unwilling to discuss the Farmers’ Rights issue 
at all. They insisted that Farmers’ Rights had to be called the “concept of” Farmers’ Rights, 
referring to their legal systems where rights automatically become part of their constitutions 
(particularly the American delegation was concerned with this aspect) (The Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment 1997b). Their lip service consisted inter alia of attempts to 
weaken the language in the article on Farmers’ Rights. US for example suggested altering 
“ensure their participation” to “arrangements in which they may participate” (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin 1998:10). Since the negotiations at times reached a deadlock and they 
did not get their will, the US delegation considered on several occasions to withdraw from the 
negotiations (Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). This put the other countries in a predicament, as they 
did not know how much to give in to the demands of the US. Even if they complied with the 
American proposals, they had no guarantee that the US would sign or ratify the final 
agreement, as illustrated in the CBD process. However, in 1997 the procrastinating behaviour 
of the US led to discussions on excluding the Americans from further discussions (The 
Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1997b).  
Nevertheless, there were routine changes in the American delegation around 1998 
(Bretting 2003 [interview]). In the following years, the US negotiators won admiration for 
their constructive sincerity (ETC group 2001a:15). However, they filed a last minute proposal 
on security which did not gain any support. Thus, they had an excuse not to sign when the 
treaty was adopted in November 2001. According to the ETC group (2001a:15), Canada 
astonished many G-77 countries with its unsympathetic and uncompromising posture. 
According to their own judgement, Canada tried to find compromises, but its role in clarifying 
issues was not always recognised (Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). Australia also showed little 
willingness to co-operate. During the Montreux meeting it become an outsider because of its 
implacable opposition to Farmers’ Rights and its delaying tactics (ETC group 1999). The US, 
Canada and Australia in particular often delayed the process because they had to consult with 
their capitals. Japan and New Zealand played a more marginal role in the JUSCANZ 
coalition. 
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EU and the European Region 
As opposed to the JUSCANZ countries’ reluctance to Farmers’ Rights, the EU was far more 
positive to the demands of developing countries. They could recognise Farmers’ Rights as 
something more than just a mere “concept” of conservation. They recognised the need to 
create some benefit sharing mechanisms. However, they did not accept IPR for farmers’ 
varieties and they advocated national responsibility for implementation. The explanation for 
the EU’s position is mainly found in its agricultural sector (Borring 2002; Latin American 
delegate 2003 [interviews]). Compared to for example the North American sector, there are 
far more farms that are still family run due to public support. Regarding IPR, it is more 
common with plant breeders’ rights in the EU, and the opposition to patents is strong.91 
Environmental and other concerns make the Europeans sceptic to GMOs. Due to a de facto 
EU moratorium on the recognition of new GMOs in 1998, the US launched a case against EU 
in the court of WTO in spring 2003 (The Office of United States Trade Representative 2004). 
 The EU’s position was between the developing countries and the JUSCANZ countries. 
Did the Union use this position to influence the outcome by being a compromise supplier? 
During the years of negotiations, the EU and G-77 got closer to each other. However, due to 
partly unsuccessful co-ordination, because of divergence of views internally and inflexible 
negotiating tactics, the EU did not manage to fill its potentially very important role as 
intermediary (Borring; Evjen; Fowler 2002; Smith 2003 [interviews]). Trying to achieve a 
common EU position was rather like a negotiation within the negotiations and was definitely 
not always easy, particularly when the negotiations took a direction that the EU was 
unprepared for. Within the EU, there are a mixture of interests combining narrow self-
interests and more idealistic views, though many EU delegates sought to develop pragmatic 
and realistic positions which would further the progress of the negotiations. This mixture can 
have confused the developing countries, which made it easier for them to relate to the pure 
“realpolitik” of the North Americans (Borring 2002; Egziabhar 2003 [interviews]). The text 
on Farmers’ Rights that was accepted stemmed from an American proposal rather than a 
European one. If the EU had managed to be more vigorous and effective, it is possible that the 
article on Farmers’ Rights could have been more committing. On the other hand, it is believed 
that the article on Farmers' Rights would have been even weaker had it not been for the EU's 
influence (Smith 2003 [interview]). It must be said, however, that the EU played a much more 
dynamic role in later stages of the negotiations and was instrumental in helping to find 
solutions to many issues, including the articles on access and benefit sharing. At the same 
time, co-ordination within the European Region developed in a positive way and became an 
important vehicle for the dynamics of the negotiations (Borring 2002 [interview]). 
 
Conclusion 
The assumptions of the power-based perspectives are misleading as regards the dominance of 
powerful states. They were not capable of dictating the outcome. If the EU had joined the 
JUSCANZ countries’ opposition against Farmers’ Rights, the probability of fulfilling the 
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power-based prediction would have been higher. Still, even if the two coalitions of powerful 
states had been united, I do not think the negotiation outcome would have been essentially 
different. The EU’s relatively strong sympathy for the developing countries’ request for 
Farmers’ Rights might have obstructed a weaker breakthrough. However, the EU’s 
acceptance of Farmers’ Rights as something more than a mere concept, could be seen as just 
lip service, since the responsibility of realising these rights rests with national governments. A 
strong recognition of Farmers’ Rights would have threatened the interests of the powerful 
states particularly regarding their views on intellectual property rights, because a legally 
binding recognition of farmers’ right to save, sell and exchange farm-saved seeds from 
protected varieties would limit the scope of rights of the patent holder or plant breeder.  
Because of their greater resources and because they were less in need of an agreement, 
the powerful states used delaying tactics in their attempts to achieve their goals. Therefore, 
powerful states were more prominent during the negotiations than the average country. The 
fierce resistance of particularly some of the JUSCANZ countries against the strong 
recognition of Farmers’ Rights explains why it was so difficult for developing countries to get 
their interests through. Moreover, Japan and the US demonstrated their independence and 
superiority, by being the only two states not to sign the treaty on its adoption in November 
2001.92 On the other hand, if I had excluded the power-based perspective from my 
explanatory framework, the above average prominence of the powerful states would have 
been lost. Having said this, I would like to add that abusive tactics are not confined to 
powerful states, as the Brazilian behaviour illustrates. 
In summary, the power-based perspective does explain a bit, but not much, regarding 
the medium breakthrough for the developing countries’ demand for Farmers’ Rights. With 
high expectations about achieving a broader understanding, I now move on to the interest-
based perspective. 
7.2 Interplay between Interests and Institutions 
Did different institutional factors have significance for the medium breakthrough? Following 
the outline of the theory chapter, I will first look at factors that are associated with arena, 
before looking at factors connected with actor. In the last section, I will analyse the 
developing countries’ issue specific power. 
7.2.1 Institution-as-arena 
As can be recalled from the theory chapter when arena mechanisms of institution facilitate the 
development of an agreement between self-interested countries, it usually involves giving and 
taking by all parties sake. Presumably, developing countries will gain something during such 
a process. Hence, there is a potential for a strong breakthrough for them. The factors 
associated with arena include both the characteristics of the arena where the negotiations take 
place, formal and informal rules and how the negotiations are conducted.  
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The conditioning of the influence of the most powerful states is inter alia framed by 
the decision-making procedures in UN organs like FAO. During the negotiations in CGRFA, 
all countries have one vote, hence equalising superpowers with Lilliputian states. Although 
rich states have more resources at hand making them potentially more prepared and 
represented in the negotiations, they still only have one vote and one say. Since the majority 
of the members of the CGRFA are developing countries, they have proportionally more to say 
compared to their material capabilities. Of course, if this majority values the participation and 
resources of richer countries, they need to consider their interests when negotiating. However, 
the “meat power” of developing countries contributed to prevent one single party – including 
the powerful countries – from dictating the wording of the International Treaty.93 
Regarding rules, the renegotiations of the International Undertaking involved the 
discussion of one article at a time – similar to other negotiations in FAO. Since most of the 
essential questions like access, benefit sharing, funding and Farmers’ Rights are interrelated, 
these rules made the actors more reluctant to give their final acceptance to an article since 
they wanted to await the outcome of the other articles. This was obvious for example in the 
case of access: the developing countries did not want to accept wide access before they were 
assured satisfactory benefit sharing. After all, it took five years to unbracket the first article - 
Farmers’ Rights in April 1999. There were some informal efforts to reopen the discussions, 
from the Philippines and at the request of NGOs (GRAIN 2000; Via Campesina 2001). 
However, due to the practice of not reopening agreed articles this was not done. 
Consequently, it is possible to argue that these rules made it more difficult for the states to 
agree on an article and indirectly more difficult for the developing countries to gain support 
for their views. 
Arguably, all relevant parties where included, since all FAO Member States could take 
part and non-state actors were free to observe the plenary sessions. With so many actors 
sitting around the table, however, the plenary discussions often ended up as unilateral 
declarations and turned out less efficient. This reduced political feasibility find solutions 
favoured, according to the law of the least ambitious program, the minimum definition of 
Farmers’ Rights presented by US, rather than the comprehensive definition presented by the 
developing countries. The organising of the negotiations affected the degree to which this 
“program” was activated. The regional meetings before the plenary sessions, for example, 
reduced the practical number of voices to be heard, with a subsequent increase in political 
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feasibility. Variations to size, inclusiveness and formality of sessions, also contributed in this 
direction. For example, the establishment of smaller groups like the open-ended working 
groups and closed contact groups speeded up progress because the number of parties was 
reduced. The law of the least ambitious program was, however, not fully circumvented when 
the size was reduced, as most regions and positions were usually represented in the smaller 
groups as well. The dismantling of the negotiations therefore only partly enhanced the 
possibility of reaching an agreement closer to the developing countries’ proposal than the 
American proposal. Furthermore, this way of organising the negotiations was 
disadvantageous for the developing countries, as they did not have the resources to attend 
several meetings taking place at the same time (FAO 1994b: Appendix C).  
The working groups and contact groups differed as to inclusiveness. While all 
countries and observers could participate in the former, the latter was reserved for the 
countries selected for the group. This influenced the effectiveness of the work in the groups. 
According to Earth Negotiations Bulletin (1998), it was apparent that the negotiations on 
Farmers’ Rights suffered from the fact that they were carried out in a working group. The 
unwieldiness of the group meant that little progress was made. In contrast, a strong Chair in 
the Contact Group and a smaller gathering of delegates led to greater flexibility and 
clarification of positions. After all, the agreement on the article pertaining to Farmers’ Rights 
was reached in a closed contact group.  
As the negotiation atmosphere often suffered from a polarised climate, informal 
meetings turned out to be an important supplement to the formal sessions in order to push the 
process forward. At least four “types” of informal meetings took place: The first category is 
the “friends of the chair”- meetings that took place during the ordinary sessions. They were 
necessary for loosening up deadlocks. They can be described as the least informal, as they 
were integrated parts of the formal sessions. The second category was informal meetings 
arranged by individual countries. They can be described as the most informal as the CGRFA 
did not have any responsibility for them. Such meetings where held both in Norway, Denmark 
and Sweden. The informal expert meeting in Montreux in January 1999 constitutes a third 
category as a personal initiative of the Chairman. In addition, informal discussions took place 
at private initiatives for example during lunchtime.  
The informal meetings were often efficient because the participants took part as 
individuals and not as representatives of any government (apart from the “Friends of the 
Chair” meetings). This made it possible to talk more freely and be more creative. If 
governments did not like the outcome of the informal talks, they could just say that it was an 
independent individual present at the meeting who did not represent the views of the 
government (Fowler 2002 [interview]). Several possible solutions where raised for the first 
time during these informal meetings, for example the idea of a list of plants to be included in 
the Multilateral System.94 In addition, it was easier to clear up misunderstandings under 
informal circumstances. However, it was also a challenge for the participants to become too 
personal. It was difficult to say something at an informal meeting that was contradictory to the 
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positions you later had to defend in the formal negotiations (Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). 
Particularly the informal expert meeting in Montreux turned out to be a turning point in the 
negotiations as it had created an area of overlap between the parties’ proposals (Bretting; 
Fraleigh 2003 [interviews]). Although Farmers’ Rights remained a controversial issue at 
Montreux with no consensus reached, the impact of the Montreux meeting is evident as the 
final text on Farmers’ Rights is almost identical to the draft article from the Swiss meeting. 
Since the smaller gatherings were more effective than the larger ones, the closed 
sessions were more effective than the open-ended ones, and the informal meetings more 
effective than the formal ones, why keep the plenary sessions? The reason lies in the 
transparency of the plenary sessions, which is a precondition for the legitimacy of the 
decisions. When the small, closed or informal sessions were perceived as not transparent 
enough, distrust reduced the efficiency. Since the “Friends’ of the Chair” meetings were less 
publicised, some delegations wondered what schemes were being hatched by these 
“unknown” friends (Ukabc 2001).95  
In summary, the formal and informal sessions seem to have been important 
complementary elements for reaching an agreement as they served different needs. The 
informal meetings tended to be more efficient and ensured progress. However, this progress 
would not have occurred without the legitimacy created from the transparency of the formal 
sessions. The different forms of formal meetings - from plenary sessions via open-ended 
working groups to closed contact groups – also seem to vary, from ever less transparent to 
increasingly efficient.  
 
Table 7.1: The degree of efficiency and transparency depends on type of formality, 
inclusiveness and number of actors. 
Transparency 
 
Efficiency Low High 
Low -- informal, closed, few 
High formal, open-ended, many -- 
      
An important effect of institution-as-arena is the facilitation of meetings between the 
different states. Despite the general assumption that states are unitary and have full 
information, state actors were not as well informed about the interests and priorities of the 
other participants in the area of agro-biodiversity. The fact that they met regularly at the 
headquarters of FAO in Rome facilitated a situation where they could meet and learn about 
each other’s positions. In order to tap the integrative potential you have to know in which 
issues there are common interests and in which there are divergent views. Another 
consequence of these meetings was the strategic adjusting of positions. New information 
sometimes changed states’ cost-and benefit calculus, which was followed by corresponding 
changes in strategies to maximise their own benefit and avoid stalemates. For example, what 
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had appeared to be a too hasty reaction by Egziabhar in April 1999 when the Farmers’ Rights 
Article was adopted, was due to a rational modification of Ethiopia’s cost/benefit calculus 
rather than a mistake (see box 7.1). 
 
Box 7.1: Illustration of strategic change of cost-and-benefit calculus. 
Ethiopia Adjusts its Position 
Ethiopia was among the countries pushing the hardest for Farmers’ Rights. Such rights could 
include several aspects, such as land rights and an international fund to finance the 
implementation. After an informal discussion with an American delegate, however, the 
Ethiopian delegate reviewed his opinion. They had discussed the problems of seed 
conservation by farming communities and what the treaty could do for them. This is how 
Egziabhar recalls the situation: 
 
American: The private sector should get in and help them. 
Egziabhar: But the private sector will just buy the land and plant homogenous seeds?! 
American: Yes. 
Egziabhar: What is then the contribution of the private sector for the conservation of plant 
genetic resources? 
American: The private sector must be brought in. 
Egziabhar: Are you being ideological now? 
American: Yes. Groups should never have rights granted to them because fascism and 
communism build on community rights. Community rights could repress individual rights. 
 
After this conversation, Egziabhar realised how strongly the US was against Farmers’ Rights. 
He told me that he did not support the comparison between small-scale farmers in developing 
countries with Nazis and communists, but in order to ever achieve an international agreement 
including Farmers’ Rights, he had to redefine Ethiopia’s demands. More important than 
having an international fund was to ensure that those countries which wanted Farmers’ 
Rights, had the opportunity to grant such rights nationally.  
Source: Egziabhar 2003 [interview]. 
 
Conclusion 
Characteristics of the actual negotiation arena seem to have some credit for the partial success 
of the developing countries. Most of the other institutional factors seem to have pulled in 
different directions, however. New ways of organising the negotiations helped to move the 
process forwards and was therefore an essential precondition getting an agreement on 
Farmers’ Rights at all. Delegates from both developing and developed countries had to 
modify their initial proposals to make them more realistic in terms of what their counterparts 
would accept. The informal meetings were particularly important in this respect, as they 
facilitated a search for common ground instead of just repeating distinct and distant proposals 
on Farmers’ Rights in plenary sessions. In addition, the different ways of conducting the 
negotiations helped to partly circumvent the law of the least ambitious program, hence 
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moving the Farmers’ Rights Article from the minimum American definition closer to the 
developing countries’ definition. On the other hand, the search for a common ground also 
forced the developing countries to adjust their initial proposals. In summary, the factors 
associated with institution-as-arena go some way in explaining the medium breakthrough for 
developing countries. 
7.2.2 Entrepreneurial Leadership 
The issues included in the mandate for the renegotiations of the IUPGR were decided at an 
early stage. The way to frame these issues, however, was not fixed. If entrepreneurial leaders 
frame issues in such a way that the demands of developing countries are addressed in a 
favourable way for them, a strong breakthrough for developing countries is possible. I have 
identified such leaders among persons with both formal and informal positions during the 
negotiations. 
Secretariats are in a formal position to conduct entrepreneurial leadership. Besides, 
they have the best qualifications for fulfilling the role as entrepreneurial leader since they are 
the only actors that are independent of national interests and with an institutional role and 
memory (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999:7). Previously, in the late 1980s, the FAO secretariat 
was known to have been proactive in favour of the interests of the developing countries, but 
they were more even-handed during the revision of the IUPGR. In the last stages of the Treaty 
negotiations, the impression was that the Director General of FAO did not do much to 
enhance the negotiation process, although political attention and priority from a high level 
may have accelerated the progress (Borring 2002 [interview]). The secretariat of the CGRFA 
on the other hand, was dedicated to the process. 
The Secretary of the CGRFA, José Esquinas-Alcázar was actively engaged in the 
revision of the IUPGR. Together with his Assistant Secretary, Clive Stannard, he 
professionally facilitated the negotiations, winning respect from all member countries (ETC 
group 2001a:15). They did not have the mandate to negotiate, but they identified issues that 
were complex and unclear. They provided a “non-paper” that elaborated on inter alia 
Farmers’ Rights, which incorporated aspects of Farmers’ Rights proposed by the developing 
countries and identified remaining issues (FAO 1996). In order to clarify difficult issues, they 
provided Background Study Papers written by scientists and other experts that were 
independent of FAO and the negotiating governments. As time dragged out, the ordinary 
budget of the CGRFA was not sufficient to finance the participation of developing countries. 
Requesting additional funding was therefore another function of the secretariat.  
While the secretariat worked hard to carry out the negotiations smoothly, Ambassador 
Fernando Gerbasi from Venezuela chaired the Commission from 1997 until the end. Did he 
use his formal position as chairman to exercise entrepreneurial leadership? Gerbasi actively 
framed the issues on the agenda by setting up working groups and contact groups as well as 
temporary groups of “friends’ of the chair” to discuss difficult questions in more confidential 
settings. Despite his efforts over two years to move the negotiations ahead, negotiations had 
come very close to a total standstill by 1998, having produced an overly long, unreadable and 
almost completely bracketed negotiation text (GRAIN 2000). During a consultation round in 
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August that year he visited, inter alia laggards like Brazil and USA, in an attempt to make 
them more supportive to the process. The Montreux meeting in January 1999 took place on 
his initiative. At that meeting, he suggested discarding the heavily bracketed negotiation 
drafts, and to start from scratch. He presented the results of the meeting at the next session in 
the CGRFA as the “Chair’s Elements”, which constituted a much clearer negotiation draft. 
This made it easier to focus the discussions. In April 1999, he also initiated the establishment 
of the permanent Contact Group.  
Gerbasi followed the formal and informal rules of international negotiations always 
with progress in mind. Rene Salazar from the Philippines had fought to reverse the “Farmers’ 
Rights blunder” (ETC group 2001a:15), but Gerbasi refused to reopen the discussions on 
Farmers’ Rights after a consensus had been reached in 1999. Because there  
were several controversial issues besides Farmers’ Rights, a reopening of this issue might 
have upset the negotiations. All my informants expressed satisfaction with the work done by 
Gerbasi. The ETC group describes him as “the single most important factor in the success of 
the negotiations” (ETC group 2001a:15). But is it necessary to have an institutional role such 
as Chair in order to be an entrepreneurial leader? 
 
 
Illustration by the ETC group: The Norwegian delegate Jan Borring separates the 
fronts and calls for his colleague, Grethe Evjen. According to the ETC group, Norway 
had the most effective delegation (ETC group 2001a). 
 
The Norwegian delegation proved that this is not. Jan Borring was one of the few delegates 
who took part in the negotiations throughout the whole process. Grethe Evjen joined him in 
1998. While all the countries were perceived as only fighting to maximise their own self-
interests, Norway was looking for compromises (Fowler 2002 [interview]). Norway wanted 
an open access regime, strong restrictions on IPR, mandatory benefit sharing and recognition 
of Farmers’ Rights that also developing countries could accept. It was faithful to its 
principles, and sometimes portrayed as “more royal than the king” (Fraleigh 2003 
[interview]). For its views, Norway was not always popular among the other OECD countries, 
but it did not always support the developing countries either.  
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The Norwegian delegation was creative and many of the breakthroughs occurred 
following Norwegian proposals (Stannard 2003 [interview]). For example, they made some 
suggestions as to how the Chair could address the issues on the agenda;: by regularly 
changing topics, announcing breaks more frequently, asking 2/3/4 delegates to meet and see if 
they can agree on something, and making clear at the beginning of meetings that time would 
not be spent according to how long people wanted to discuss items, but the aim of the meeting 
was to cover all issues on the agenda (Borring 2000). Due to the interlinkage of the issues, 
Norway advocated the idea of discussing package deals rather than one issue at a time. 
Furthermore, Norway initiated together with the other Nordic countries informal consultations 
in Norway, Denmark and Sweden, and efficiently headed the European Region during the last 
part of the negotiations.  
 As a supplier of compromises, Norway built bridges between the traditional blocs of 
OECD and G-77. Jokingly, it was said that the country’s contribution to the negotiation 
process was disproportionate to its contribution in plant breeding (Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). 
This absence of strong economic interests in the breeding sector partly explains why Norway 
could take on this role as mediator (Fowler 2002 [interview]). The Norwegians were trusted 
because they did not have a desire to rule the world (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]). Thus, as a 
small country, Norway was in an advantageous position compared to their great power 
colleagues. In addition, as a Western European country and not member of the EU, they were 
freer to adapt to how the discussions developed during the sessions. Such flexibility was a 
necessary condition for Norway to play the role it did. Besides, the EU did not always, 
particularly not in the early stages, manage to play a central role. Hence, there was room for 
other actors to take the lead. For that matter, Norway’s line in the negotiations was in 
harmony with its general foreign policy as a small and marginal country favouring strong 
multilateral regimes. But were Norway’s positions supportive for developing countries? 
They were so in at least three ways. First, Norway worked for addressing the issues in 
package deals rather than one article at a time. The JUSCANZ countries did not want to mix 
the issues of access and benefit sharing, while developing countries favoured such a 
structuring of the negotiations. Besides, the delaying effects of discussing one article at a time 
might have been reduced by the package deals. Second, Norway worked for issues of 
importance for developing countries, including mandatory benefit sharing and the importance 
of in situ conservation. On several occasions it stressed that the right of farmers to save, sell 
and exchange farm-saved seeds was an essential part of Farmers’ Rights. Third, Norway, like 
some other countries, financially supported the participation of developing countries. For 
example in May 1997 African countries had a thorough preparation process before the 
session, which made them more prepared and thus more able to protect their interests. 
Jan Borring was described as “the Norwegian delegate who has emerged as a pivotal 
figure in the talks” in The Financial Times (22 June 2001). All in all, personalities dominated 
the whole negotiation process. Since few countries had stable delegations, the contribution of 
the various countries differed according to the individual representatives. When for example 
Linda Brown from the UK took part, the UK gave constructive contributions in the 
discussions on Farmers’ Rights. Johan Bodegård from Sweden was the most proficient chair 
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of the EU, but when Sweden no longer had the EU presidency, he did not return to Rome. 
Germany was very active in Leipzig, but after that, their involvement dropped (Borring; 
Fowler 2002 [interviews]). Zofia Bulinska Radomska from Poland also supported Farmers’ 
Rights (ETC group 2001a:15). Other constructive players from the European region included 
Peter Vermeij from the Netherlands, Lise Steffensen from Denmark, Gert Kleijer from 
Switzerland and Dieter Obst from the EC Commission. Potential entrepreneurial leaders from 
the developing countries will be dealt with in the next section. 
A paper by Susan Bragdon (2000) at IPGRI suggesting different legal mechanisms 
that may have helped the parties overcome the barriers that caused them to act with suspicion, 
can be called an attempt to conduct entrepreneurial leadership by an international 
organisation. I have not found any references to her suggestions, which included memoranda 
of understanding and letters of intent. This may illustrate the difficulty of non-state actors to 
play a leading role in this sense, as they only took part in the negotiations as observers. 
 
Conclusion 
Individuals earning the label entrepreneurial leaders seem to have been crucial for the 
adoption of the ITPGRFA, thus supporting Young’s assumption that leadership is a necessary 
condition for regime formation. These leaders have in several aspects also been fundamental 
in addressing the issues in such a way that the developing countries partly got their interests 
included. Integrated package deals have been particularly important in this regard. The 
secretariat’s good relations with all member states gave them credibility across the North-
South divide. Although they did not have the mandate to negotiate, their mandate allowed for 
activities, such as the “non-paper” and financial support which were a positive contribution to 
the developing countries. The leadership of the Chairman was more neutral in this respect, 
while some European countries, particularly Norway, were important in framing how 
Farmers’ Rights were addressed. Because all these leaders took many considerations into 
account, the support for developing countries was not absolute. Thus, this factor of 
entrepreneurial leadership also goes a long way in explaining the medium breakthrough for 
developing countries. 
7.2.3 Issue-specific Power 
If developing countries have issue specific power, they have a chance to get their interests 
reflected in the negotiation outcome. Thus, a strong breakthrough is possible. I will now 
analyse the two components of such power, basic game power and negotiation power 
respectively (Underdal 1997a). 
 
Basic Game Power 
Basic game power refers to the parties’ control over the resources in question as well as their 
economic and technological capacity to make use of the resources. Although agro-
biodiversity is not evenly distributed, no country is self-sufficient in plant genetic resources 
(Kloppenburg 1988; Palacios 1999). This interdependence among states establishes the 
rationale for the multilateral system for access to PGRFA. However, some rich countries and 
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large corporations could well manage a situation without a treaty, as they can afford bilateral 
agreements to access these vital resources (Fowler 2002 [interview]). Furthermore, there 
seems to be less interest in the South’s germplasm for agricultural purposes.. While the need 
for traditional varieties and wild relatives was widely acknowledged in the 1950s (Pistorius 
1997:18), breeders’ associations like ASSINSEL say that farmers’ varieties play an 
insignificant role in modern breeding (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Royal 
Botanic Gardens Key 1999). Kerry ten Kate and Sarah Laird (1999:155) account for 
industry’s need for and interest in South’s germplasm as follows:  
Companies’ confidence that adequate collections for the next few decades are easily 
available without the need for prior informed consent and benefit-sharing, and the 
disadvantages of working with unadapted and primitive germplasm, mean that they 
are not prepared to engage in speculative investment in access to new, unadapted or 
primitive germplasm. This limits their demand for access and their enthusiasm for 
benefit-sharing. The sad truth is that there is not sufficient, ongoing demand for new 
materials for there to be the political will to make commitments on benefit-sharing. 
Although the raw material to the biotechnological industry always has to come from 
somewhere, the limited demand for access to farmers’ varieties therefore reduced the basic 
game power of the developing countries. This subsequently weakened the strength of their 
claims for Farmers’ Rights during the negotiations. Since more gene materials are now 
collected and stored in gene banks, the dependency on developing countries as providers of 
germplasm is reduced. Consequently, it was very important for the advocates of Farmers’ 
Rights to reach an agreement now (Borring 2002 [interview]). One consequence of this 
limited interest in farmers’ varieties is that potential IPR protection of traditional PGRFA and 
their wild and weedy relatives are likely to have small economic value, especially if the 
protected subject matter originates from in situ conditions (Girsberger 1999:317). In addition, 
Fowler, Smale and Gaiji (2001) claim that the developing countries in recent years have 
increased their dependency on germplasm from abroad, particularly on improved germplasm 
from the CGIAR centres. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that the developing 
countries are just getting back resources that they supplied the gene banks with earlier. It is 
precisely the high contribution of PGRFA from developing countries to the gene banks that 
make the developed countries less dependent on the “South” today, because they have free 
access to the gene banks. Furthermore, what also reduces the developing countries’ basic 
game power is the fact that their economic and technological capacity to use these resources is 
far smaller than is the case for most developed countries (Rosendal 1999:147). Conventional 
breeding as well as modern biotechnology is still at an advanced level in mainly OECD 
countries. 
There is apparently a paradox regarding the value of the South’s germplasm. On the 
one hand, little value is ascribed to it by the breeding industry. On the other hand, it is 
perceived unfortunate that traditional varieties are being lost. For example, recent efforts to 
collect and conserve wild relatives of peanuts in Bolivia and papaya in Colombia have been 
turned away (Fowler 2002). These varieties are now extinct. The concern for such losses 
contributes to the belief of Northern governments that the South’s participation in the regime 
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is necessary in order to solve the environmental problem of genetic erosion. This perceptible 
paradox is linked to the fact that PGRFA have high agricultural value as shared and 
accessible resources, and low economic value when exclusive rights are placed on them 
(either through IPR or national access regulation). 
While it is not a straightforward task to assess developing countries’ basic game 
power regarding their control over the resources in question, the important issue during the 
negotiations was that the developed countries to a less extent perceived the South’s 
germplasm to be important and valuable for them. I will return to two questions related to 
basic game power in connection with the knowledge-based perspective (see section 7.3): first, 
I will argue that the high percentage of the material stored in international gene banks that 
stem from the South means a moral obligation for benefit sharing and Farmers’ Rights. 
Second, developed and developing countries perceive the situation and evaluation of the 
sources of basic game power differently. In summary, I only find limited scope for the 
developing countries’ basic game power when considering control over resources other than 
desire and the technology to utilise them. 
 
Negotiation Power 
Negotiation power refers to capabilities based on strength in numbers, coalitions, and 
leadership (Underdal 1997a: 17). As in many other forums under the UN umbrella, the 
renegotiations of the International Undertaking divided the FAO Member States into two 
groups: The Group of 77 Developing Countries plus China (G-77, -which now consist of a 
higher number of countries) on the one hand and the OECD Member States on the other. 
Based on strength in numbers, the G-77 countries form a majority in UN forums and hence 
have potentially strong negotiation power. Nevertheless, I will argue that an insufficiently 
organised coalition due to divergent interests, an insufficiently developed national policy and 
limited resources reduced this power. 
Despite the notion of a clear North versus South dimensions in the discussions 
regarding plant genetic resources, it became apparent that the different regions of the Third 
World had divergent interests, with subsequent consequences for creating a strong coalition. 
The issue of Farmers’ Rights was the most strongly advocated by African countries, 
especially Ethiopia, Angola and Cameroon. Tewolde Egziabhar represented Ethiopia at many 
of the negotiation sessions and his country was perceived as the main counterpart to the 
JUSCANZ countries regarding Farmers’ Rights. The Philippines (Rene Salazar) and India 
(though this varied a lot from representative to representative) also supported the recognition 
of such rights (Borring 2002 [interview]). During the negotiation process, India started the 
pioneering work of legislating Farmers’ Rights nationally. This showed India’s commitment 
to this issue. 
The modernised agricultural sector of several Latin American countries faces different 
challenges than the African and Asian smallholding farmers. In general, the support for 
UPOV was strong among some Latin American countries (ibid.). Uruguay in particular 
refused to accept the right of farmers to use farm-saved seeds in a traditional way as part of 
Farmers’ Rights. Brazil and Colombia read the CBD paragraphs on prior informed consent 
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and benefit sharing literally and strongly supported the benefit sharing aspect of Farmers’ 
Rights. Furthermore, they paved the way for a ‘bilateralisation’ of international germplasm 
transfers.  
Argentina was perceived as “a flag-bearer for the Cairns Group” and “the delegation 
rarely bothered to pretend membership in the G77” (ETC group 2001a:13). They feared that 
Farmers’ Rights could be used as a tool by the Europeans to continue to subsidise their 
agriculture (anonymous Latin American delegate 2003 [interview]). Due to the historical 
genocide of the Indians, there are no local farmers left in Argentina and Farmers’ Rights 
therefore only have indirect relevance for this country. According to one Latin American 
delegate, Farmers’ Rights should give opportunities for rural farmers to improve their quality 
of life. A lot of rural farmers come from Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia and settle in 
shantytowns in Buenos Aires because their living standards are so low. Thus, he concludes 
that Farmers’ Rights is an excellent tool for studies on how to improve the living standards of 
rural populations (ibid.). 
The list of crops to be covered by the Multilateral System also made the absence of a 
coalition among the developing countries perceptible as they were not willing to include 
“their” plants. When China did not want to include soybeans, Malaysia refused to include oil 
palm and Latin America rejected the inclusion of tomatoes. The only issue where the 
developing countries were clearly united was about financial transfers from the North 
(Borring 2002 [interview]). One representative from the developing countries claims that G-
77 was united in its stand on Farmers’ Rights (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]). Another 
representative stresses that Ethiopia was the main proponent of the issue, while most other 
developing countries were bystanders (Lim 2003 [interview]). My perception is that the 
African countries were by far the most consistent defenders of Farmers’ Rights, with the 
blessing of the Asian countries. In their rhetoric, the Latin American countries seemed 
sympathetic too, but due to their UPOV-allegiance I find that they were supportive of a less 
comprehensive definition of Farmers’ Rights than the two other regions. This is summarised 
in the figure below.96  
 
Minimum FR                      Maximum FR  
 
 
                            Latin America                              Asia      Africa 
                                          (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay)              (Philippines, India)  (Angola, Ethiopia) 
 
Figure 7.1: The regions of the “South” on the continuum of Farmers’ Rights (FR) and 
the most active countries are highlighted. The most active countries on the issue are 
highlighted as several countries in each region were bystanders. 
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While some developing countries had well-defined national interests, this was not the case for 
numerous other G-77 countries (Borring; Fowler 2002; Egziabhar; Fraleigh; Lim 2003 
[interviews]). Several Southern governments did not understand what was at stake; hence, 
they did not develop a national policy. The position of Kenya during the negotiations, for 
example, was up to the Kenyan delegate to decide. A trip to Rome was considered a reward 
rather than an opportunity to fight for national interests. This resulted in a situation of high 
turnover and poorly prepared delegates. Many delegates did not know exactly what Farmers’ 
Rights were, just that they were considered to be in the interests of the South. Several issues 
were raised as part of Farmers’ Rights, which by other delegates were believed to exceed the 
core of the concept. This might have reduced the developed countries’ willingness to accept 
the developing countries’ proposal on Farmers’ Rights. According to Egziabhar, the high 
turnover and relative poor level of preparedness, did not affect the developing countries 
influence on the issue of Farmers’ Rights (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]). Another delegate 
believed that the poor level of preparedness related to high turnover reduced the delegates’ 
innovative abilities and therefore slowed down the negotiation process (Borring 2002 
[interview]). On the other hand, one delegate viewed the causality of turnover and duration 
differently: there was a high turnover because the negotiations lasted long (Fraleigh 2003 
[interview]).  
The concept of Farmers’ Rights is very complex and several of the objections and 
critical remarks are related to the practical operationalisation of the concept. This is for 
example what Barry Greengrass from the UPOV secretariat says about IPR for farmers’ 
varieties (Greengrass 1996:51):  
If someone is to be granted a legal right to a plant variety that may need to be 
enforced in the courts, then the identity of the plant variety or material must be 
establishable. This is one of the key features that underlines the whole basis of 
Farmers’ Rights. If the material cannot be identified, it will impose limitations in any 
system that is created. There is no point in creating a new form of rights unless it can 
be enforced in practice. 
The developing countries provided only to a little extent work and suggestions for how their 
proposal on Farmers’ Rights could be put to work. The Indian legislation as well as the 
African Model Law for collective rights are contributions in this regard (Ekpere 2000)97. 
Thus, it is possible that with more prepared and stable delegations and having clearly defined 
national positions that were operationalised, the developing countries would have become 
more influential than they were. This is partly due to the small resources that several 
developing countries had available to spend at these negotiations. Participation in 
international negotiations is costly, which made developing countries disadvantaged in 
comparison with developed countries. Many of the G-77 countries had to rely on support 
from donors in order to take part, and could rarely send more than a few persons, while 
developed countries often were strong in numbers. This became a problem for example when 
the plenary negotiations were divided into smaller groups. In combination with the developed 
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countries, the scarce resources made developing countries more susceptible to proposals from 
the rich countries (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]).98 Furthermore, their distrust of Europeans, 
made them go for the American proposal rather then the European one, even though the latter 
would have provided a wider recognition of Farmers’ Rights than the former (Borring 2002 
[interview]). In addition, critics insist that the range of claims made under the Farmers’ Rights 
umbrella far exceeded the mission of both CGRFA and the CBD, and should either be 
reduced or dropped altogether (Crucible II Group 2000:58).99 Developing countries’ 
‘inclusive’ definition of Farmers’ Rights may explain why they did not achieve a 
breakthrough for many of their ideas. In addition, it is claimed that Farmers’ Rights were of 
great importance for developing countries in the beginning, but as the years passed, they lost 
their focus on the issue in favour of benefit sharing (Fowler 2002 [interview]). In sum, 
divergent interests, unprepared delegations as well as poorly developed proposals weakened 
the coalition among the developing countries. 
Accordingly, leading this group was a challenge. Among the active delegates from the 
developing countries, Lim Engsiang of Malaysia comes closest to a description of an 
entrepreneurial leader. The ETC group gives him credit for being professional and pragmatic 
when constantly being positioned between “the abusive tactics of Brazil and the demands of 
Africa” (ETC group 2001a:14). Other individuals also provided effective leadership, but then 
more in the sense of group leaders who promote the interests of the group rather than 
entrepreneurial leaders who have to strive for a consensus. Egziabhar from Ethiopia put a lot 
of effort into co-ordinating the policy of the African countries. As the African delegates 
changed very often, he had a lot of work in briefing all of them. He made written comments 
on what had happened at previous sessions, what were the most conspicuous issues and what 
should be the positions of the African region (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]). According to 
Egziabhar, his written comments made the African policy more coherent when delegates from 
different African countries participated in different working groups. Fowler, representing 
IPGRI at the negotiations, however, has the impression that the developing countries were 
strongly and emotionally arguing for Farmers’ Rights for years without knowing what it was 
(Fowler 2002 [interview]). Rene Salazar from the Philippines was another prominent 
advocate for Farmers’ Rights and a leading person in the Asian Group. Informally he explored 
the possibilities for reopening the discussions on Farmers’ Rights after the unbracketing of the 
text in April 1999. The Brazilian delegation was also influential, but its main efforts were not 
directed at the recognition of Farmers’ Rights. 
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Conclusion 
There appears to be only limited scope for the developing countries’ basic game power. 
Apparently, a weak coalition and variable group leadership also reduced their negotiation 
power. This may to some extent account for the medium breakthrough of the developing 
countries' interests. Altogether, the variables connected to the interest-based perspective 
largely explain the medium breakthrough for the developing countries. Nevertheless, they do 
not explain everything. Where does for example the idea of Farmers’ Rights come from in the 
first place? I will now turn to the knowledge-based perspective to see if this approach has 
something to add to our understanding. 
7.3 Significance of ‘Knowledge’ 
Where did the states get their perceptions and preferences about Farmers’ Rights? Ideas and 
knowledge regularly play a significant role in shaping the beliefs and expectations of states 
involved in international co-operation. If intellectual leaders advocate knowledge and ideas 
that are favourable for developing countries claims on Farmers’ Rights, and diffusion of these 
norms takes place, a strong breakthrough is possible. Did anyone conduct such leadership 
during the revision of the IUPGR? 
 
Epistemic Communities 
Representatives from epistemic communities often attempt to influence national objectives 
and beliefs. According to Haas (1992:3) epistemic policy co-ordination is only likely to occur 
in the presence of (1) a high degree of uncertainty among policymakers, (2) a high degree of 
consensus among scientists, and (3) a high degree of institutionalisation of scientific advice. 
The complexity of the ITPGRFA negotiations demanded competence in plant genetic 
resources, intellectual property rights for plants and genes, the financial and technical aspects 
of germplasm flows and transfer agreement, as well as knowledge of the CBD. “Such a 
panoply of issues has even some developed countries concerned about their lack of expertise” 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2000:16). Furthermore, several linkages between the issues at 
hand are not clear-cut. Does for example IPR in reality restrict access?100 GRAIN claims that 
most of the 1990s negotiations seemingly dragged on in every direction except forward, 
largely because of confusion among the delegates about what was at stake (GRAIN 2000). 
Obviously, the uncertainty among policymakers was high, and the potential influence of the 
scientists present. What about consensus? 
As far as consensus is concerned, the Keystone Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic 
Resources is close to the description of an epistemic community (Rosendal 1999:173). Some 
of the Keystone representatives belonged to international organisations (including FAO), 
others were scientists or members of various NGOs. The declared goal of Keystone was to 
reach consensus among experts from varied disciplines, through informal debates (Keystone 
1988). Of relevance for international recognition of Farmers’ Rights, Keystone was “one of 
the first international forums to recognise the informal crop development system as 
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counterpart to the formal, institutional system” (de Boef, Berg and Haverkort 1996:103). 
During its second meeting in Madras, the final report recognised Farmers’ Rights and 
identified an international fund to implement them (Keystone, 1990). Since such a diverse 
group of individuals, including representatives from the breeding sector and the developed 
countries supported the idea of Farmers’ Rights, this gave increased legitimacy for the 
developing countries’ claims. 
IPGRI represented the CGIAR centres during the negotiations. The research 
institution achieved most of its main policy goals, like the adoption of the Multilateral System 
for access and benefit sharing (Sauvé and Watts 2003).101 This may be related to the 
presentation of their input in the negotiations as “science”, which may have increased the 
legitimacy of their suggestions. However, science is not necessarily either free of interests or 
true. IPGRI and the other CGIAR centres, for example, played a leading role in the green 
revolution, which increased food production. On the other hand, the high-yielding varieties 
from the laboratories of CGIAR replaced local varieties on a large scale, thus increasing the 
process of genetic erosion. Today, these centres are actively involved in controversial projects 
involving genetic engineering, like the well-known “Golden Rice”-project now being 
conducted at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines.102 Thus, with regard 
to the second condition for an epistemic community, I will argue that there is not a full 
scientific consensus in the issue area of plant genetic resources. 
  Regarding Haas’s third condition, scientific advice was to a large degree 
institutionalised in IPGRI. A study by Sauvé and Watts shows IPGRI’s importance as a 
leading source of scientific and technical information (Sauvé and Watts 2003:319). Numerous 
delegations to the negotiations had not prepared their own scientific data upon which to base 
their decisions. Through studies, seminars, formal interventions during negotiations and 
personal contact, IPGRI exerted their influence. Since the reduction of scientific uncertainty 
seems to have increased the prospects for states to reach an agreement, Haas’s notion of 
uncertainty rather than Young’s notion seems to describe the situation best. IPGRI’s paper on 
international germplasm transfers, explaining that developed countries today usually get their 
germplasm from other developed countries, and that developing countries to a large extent 
import germplasm, contributed to change the perceptions of hard-liners such as Brazil 
(Borring 2002 [interview]). Brazil had been tough on promoting strict access regimes and 
favouring “bilateralisation” of germplasm transfers. Some of the African delegates, however, 
were perceived as wishing to ignore such data (Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). Nevertheless, this 
study influenced the perception among developed countries of their dependency on 
germplasm from developing countries. Getting “scientific evidence” that they did not need the 
                                               
-<

 7
9#$	+V 		
	
 
!



-	'''+ 	#		

			
	
W	W

	

		
!
8
	!
	 
!		

Q
		 
!		

			
	 
		
		
				
 	+			
		

	
	
@

!		
	
	9$
	
!		
 
	
!+,%	
>
. !
 	#	$


4==   ==

2$0

 
'
PGRFA of the South had an impact on their views on the South’s basic game power. This 
made it harder for the developing countries to argue for Farmers’ Rights, particularly the 
benefit sharing part of these rights. 
Despite the lack of downright scientific consensus, IPGRI may be said to have been 
part of an epistemic community which encompassed members of IPGRI, members of the 
CGRFA Secretariat and the technically oriented members of national delegations (Sauvé and 
Watts 2003:324). The State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources and the Background 
Study papers prepared at the request of the Secretariat of the CGRFA, were also important in 
providing scientific knowledge on relevant issues. No direct references to the study papers 
were made during the negotiations, but they were inputs to various countries’ proposals and 
speeches (Smith; Stannard 2003 [interviews]).  
Another effect of this epistemic community is evident on the agenda for the revision 
of the IUPGR, since Farmers’ Rights became an item on the agenda partly due to the 
secretariat of the CPGR. In the early 1990s, José Esquinas-Alcázar believed that the draft for 
the CBD did not reflect the specific needs for preserving biodiversity in agriculture (Esquinas-
Alcázar 2003 [interview]). Gathering other delegates with an agricultural background who 
were present in Nairobi in 1992, they drafted a resolution declaring the issues of ex situ 
collections collected before CBD as well as Farmers’ Rights were unresolved. This resolution 
was adopted and prompted the mandate for the renegotiations of the International 
Undertaking. The fact that Farmers’ Rights were explicitly part of the mandate for the 
revision of the undertaking also made it easier for developing countries to confront the 
powerful states with their demands. Initially, the JUSCANZ countries were unwilling to 
discuss the issue. Despite their bargaining advantage, however, they did not manage to 
exclude Farmers’ Rights from the agenda. This illustrates the power of ideas. When Farmers’ 
Rights were included as an element in the issue area of agro-biodiversity in the 1980s, not 
even the only superpower in the world could remove it. 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations and Intellectual Leadership 
Did any NGO-representatives disseminate ideas about the desirability of certain arrangements 
of relevance for Farmers’ Rights? Obviously, the coining of the political idea of Farmers’ 
Rights by the NGO-activist Pat Mooney and Cary Fowler in the early and mid-1980s is 
fundamental (Fowler 1994:192).103 Since there were plant breeders’ rights, they considered 
that there should be Farmers’ Rights too. The argument was that farmers in developing 
countries are breeders too and should get credit for their work since modern breeders only add 
the last link in the chain in the development of modern varieties. In addition, through their 
agricultural practice they conserve PGRFA, in contrast to the monoculture of modern 
agriculture which reduces diversity. Commenting on the origin of the concept, Barry 
Greengrass in the UPOV secretariat says (Greengrass 1996:54): 
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If we had not adopted the expression “Breeder’s Right,” my guess is that Pat Mooney 
would not have come up with the idea of “Farmers’ Rights,” and we would not have 
allowed ourselves to be led down the wrong road as a result of the language that we 
have chosen to use.  
Linguistically, Farmers’ Rights "balanced" Plant Breeders Rights. Despite UPOV’s discontent 
with the creation of the concept, Mooney and Fowler lobbied the developing countries so 
successfully that Farmers’ Rights become one of the major issues for discussions at the CPGR 
during the 1980s and 1990s (CEAS 2000:43). In addition to the concept of Farmers’ Rights, 
they generally highlighted the role of traditional farming in conservation and the taxonomic 
knowledge of farmers. The words used evince the recognition of such farming and breeding. 
Farmers’ varieties used to be called primitive cultivars, which reflect a lack of recognition.  
 
Box 7.2: Illustration of NGOs’ recognition of farmers’ contributions in PGRFA 
development. 
Landraces or Farmers’ Varieties? 
Recognition of traditional varieties has been part of the political debate 
regarding Farmers’ Rights. The debate has sometimes had a more rhetorical 
than a substantial content. Cary Fowler recalls a discussion in the 1980s with 
Jaap Hardon, who was running a gene bank in the Netherlands. Fowler and 
other NGO-representatives referred to traditional varieties as farmers’ 
varieties. The argument was that these varieties were not just given by the land, 
but differed from other raw materials in that farmers had improved them. 
Hardon believed landraces was the proper name, and disagreed that inventions 
should be named after the inventors. He said that this was not the case 
regarding other inventions, “after all, we call it Landrover”, he said. However, 
Fowler and his colleagues where not convinced and considered farmers’ 
varieties still to be the legitimate name for the varieties as stake, so they 
replied: “but we have Volkswagen!” 
Source: Fowler 2002 [interview] 
 
Various accomplishments by NGOs like GRAIN, RAFI and UKabc during negotiations could 
be described as intellectual leadership in favour of the developing countries. First, the Gaia 
Foundation’s interference saying that it was the duty of the secretariat to help the poor and 
less resourceful countries get their interests attended to, and not to promote the interests of the 
rich. Second, the transfer of information to delegates at side events highlighting the 
importance of Farmers’ Rights and the negative consequences if farmers’ traditional right to 
save and use seeds is not recognised. Third, the writing of open letters to delegates, urging 
them to finalise the negotiations and reopen the discussions on Farmers’ Rights during the 
first half of 2001.104  
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Taken their own comments into account, the NGOs promoting Farmers’ Rights did 
not succeed as intellectual leaders in the sense that they felt that their ideas were incorporated 
in the treaty text. Via Campesina for example describes the text on Farmers’ Rights as a step 
backwards and a bleak lip service to what these rights should entail, in their opinion (Via 
Campesina 2001). The NGOs’ faultfinding publications in the most recent years may have 
came too late in the process to be influential. Besides, according to Cary Fowler, the NGOs 
favouring Farmers’ Rights participated irregularly and if leaders of the NGOs had joined the 
last sessions, representatives from developing countries would not even had recognised them 
(Fowler 2002 [interview]). Thus, Fowler believes that the medium breakthrough is associated 
with the fact that the developing countries were present but unprepared, while the NGOs were 
often prepared but not always present in the negotiation sessions. 
 
Table 7.2: One interpretation of the medium breakthrough is that actors promoting 
Farmers’ Rights were not present and well prepared at the same time. 
Presence 
 
Preparation Low High 
Low -- NGOs 
High Developing countries -- 
 
Why is Cary Fowler so critical? He seems to prove the fact that intellectual leaders generally 
have little ability to control the uses that others make of their ideas. Oran Young says this is 
“a fact that can become a source of irritation or even acute frustration on the part of those who 
dislike the way in which their ideas are applied to actual cases” (Young 1991:301). As time 
passed, Farmers’ Rights were increasingly connected to benefit sharing, which Fowler 
describes as “the first hi-jacking” (Fowler 2002 [interview]). Fowler and Mooney regarded 
the International Undertaking with a fund to promote conservation as providing a real and 
substantial benefit to farmers since it was protecting a resource that was disappearing. Thus, 
there was an element of benefit sharing in the original idea, but this was collective benefit 
sharing, not benefit sharing aimed at specific farmers, communities or countries. During the 
negotiations, however, benefit sharing became increasingly associated with monetary benefit 
sharing, which Fowler calls “the second hi-jacking”. The aspect of this last “hi-jacking” that 
he considers the most negative occurred when Farmers' Rights came to be used as a slogan for 
advocating a form of intellectual property rights for farmer varieties. According to Fowler, 
this was a serious and major misappropriation of the term (ibid.). For him, Farmers’ Rights 
are especially important in the connection of in situ conservation (see for example the Global 
Plan of Action, which to some extent is written by him) and he believes that non-monetary 
benefits are likely to far exceed any cash return that may result from the use of the genetic 
resources (Raymond and Fowler 2001). He gets support from Carlos Correa (2000:21), who 
says that “it would seem illogical to make Farmers’ Rights part of the IPRs system because it 
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is that very system that has created the problems that the concept of Farmers’ Rights aims to 
solve”. 
In general, my informants from the developed countries were very critical about the 
role played by the NGOs that favoured Farmers’ Rights. The NGOs were believed to be busy 
criticising developed countries instead of trying to influence developing countries as they 
used to do in the 1980s. Particularly the work of GRAIN is criticised during this process 
(Borring; Evjen; Fowler 2002 [interviews]). Due to GRAIN’s firmness on its principles 
concerning no patents on life, they were perceived as giving priority to these principles in a 
fundamentalist way, thereby risking to spoil an agreement rather than achieving an agreement 
in which they could not support every single paragraph. According to Fraleigh, the NGOs had 
both good ideas and not so good ideas regarding Farmers’ Rights (Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). 
However, the “lecturing” attitude demonstrated by many NGOs, which “treated government 
representatives as stupid puppets that just existed in order to be pressured”, made it difficult 
for delegates to accept even their good ideas (ibid.). The NGOs could stick more faithfully to 
their programmes and principles since they did not have to take the responsibility at the 
negotiating tables, where states find themselves in the situation that compromises are the only 
way to move forwards.  
Instead of getting their views accepted, the NGOs may have influenced the negotiation 
atmosphere in a negative way. The coining of concepts such as “biopiracy” made NGOs 
contributes to the polarisation between the developed and the developing countries. RAFI, for 
example, thought that IPR exacerbated the unequal distribution of benefits between North and 
South while at the same time encouraging and even legitimising the exploitation of traditional 
knowledge (CEAS 2000:42). Thus, the NGOs created an illusion among the developing 
countries that they had a treasure which the industrialised countries desperately wanted 
(Fraleigh 2003 [interview]). The truth according to Fraleigh, was that the industrialised 
countries mainly got their PGRFA from breeding programmes in their own or other 
industrialised countries rather than the unimproved landraces of the South. In contrast, my 
informant from a developing country found the presence and work of the NGOs to be 
supportive (Egziabhar 2003 [interview]). The UKabc get credit for its work on getting the 
negotiations covered by the media (Borring 2002 [interview]). Thus, the significance and 
perception of the NGOs favouring Farmers’ Rights varied, limiting the diffusion of the norms 
they advocated. What was the role of the breeding industry? 
ASSINSEL’s surprising proposal on benefit sharing supports some sorts of 
compensation to the South. According to Patric Mulvany of ITDA (UK) the developing 
countries appreciated this move: “Developing nations took the industry proposal as 
“admission that the South has been ‘ripped off’ but now the companies are prepared to pay” 
(IATP et. al., 2001). However, the developing countries did not get support from the NGOs 
regarding their claim for IPR for farmers’ varieties. Apart from this proposal, ASSINSEL 
promoted views and ideas contradictory to developing countries regarding Farmers’ Rights. 
How does the position of ASSINSEL have relevance for Farmers’ Rights? First, regarding 
maintenance of genetic resources, ASSINSEL believed that ex-situ conservation is the most 
important and must be emphasised especially for landraces and obsolete varieties. In situ 
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conservation could be a useful and complementary approach, but ASSINSEL considered on-
farm conservation of landraces as difficult to defend (ASSINSEL 1996). Second, ASSINSEL 
members “are strongly against any “farmers’ privilege” going beyond the provisions of the 
1991 Act of the UPOV Convention” (ASSINSEL 2001). As this act permits farmers to use 
protected varieties for propagating purposes on their own holdings, ASSINSEL believed that 
subsistence farmers are not affected by plant breeders’ rights (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food and Royal Botanic Gardens Key 1999). Third, they reckon genetic 
diversity in landraces and wild species as resources of limited present value for breeding 
purposes (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the long period it took to finalise the negotiations provided ample time 
for new ideas to mature in the minds of delegates. For example, the important role of 
traditional knowledge is recognised in the CBD and discussions are taking place in WIPO. 
While only “farmers” where mentioned in the Annexes to the IUPGR, Article 9 alludes to 
“the local and indigenous communities and farmers”, in line with the terminology of the 
CBD. This is a clear indicator of the growing recognition of the role played by such 
communities in the creation and preservation of knowledge of value for the society as a whole 
(Correa 2000:26). Similarly, the delegates may have dropped the idea of an international fund 
to implement Farmers’ Rights since they had learned that the FAO fund established in the 
1980s never materialised. 
Egiziabhar from Ethiopia presented Farmers’ Rights as a “South” issue, hence playing 
on the image of the historical exploitation by the North of the South. This illustrates that 
delegates from the developing countries themselves were able to become intellectual leaders. 
When Farmers’ Rights were looked upon as the “South’s” rights against the “North’s” plant 
breeders’ rights, it may become a legitimate norm rather than just a claim from some actors 
promoting their own self-interests. The Europeans may therefore have recognised that 
Farmers’ Rights are fair, explaining the closing of the gap between the European Region and 
the developing countries during the discussions on the issue. 
The ‘fear’ of the precedence that norm diffusion can create, was obvious in several 
issues. For example, the financial question caused a lot of trouble. In 1991, the FAO 
Commission agreed that an international fund was the best way of implementing Farmers’ 
Rights. In the meantime, a fund had been established under the Montreal Protocol and the 
funding mechanism of CBD (the Global Environment Facility) was being developed in 
UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank. It is likely to believe that the developed countries were 
opposed to making the international fund for Farmers’ Rights workable, in an attempt to 
prevent the creating precedents for such financial mechanisms which obligated them to pay, 
in the context of a world-wide economic downturn in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the 
JUSCANZ countries’ unwillingness to accept benefit sharing as mandatory when patenting 
plant genetic material may be due to a fear of establishing a norm affecting their general 
patent practice.  
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Conclusion 
A variety of actors can be described as intellectual leaders – supporting to a large extent the 
developing countries’ request for Farmers’ Rights. Most importantly, the very idea of 
Farmers’ Rights as a political concept is the result of intellectual leadership. The performance 
of several NGOs in favour of Farmers’ Rights did not appeal to developed countries, 
however. This reduced the potential influence of their ideas on Farmers’ Rights. The impact 
of “science” from IPGRI regarding Farmers’ Rights was less significant compared to the more 
ethical and moral discussions of Keystone. However, IPGRI’s reference to science may have 
increased their influence, while NGOs’ behaviour might have reduced their influence. This 
indicates that intellectual leadership supporting the idea of Farmers’ Rights is not a necessary 
condition for enhancing the developing countries’ breakthrough. The presentation of the ideas 
is crucial for whether a diffusion of these ideas will take place. The partial ambiguity of the 
ideas promoted by intellectual leaders as well as the presentation of the ideas seems to be 
significant for understanding the medium breakthrough for the developing countries.  
7.4 Complementarities and Modifications 
How do the three perspectives relate to each other in this case? Together they provide a more 
comprehensive explanation for the medium recognition of Farmers’ Rights than if considered 
separately. Their complementary aspects are thus obvious. Without the focus on dominant 
states provided by the power-based perspective, for example, there would be a small gap in 
our understanding of why it was so difficult for promoters of Farmers’ Rights to gain 
acceptance for a comprehensive recognition of these rights. Likewise, if organisation of the 
negotiations was left out, it would be difficult to understand how self-interested states could 
ever reach an agreement on such controversial issues as Farmers’ Rights. Since non-state 
actors such as NGOs played an important role in coining the concept of Farmers’ Rights and 
later in promoting it, the knowledge-based perspective is necessary to complement the state-
focus of the interest- and power-based perspectives. Other supplements of the knowledge-
based perspective are explanatory factors such as the role of science.  
It is important to stress, however, that the borders between the perspectives are not 
always clear-cut. This creates the practical challenge of deciding which theoretical label best 
describes an empirical event. I have been confronted with this challenge particularly in the 
case of leadership where some people could be described as both entrepreneurial as well as 
intellectual leaders, and sometimes they may even have acted as group leaders for their 
coalition. In addition, the arena factor is the basis for two different mechanisms since it 
facilitates learning which results in strategic changes in states’ cost-benefit calculus as well as 
changes in states’ perceptions due to norm diffusion.  
The complementary appearance of the three perspectives is not always the case, as 
they sometimes seem to modify each other. This is most obvious in the case of the 
shortcomings of power. The institutional characteristics of FAO demonstrate that power based 
on overall material capabilities is not as absolute as assumed in the power-based perspective. 
In addition, ideas highly influence the agenda and what is on the agenda is discussed. This 
reduced the powerful states’ scope of influence. Besides, when applying the knowledge-based 
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perspective, the assumption that states are unitary and rational made in both the interest- and 
power-based perspectives is modified. The cognitively oriented viewpoint illuminates the 
dynamic character of states’ interests and perceptions which can change when confronted 
with new ideas and scientific knowledge. Thus, states’ interests and perceptions are not given 
a priori. Following this argument, the states’ interests and perceptions are not necessary 
stable. During the long negotiation process of the ITPGRFA, the positions of the states 
“matured” as a respond to what both happened at the negotiation table, but also as a reaction 
to what happened in other forums. This helps us understand why the developing countries 
could present one common proposal on Farmers’ Rights in 1996, but have different opinions 
regarding the issue a few years later. 
When applying a time dimension for the formation phase of the International Treaty, 
the prominence of ideas and intellectual leadership during the agenda formation seems 
apparent. The institutional factors such as entrepreneurial leadership proved to be very 
important during the negotiation stage. The fact that institutional factors are significant at this 
stage does not come as a surprise, considering that this is the time when the actors actually 
meet in the institutional arena. The inability of the JUSCANZ countries to exclude Farmers’ 
Rights from the agenda shows that the power-based perspective is more notable after the 
agenda formation. The refusal of the US and Japan to sign the treaty at its adoption in 
November 2001 also indicate the explanatory power of the power-based perspective in the 
transition between negotiation and operationalisation. 
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8: Conclusions and Reflections 
8.1 Looking Back 
The objective of this thesis was to find out whether the recognition of Farmers’ Rights in the 
ITPGRFA represents a breakthrough for the South. Farmers’ Rights have been among the 
most contested issues during the germplasm debate in FAO since the 1980s. These rights 
were simultaneously recognised in 1989 together with plant breeders’ rights. Nevertheless, 
due to the lacking implementation of Farmers’ Rights, and the developments in other 
international forums, Farmers’ Rights were again placed on the international agenda when the 
revision of the International Undertaking started in 1994. Throughout seven hard years of 
negotiations, the Member States of FAO discussed the text of what was to be the first legally 
binding treaty specifically pertaining to PGRFA. In 1999 the negotiating parties adopted a set 
of provisions on Farmers’ Rights as part of the treaty. As elaborated on in Chapter 5, I 
consider this recognition to be a medium breakthrough for the South. The deficient 
international responsibility for implementing Farmers’ Rights as well as the ambiguous 
recognition of the right of farmers to sell, use and exchange farm-saved seeds of protected 
varieties is a departure from the developing countries’ original proposal on Farmers’ Rights. 
On the other hand, the recognition of the rights of farmers to participate in decision-making 
regarding PGRFA as well as in the sharing of the benefits arising from the use of these 
resources are in line with the claims of the developing countries. Besides, the optional list for 
what countries can include as Farmers’ Rights, do not prevent countries to implement 
Farmers’ Rights nationally in a comprehensive way. 
In order to understand this negotiation outcome, the power-based hypothesis was 
deemed least relevant. According to neorealist theory, an assessment of power relationships in 
international negotiations must comprise the overall power resources of states and compare 
them with other states. The prospect for breakthrough for the developing countries is thus 
weak and this perspective excludes the potential of a kind of “Southern power”. On the other 
hand, such power can be captured by the concept of issue-specific power endorsed by interest-
based theory. The developing countries’ relatively low values on the two components of 
issue-specific power go a long way in explaining why Farmers’ Rights were not fully 
recognised as the developing countries had opted for. First, the basic game power of the 
developing countries is weak because germplasm collections to international gene banks 
during the last decades have reduced their control over plant genetic resources. Second, the 
partly divergent interests that prevented the developing countries to stick together throughout 
the seven years of negotiation as well as the variable group leadership reduced their 
negotiation power. In the case of Farmers’ Rights, even some developed countries (e.g. 
Norway) worked harder for their recognition than some developing countries. Entrepreneurial 
leaders have been fundamental in addressing the issues in such a way that the developing 
countries got their interests included. Even though delegates from both developing and 
developed countries had to modify their initial proposals during the negotiations, the different 
ways of conducting the negotiations helped to partly circumvent the law of the least ambitious 
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program. Hence, the Farmers’ Rights Article was moved from the minimum American 
definition of these rights closer to the developing countries’ definition. Altogether, the 
interest-based perspective’s specific focus on the negotiation phase largely helps us to 
understand the moderate results from the developing countries’ point of view. Nevertheless, 
neo-institutional theory can not fully account for the negotiation outcome. While it was harder 
to assess the role of norm diffusion and intellectual leaders, the knowledge-based perspective 
contributed to our understanding with additional aspects. For example, the very concept of 
Farmers’ Rights was coined by NGO-representatives. In addition, several NGOs supported 
most of the measurements on Farmers’ Rights suggested by the developing countries, but 
their behaviour reduced their influence as intellectual leaders. Furthermore, scientific 
knowledge contributed to changes in the perceptions of some of the delegates.  
8.2 Scope for Generalisations 
To what extent is regime theory a useful analytical tool for analysing the role of developing 
countries in regime formation? I will opt for a confirmative answer with some reservations. 
The interest-based perspective had, as expected, by far the strongest explanatory power and 
could to a large extent account for the result. In addition, particularly the cognitive approach 
complemented the understanding provided by the institutional factors. The power-based 
perspective was less beneficial in this case, partly because in the realist view, environmental 
degradation as long as it does not affect the natural resource base does not constitute a 
separate power resource (Biermann 2002:15). The power-based perspective was also not so 
relevant because I looked at the ITPGRFA in isolation without including the other on-going 
international processes. The powerful states pursue their interests more successfully in forums 
like for example the WTO. If the analysis of regime formation would have included regime 
interaction, the power-based perspective would have had a higher explanatory power.  
On this background, it is reasonable to ask whether “Southern Power” is a fruitful 
approach to study Farmers’ Rights and the issue area of PGRFA. Undoubtedly, the conflict 
line in the issue area of biodiversity has in general been between the North and the South, as 
described in chapter 4. Thus, several analyses of the international debate on these matters 
have described them in these terms (see for example Bragdon 2000:4; Cullet 2003:6; Fowler 
1993). This perception is also shared by NGOs engaged in the sustainable management of 
PGRFA (see for example GRAIN 2001c). However, this persisting framing of the debate in 
terms of North-South is believed to have further polarised an already difficult negotiation 
climate. Furthermore, this framing may also blur the actual situation of high interdependence 
on genetic resources. The developing countries often co-operate under the label of G-77 and 
in 1996, they presented a common proposal on Farmers’ Rights. Thus, in the case of the 
international germplasm debate, I will argue that the picture of the North versus the South has 
captured much of the actual situation. Today, the South has became a more comprehensive 
and complex group due to among other thinks different economic development between the 
least developed countries and newly industrialised countries. The common interest in a new 
economic world order in the 1970s is not prevailing nowadays. The developing countries have 
therefore different approaches to IPR on living material, biotechnology and agricultural trade. 
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However, the North-South picture still prevails in the minds of people (like representatives of 
NGOs and developing countries), despite the fact that the issue specific power of the South 
has changed during the last decades.  
Regarding basic game power, the richness in PGRFA and capacity in biotechnology 
differ widely between the various regions and countries of the South. Partly because of these 
differences, the developing countries have occasionally different interests. This has 
consequences for the South’s negotiation power. For example, in the biodiversity negotiations 
(Conferences of the Parties to the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol), the group of “like-
minded mega-diversity countries”105 and the Miami-group106 now have developed stronger 
coalitions than the G-77. Although the adoption of a “Southern power” approach in my case 
has been fruitful, this approach has apparent weaknesses. Thus, when analysing the 
international germplasm debate in the future, such an approach has to be done with caution.107 
What are the lessons from this case regarding “Southern power” in international 
environmental negotiations in general? 
First, basic game power is essential. If the Northern governments believe that the 
participation of the developing countries in the negotiated regime is necessary to combat an 
environmental problem, there is a potential for the developing countries to push for 
differentiation in norms and responsibility. This could for example include technology 
transfers of more environmentally friendly technology from the North to the South. Basic 
game power is apparent in the case of climate change. Evidently, the reduction of polluting 
emissions from the North has less significance if not populous developing countries such as 
India and China follow up with similar efforts. Intellectual leaders may promote scientific 
knowledge or norms that influence the perceptions of the South’s basic game power. 
At the negotiation table, the degree of coalition among the developing countries and 
group leadership will be crucial for whether the South will manage to transform potential 
basic game power into negotiation power. The further away the position of the South is from 
the position of the dominant actors, the harder will it likely be to gain a strong breakthrough. 
However, entrepreneurial leaders, who may frame the agenda in a favourable way for the 
developing countries, can support the negotiation power of the South. The characteristics of 
the arena may also affect the negotiation power. The developing countries’ strength in 
numbers is only relevant if the decision-making rule is one country – one vote. If for example 
negotiations on management of genetic resources are moved from FAO and UNEP to the 
WTO, the negotiation power of the South is probably reduced. Moreover, the case of agro-
biodiversity has shown that even in an issue-area that historically could be described along the 
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lines of the North versus the South, such phrases might blur the actual situation. At the 
beginning of the third millennium, the policies and interests of G-77 countries may diverge so 
much that constellations during international environmental negotiations may not take place 
under the umbrella of “the South”. Instead of collaborating together with all G-77 countries, 
smaller groups of developing countries tend to form coalitions during international 
environmental negotiations. The well-organised collaboration within the group of “like-
minded mega-diversity countries” give the group high negotiation power. Since these 
countries are particularly rich in biodiversity including medicine plants, their basic game 
power is arguably higher than the case of the South in the ITPGRFA negotiations, which dealt 
exclusively with plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. This comparatively high 
negotiation as well as basic game power, may give room for influence in international 
environmental negotiations for countries relatively poor in overall material capabilities. The 
“Southern power” approach may therefore have relevance for studies of these new coalitions 
of developing countries even though they do not include all developing countries.   
8.3 Looking Ahead 
What are the future prospects for Farmers’ Rights? With the ITPGRFA, the Contracting 
Parties affirm that the promotion of Farmers' Rights at the national and international levels are 
fundamental to the realisation of these rights (Preamble), and that the responsibility for 
realising Farmers' Rights rests with the national governments (Article 9). The suggested 
measures to protect and promote Farmers' Rights are not legally binding but subject to 
national legislation, as appropriate, in accordance with the needs and priorities of the 
countries. The two other articles, which contain provisions related to Farmers' Rights, are, 
however, legally binding. The first article provides for farmers who contribute to maintaining 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, to receive benefits arising from the 
Multilateral System (Section 13.3). The second provision ensures that when it comes to 
funding, priority will be given to the implementation of agreed plans and programmes for 
farmers in developing countries, who conserve and sustainably utilise plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture (Section 18.5). Whereas the latter two provisions will be dealt with 
by the Governing Body, due to their status of being legally binding, there is great uncertainty 
pertaining to the question of how to approach Article 9, since its provisions are not legally 
binding. This uncertainty may also affect the implementation of Articles 13 and 18, since the 
plans and programmes to be supported (Sections 13.3 and 18.5) are measures undertaken by 
national governments (Article 9). The treaty will enter into force this year, though the 
Governing Body will probably take some time until it gets to further elaborate on Farmers’ 
Rights. 
Meanwhile, other international processes affect the future of Farmers’ Rights. The Ad 
Hoc Open-ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8j and Related Provisions of the 
CBD is mandated to inter alia provide advice on the application and development of legal and 
other appropriate forms of protection for the knowledge of indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity; and also to identify objectives and activities falling within the scope of the CBD, 
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and recommend priorities, including equitable benefit sharing (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
2003). At the same time, the WIPO's Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore elaborates on connected issues. 
Some countries may argue that the work being done in these two forums is sufficient in these 
matters, so they will avoid "duplications" by opening another front in the FAO. Others might 
want coherence in the developments and co-ordination between these forums and 
organisations. The implementation of Farmers’ Rights as they relate to PGRFA will depend 
on how these processes will work together. At the national level, there have been some 
attempts in different directions to develop operational domestic guidelines and acts of 
legislation for the implementation of Farmers' Rights (e.g. by the Organisation for African 
Unity, Zambia, India, Thailand, and Bangladesh). 
Developments in “adverse” forums like WTO, UPOV and WIPO (Standing 
Committee on the Law of Patents) will also condition the realisation of Farmers’ Rights. 
What if for example UPOV is revised once again and plant breeders’ rights get even closer to 
patents regarding restriction of access to PGRFA? Alternatively, what if the possibility of 
“world patents” becomes possible through WIPO? The Substantive Patent Law Treaty will 
probably prohibit Member States from making any further demands on patent applications 
than those found in the treaty (Wolff 2004:32). If such a treaty is adopted, it will not be 
possible to require the patent applicant to inform about the source country of the biological 
materials, which is a necessary precondition for benefit sharing. In addition, the US, the EU 
and the EFTA countries all enter into bilateral trade agreements with single developing 
countries on the condition that the developing countries comply with even stricter IPR 
legislation on living material than the standard put forward by the TRIPs (Bjørnstad 2003). 
Such strong IPRs restrict the right of farmers to save, use and exchange farm-saved seeds. 
In summary, these different and partly conflicting processes condition the scope for 
implementation of Farmers’ Rights, as they were initially proposed by the developing 
countries. Hence, the longer it takes to start implementing the provisions on Farmers Rights 
under the ITPGRFA, the weaker the prospects for the realisation of these principles will be. 
The sustainable management of PGRFA will be affected accordingly.  
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Appendixes 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix 1: 
 
THE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO FARMERS' RIGHTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES  
FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
From the Preamble 
The Contracting Parties, 
(...) Affirming that the past, present and future contributions of farmers in all regions of the 
world, particularly those in centres of origin and diversity, in conserving, improving and 
making available these resources, is the basis of Farmers' Rights. 
 
Affirming also that the rights recognised in this Treaty to save, use, exchange and sell farm-
saved seed and other propagating material, and to participate in decision-making regarding, 
and in the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from, the use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, are fundamental to the realisation of Farmers' Rights, as 
well as the promotion of Farmers' Rights at national and international levels. 
  
Article 9 – Farmers' Rights 
9.1 The Contracting Parties recognise the enormous contribution that the local and 
indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of the world, particularly those in the 
centres of origin and crop diversity, have made and will continue to make for the conservation 
and development of plant genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture 
production throughout the world. 
 
9.2 The Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realising Farmers' Rights, as 
they relate to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, rests with national 
governments. In accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as 
appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote 
Farmers' Rights, including:  
 
(a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture; 
(b) the right to equitably participate in the sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation 
of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; and 
(c) the right to participate in making decisions, at the national level, on matters related to 
the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture. 
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9.3 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to 
save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seeds/propagating material, subject to national law as 
appropriate.  
 
From Article 13 – Benefit Sharing in the Multilateral System 
13.3 The Contracting Parties agree that benefits arising from the use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture that are shared under the Multilateral System should flow 
primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers in all countries, especially in developing 
countries, and countries with economies in transition, who conserve and sustainable utilise 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 
 
From Article 18 – Financial Resources 
18.5 The Contracting Parties agree that priority will be given to the implementation of 
agreed plans and programmes for farmers in developing countries, especially in the least 
developed countries, and in countries with economies in transition, who conserve and 
sustainable utilise plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
THE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO FARMERS' RIGHTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 
_________________________________________________________________ 
From Resolution 4/89 – Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking 
3. states adhering to the Undertaking recognise the enormous contribution that farmers of 
all regions have made to the conservation and development of plant genetic resources, which 
constitute the basis of plant production throughout the world, and which form the basis for the 
concept of Farmers’ Rights; 
4. the adhering states consider that the best way to implement the concept of Farmers' 
Rights is to ensure the conservation, management and use of plant genetic resources, for the 
benefit of present and future generations of farmers. This could be achieved through 
appropriate means, monitored by the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, including in 
particular the International Fund for Plant Genetic Resources, already established by FAO. To 
reflect the responsibility of those countries which have benefited most from the use of 
germplasm, the Fund would benefit from being supplemented by further contributions from 
adhering governments, on a basis to be agreed upon, in order to ensure for the Fund a sound 
and recurring basis. The International Fund should be used to support plant genetic 
conservation, management and utilisation programmes, particularly within developing 
countries, and those which are important sources of plant genetic material. Special priority 
should be placed on intensified educational programmes for biotechnology specialists, and 
strengthening the capabilities of developing countries in genetic resource conservation and 
management, as well as the improvement of plant breeding and seed production.  
 
From Resolution 5/89 – Farmers' Rights 
Endorses the concept of Farmers' Rights (Farmers' Rights mean rights arising from the past, 
present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available 
plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity). These rights are 
vested in the International Community, as trustee for present and future generations of 
farmers, for the purpose of ensuring benefits to farmers, and supporting the continuation of 
their contributions, as well as the attainment of the overall purposes of the International 
Undertaking) in order to: 
(a)  ensure that the need for conservation is globally recognized and that sufficient funds 
for these purposes will be available; 
(b)  assist farmers and farming communities, in all regions of the world, but especially in 
the areas of origin/diversity of plant genetic resources, in the protection and conservation of 
their plant genetic resources, and of the natural biosphere; 
(c)  allow farmers, their communities, and countries in all regions, to participate fully in 
the benefits derived, at present and in the future, from the improved use of plant genetic 
resources, through plant breeding and other scientific methods. 
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From Resolution 3/91 – National Sovereignty and International Fund 
Endorses the following points: 
1.  that nations have sovereign rights over their plant genetic resources; 
2 that breeders' lines and farmers' breeding material should only be available at the 
discretion of their developers during the period of development; 
3. that Farmers' Rights will be implemented through an international fund on plant 
genetic resources which will support plant genetic conservation and utilisation programmes, 
particularly, but not exclusively, in the developing countries; 
4.  that the effective conservation and sustainable utilisation of plant genetic resources is 
a pressing and permanent need, and, therefore, the resources for the international fund as well 
as for other funding mechanisms should be substantial, sustainable and based on the 
principles of equity and transparency;  
5.  that through the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, the donors of genetic 
resources, funds and technology will determine and oversee the policies, programmes and 
priorities of the fund and other funding mechanisms, with the advice of the appropriate 
bodies. 


 
-(
References 
Written Sources 
Allison, Graham T. (1969): ”Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The 
American Political Science Review, LXII, 3: 689-718. 
Andersen, Regine (1999): “Understanding actor choices in the domestic implementation of 
regimes pertaining to biological diversity in agriculture”, Doctoral Course on the 
'Grand Theories' of International Politics 10-12, and 18 November 1999, University of 
Oslo, Institute of Political Science, Essay. 
Andersen, Regine (2001): Conceptualising the Convention on Biological Diversity: Why is it 
difficult to determine the ’country of origin’ of agricultural plant varieties? Lysaker: 
FNI Report 7/2001. 
Andersen, Regine (2003): ”FAO and the management of Plant Genetic Resources”, Fridtjof 
Nansen Institute: Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and 
Development 2003/2004, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, pp. 43-53. 
Andersen, Regine (2004): “Internasjonale avtaler: Hva betyr de for kommersiell bruk av 
genetiske ressurser?”, Kommersiell bruk av genetiske ressurser, working seminar 
arranged by the Norwegian Council of Genetic Resources 14.01.2004. Powerpoint 
presentation. 
Andersen, Svein S. (1997): Case-studier og generalisering. Forskingsstrategi og design. 
Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Andresen, Steinar and Jon Birger Skjærseth (1999): ” Can international environmental 
secretariats promote effective co-operation?” Paper presented at the United Nations 
University’s International Conference on Synergies and Co-ordination between 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Tokyo, Japan, July 14-16, 1999. 
Andresen, Steinar and Shardul Agrawala (2002): ”Leaders, pushers and laggards in the 
making of the climate regime”, Global Environmental Change, No 12 (2002), pp.41-
51.  
Arts, B. and P. Verschuren (1999): “Assessing political influence in complex decision-
making: an instrument based on triangulation. International Political Science Review 
Vol. 20, No.4, pp.412-424. 
ASSINSEL (1996): ”FIS-ASSINSEL Position on Maintenance of and Access to Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA)”, adopted May 1996, (2003, December 
15) [online]. – URL: 
http://www.worldseed.org/Position_papers/pos1_asse.htm,10.11.2003. 
ASSINSEL (2001): ”Position Paper on Farm Saved Seed”, adopted May 2001, (2003, 
December 15) [online]. – URL: http://www.worldseed.org/positions.html, 10.11.2003. 


 
-'
Berg, Trygve, Åsmund Bjørnstad, Cary Fowler, and Tore Skrøppa (1991): ”Technology 
Options and the Gene Struggle” A report to the Norwegian Research Council for 
Science and Humanities. Ås, March 1991: Development and Environment No. 8, 
Noragric Occasional Papers Series C. 
Betsill, Michele M. and Elisabeth Corell (2001): ”NGO Influence in International 
Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis”, Global Environmental 
Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 65-85. 
Biermann, Frank (2002): “Power and Interdependence in Global Environmental Policy. 
Explaining the New Bargaining Power of Developing Countries”. Paper presented at 
the 43rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 
Louisiana 24-27 March 2002. 
Bjørnstad, Bell Batta: “Press for patenter gjennom handelsavtaler”, [online]. – URL: 
http://www.nu.no/genesis/d5c7a88c4f7ac885e115c2400b54c563/4ccfcb72533b277e6a
876264a17509ce.html 12.10.2003. 
Borring, Jan (2000): e-mail to Geert Kleijer, subject: “CG meeting 3-7 April”, 16.03.2000. 
Bragdon, Susan H. (2000): ”Moving forward with the International Undertaking: legal 
mechanisms to alleviate mistrust”, IPGRI: Issues in Genetic Resources No.9 April 
2000. 
Bragdon, Susan H. (2003): ”The Multilateral System of Genetic Resources Exchange: Why 
trade in food genetic resources matters?”, Bridges, Vol.7, No. 6 July-August 2003, pp. 
20-22. 
Brush, Stephen B (1994): ”Providing Farmers’ Rights Through In Situ Conservation of Crop 
Genetic Resources”, CPGRFA Background Study Paper No. 3, Rome: FAO. 
Cairns group (2003): Web site for the Cairns group [online]. – URL: 
http://www.cairnsgroup.org/introduction.html, 15.12.2003. 
Carr, E.H. (1962): The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (1939), London: Macmillian. 
CBD (2003): ”Report of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group Meeting on the Potential 
Impacts of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies on Smallholder Farmers, Indigenous 
and Local Communities and Farmers’ Rights”, UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/9/INF/6-
UNEP/CBD/WG8J/3/INF/2 , 29 September 2003. 
CEAS Consultants (Wye) Ltd, Centre for European Agricultural Studies in association with 
Geoff Tansey and Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute: ”Study of the 
Relationship between the Agreement on TRIPS and Biodiversity related issues” Final 
Report for DG TRADE European Commission September 2000. 
Civil Society Organisations (2001): “A note on the results of the 6th meeting of the IU Contact 
Group in Spoleto, Italy, 23-28 April 2001” [online]. – URL: 
http://www.ukabc.org/iu4.htm#3, 20.01.2004. 


 
-
Cleveland, David A. and Stephan C. Murray (1997): “The World’s Crop Genetic Resources 
and the Rights of Indigenous Farmers”, Current Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 
477-516. 
Coleman, William D. and Melissa Gabler (2002):”Agricultural Biotechnology and Regime 
Formation: A Constructivist Assessment of the Prospects”, International Studies 
Quarterly Vol. 46, pp. 481-506. 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002): Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy, London: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. 
Correa, Carlos M. (1999): Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property 
Rights, CPGR Background Study Paper No. 8, Rome: FAO. 
Correa, Carlos M. (2000): “Options for the Implementation of Farmers’ Rights at the National 
Level”. Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E) Working Paper 
No.8, Geneva: South Centre. 
Crucible Group (1994): People, Plants and Patents. The Impact of Intellectual Property on 
Biodiversity, Conservation, Trade and Rural Society. Ottowa: International 
Development Research Centre. 
Crucible II Group (2000): Seeding Solutions. Volume 1. Policy options for genetic resources: 
People, Plants and Patents revisited. Rome: IPGRI and the Dag Hammerskjöld 
Foundation.  
Cullet, Philippe (2003): “The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture”, IELRC Briefing Paper 2003-2. Geneve: International Environmental 
Law Research Centre.  
de Boef, Walter S., Trygve Berg and Bertus Haverkort (1996): “Crop Genetic Resources” 
pp103-128 in Joske Bunders, Bertus Haverkort and Wim Hiemstra (eds): 
Biotechnology; Building on Farmers’ Knowledge, London and Basingstoke: 
MacMillan Education Ltd. 
de Sande, Theo van, Guido Ruivenkamp and Stèphane Malo (1996): “The Socio-political 
Context”, pp181 –198 in Joske Bunders, Bertus Haverkort and Wim Hiemstra (eds): 
Biotechnology; Building on Farmers’ Knowledge, London and Basingstoke: 
MacMillan Education Ltd.  
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (1996): “Report of the Fourth International Technical Conference 
on Plant Genetic Resources: 17-23 June 1996”, Vol. 9, No. 47. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (1998): “Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Commission on 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: 8-12 June 1998”, Vol. 9, No.97. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2000): “Third Inter-sessional Contact Group on the revision of 
the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, in Harmony with the CBD, 
26-31 August 2000”, Vol 09, No. 161. 


 

Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2001): “Summary of the Sixth Extraordinary Session of the 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: 24 June-1 July 2001”, 
Vol. 9, No. 197. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2003): “Summary of the Third Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Inter-sessional Working Group on Article 8 (J) and related provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity: 8-12 December 2003”, Vol. 9, No. 273. 
Ekpere, Johnson (2001): The African Model Law. The Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological 
Resources. An Explanatory Booklet. Addis-Ababa: Organisation for African Unity. 
Emmott, Steve (2001): “No Patents on Life: The Incredible Ten-year Campaign against the 
Europe Patent Directive”, in Brian Toker (ed): Redesigning Life? The worldwide 
challenge to genetic engineering, London and New York: Zed Books, pp. 373-384. 
Esquinas-Alcàzar, Josè (1996): “The Realisation of Farmers’ Rights”, pp. 2-15 in M.S. 
Swaminathan (ed.): Agrobiodiversity and Farmers’ Rights. Madras: Konark 
Publishers PVT LTD. 
ETC group (1999): “Australia’s Unresolved Plant Piracy Problems”, Press Release, April 12, 
1999. 
ETC group (2001a): “The Law of the Seed!”, Translator, Vol.3, No.1 December 2001.  
ETC group (2001b): “Proctor’s Gamble. Yellow Bean Patent Owner Sues 16 Farmers and 
Processors in US”, News Release: 17 December 2001.  
ETC group (2002): “The United States and The Law of the Seed: Political “About Face” or 
“Two-Faced” Policy?”, News Release, Friday, November 8th, 2002. 
Falcon, W.P. and Cary Fowler (2002): “Carving up the commons – emergence of a new 
international regime for germplasm development and transfer”, Food Policy Vol. 27 
(2002), pp.197-222. 
FAO (1994a): “Revision of the International Undertaking. Issues for consideration in stage II: 
access to plant genetic resources, and Farmers’ Rights”, First Extraordinary Session, 
Rome, 7-11 November 1994, CPGR-Ex1/94/5, Rome.  
FAO (1994b): “Report of the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources”, First Extraordinary 
Session, Rome, 7-11 November 1994, CPGR-Ex/94/REP. 
FAO (1994c): “Revision of the International Undertaking. Mandate, Context, Background 
and Proposed Process”, First Extraordinary Session, Rome, 7-11 November 1994, 
CPGR-Ex1/94/3. 
FAO (1995): “Report of the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources”, Sixth Session, Rome, 
19-30 June 1995, CPGR-6/95/REP, Rome. 
FAO (1996a): “Report of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture” 
Second Extraordinary Session, Rome, 22-27 April 1996, CGRFA-Ex2/96/REP, Rome. 


 

FAO (1996b): “Report of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture” 
Third Extraordinary Session, Rome, 9-13 December 1996, CGRFA-Ex/96/Rep, Rome. 
FAO (1996c): “Options for access to plant genetic resources and the equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from their use”, CGRFA-Ex3/96/LIM/2, Rome. 
FAO (1997a): “Report of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, 
Seventh Session, Rome, 15-23 May 1997, CGRFA-7/97 REP. 
FAO (1997b): “Report of the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture”, Rome, 1-5 December 1997, CGRFA-
Ex4/97/REPORT. 
FAO (1998a): “Report on the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture”, Rome, 8-12 June 1998, CGRFA-
Ex5/98/REPORT. 
FAO (1998b): The State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 
Rome: FAO. 
FAO (1999a): “Report of the Chairman of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture on the Status of Negotiations for the Revision of the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, in Harmony with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity”, Item 4 of the Draft Provisional Agenda, Eight Regular Session 
of CGRFA, CGRFA-8/99/13, Rome. 
FAO (1999b): “Reports from international organisations on their policies, programmes and 
activities on agricultural biological diversity. Part III: International non-governmental 
organizations”, Item 8 of the Draft Provisional Agenda Eight Regular Session of 
CGRFA, CGRFA-8/99/11.3, Rome. 
FAO (1999c): “Report of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, 
Eighth session, Rome, 19-23 April 1999, CGRFA –8/99/REP. 
FAO (2000): “Revision of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, in 
Harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity. Texts for Article 13, 
Facilitated Access, Article 14.2 (d), the Sharing of Monetary Benefits on 
Commercialization, and Article 16, Financial Resources, established by the Contact 
Group during its Second Inter-sessional Meeting”, Second Inter-sessional Meeting of 
the Contact Group, Rome, 3-7 April 2000, CGRFA/CG-/00/TXT. 
FAO (2001a): “Negotiations on the Revised International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources, in Harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity. Report by the 
Chairman of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, 
Hundred and Twentieth Session of the Council, Rome, 18-23 June 2001, CL 
120/INF/16. 
FAO (2001b): “Report of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, 
Sixth Extraordinary Session, Rome, 25-30 June 2001, CGRFA-Ex 6/01/REP. 


 
)
Financial Times (2001): “Future of world’s seedbanks in doubt”, June 22. 2001. 
Fowler, Cary and Pat Mooney (1990): Shattering. Food, Politics, and the loss of genetic 
diversity. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 
Fowler, Cary (1993): “Biological Diversity in a North-South context”, in Helge Ole Bergesen 
and George Parmann (eds): Green Globe Yearbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp.35-44. 
Fowler, Cary (1994): Unnatural Selection. Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution. 
Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers S.A. 
Fowler, Cary, Melinda Smale and Samy Gaiji (2001): “Unequal Exchange? Recent Transfers 
of Agricultural Resources and their Implications for Developing Countries” in 
Development Policy Review, Vol. 19, Issue 2, June 2001, pp.181-204. 
Fowler, Cary (2002): “Sharing Agriculture’s Genetic Bounty”, Science, Vol. 297, 12 July 
2002. 
Fowler, Cary (2003): “The Status of Public and Proprietary Germplasm and Information: An 
Assessment of Recent Developments at FAO”, IP Strategy Today, No. 7 –2003. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava and David Nachmias (1992): Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences, London , Sidney, Auckland: Edward Arnold, 4th edition. 
Girsberger, Martin A. (1999): Biodiversity and the Concept of Farmers’ Rights in 
International Law. Factual Background and Legal Analysis. Berne: Peter Lang. 
Gollin, D, (1998): “Valuing Farmers’ Rights”, Evenson, R; Gollin, D; and Santaniello, V. 
(eds) (1998): Agricultural Values of Plant Genetic Resources, Wallingford: 
FAO/CEIS/CABI Publishing. 
GRAIN (2000): “Last chance for an open access regime?”, Seedling, June 2000, [online]. – 
URL: http://www.grain.org/publications/jun001-en.cfm: 19.01.2004. 
GRAIN (2001a): “Sprouting Up: IU INCHES TOWARDS THE FINISH LINE”, Seedling, 
June 2001, [online]. –URL: http://www.grain.org/publications/seed-01-6-4-en.cfm, 
20.01.2004. 
GRAIN (2001b): “The IU Hanging on its Last Brackets: A Brief Assessment”, July 2001, 
Genetic Resources Action International. 
GRAIN (2001c): “International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources: The Final Stretch”, 
October 2001. 
Greengrass, Barry (1996): ”UPOV and Farmers’ Rights”, pp.50-56 in M.S. Swaminathan 
(ed): Agrobiodiversity and Farmers’ Rights, Dehli: Konark Publishers PVT LTD.  
Greenpeace (2001): “Who will gain control over seeds and foodstuffs?” V.i.S.d.P/Ed.: 
Christoph Then 4/2001, [online]. – URL: http://www.greenpeace.org/international_en/ 
05.10.2003. 


 
/
Grieco, Joseph M. (1988): ”Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the 
newest liberal institutionalism”, International Organization 42, 3, Summer 1988, pp. 
485- 507. 
Haas, Peter M. (1990): Saving the Mediterranean. The Politics of International 
Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Haas, Peter M. (1992): “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination”, pp. 1-35 in Peter Haas (ed): special issue of International Organization 
Vol. 46, No.1.  
Haas, Peter M. (1993): “Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International 
Environmental Cooperation”, in Volker Rittberger (ed): Regime Theory and 
International Relations, Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons (1987): “Theories of International Regimes”, 
International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp.491-517. 
Hansenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (1996): “Reflection, Evaluation, 
Integration: Interest, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes”, 
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40, Suppl. 2, pp.177-228. 
Hansenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (1997): Theories of International 
Regimes Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in International Relations:55. 
Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996): The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International 
Conflicts. Columbia, SC:University of South Carolina Press. 
IATP (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy), ITDG (Intermediate Technology 
Development Group), GAIA Foundation, German NGO Forum on Environment and 
Development, GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action International), and RAFI (Rural 
Advancement Foundation International) (2001): “Seed companies threaten science 
treaty: Rolling the Die in ‘Sin City’”, Press release, Thursday, June 21, 2001. 
Jenkins-Smith, H. and P. Sabatier (eds.) (1993): Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Jönnson, Christer (1993): “Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics”, pp.202-222 
in Volker Rittberger (ed): Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford: 
Claredon Press. 
Keystone (1988): “Final Report of the Keystone International Dialogue on Plant Genetic 
Resources. Session I: Ex Situ Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources”, August 15-
18, 1988, Colorado: The Keystone Centre. 
Keystone (1990): “Final Consensus Report of the Keystone International Dialogue Series on 
Plant Genetic Resources: Madras Plenary Session”, February 1990, Colorado: The 
Keystone Centre. 


 
*
Keohane, Robert and Joseph S. Nye (1977): Power and Interdependence. World Politics in 
Transition. Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 
Keohane, Robert (1984): After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Keohane, Robert (1993): “The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-
American Research Programme”, in Volker Rittberger (ed): Regime Theory and 
International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 23-45. 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994): Designing social inquiry: scientific 
inference in qualitative research, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Kloppenburg, Jack Ralph (1988): First the seed Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Krasner, Stephan D. (1983): “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables,” in Stephan D. Krasner (ed): International Regimes, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, pp.1-21.  
Krasner, Stephan D. (1985): Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, 
Berkerley: University of California Press. 
Krasner, Stephan D. (1991): “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Parteo 
Frontier. World Politics, Vol. 43, pp. 336-366. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich and John G. Ruggie (1986): “International organization: a state of the 
art on an art of the state”, International Organization, Vol. 4, No.4, Autumn pp.753-
754. 
Levy, Marc A., Oran Young and Michael Zürn (1995): ”The study of international regimes”, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No. 3, pp. 267-330. 
Litfin, Karen T. (1994): Ozone Discourse: Science and Politics in Global Environmental 
Cooperation. New York: Colombia University Press. 
Malnes, Raino (1995): ”’Leader’ and ’Entrepreneur’ in International Negotiations”, European 
Journal for International Relations, Vol.1, No.1, pp.87-112. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1995): ”The False Promise of International Institutions”, International 
Security, Vol. 19, Winter, pp. 5-49. 
Mekoaur, Ali (2002): “A Global Instrument on Agrobiodiversity: The International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, FAO Legal Papers Online # 24, 
January 2002, Rome: FAO. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Royal Botanic Gardens Key (1999): 
“International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: 
Commercial Benefit Sharing”, Report from workshop 25 November 1999. 
Mitchell, Ronald B. (2002): “International Environment”, pp.500-516 in Walter Carlnaes, 
Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds): Handbook of International Relations, 
London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli: SAGE Publications. 


 
0
Mooney, Pat Roy (1997): ”The Parts of Life. Agricultural Biodiversity, Indigenous 
Knowledge, and the Role of the Third System”, Development Dialogue, Special Issue. 
Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjöld Foundation. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1999): ”A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and 
International Cooperation”, International Organization, Vol 53, No 2, Spring 1999, 
pp. 267-306. 
Morgenthau, Hans (1960): Politics Among Nations, 6th edition 1985, New York: Knopf. 
Mulvany, Patrick (2001): “Global seed treaty hangs in the balance” Biotechnology and 
Development Monitor, No. 46, pp. 20. 
NGO RELEASE (2001): “International Undertaking endangered by crafty US delegation”, 29 
June 2001. 
Norwegian Agriculture Inspection Service (2003): “Årsrapport 2002”, [online]. – URL: 
http://www.landbrukstilsynet.no, 12.12.2003. 
Palacios, Ximena Flores (1999): Contribution to the Estimation of Countries’ 
Interdependence in the Area of Plant Genetic Resources, CPGR Background Study 
Paper, No.7, Rome: FAO. 
Pistorius, Robin (1997): Scientists, plants and politics. A history of the plant genetic resources 
movement, Rome: IPGRI. 
RAFI (2001): Seeds Saved in Spoleto, RAFI News Release, Friday, May 4, 2001. 
Raymond, Ruth and Fowler, Cary (2001): “Sharing the non-monetary benefits of agricultural 
biodiversity”, Issues in Genetic Resources No. 5, September 2001. International Plant 
Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy. 
Rosendal, G. Kristin (1995a): ”The politics of patent legislation in biotechnology: an 
international view”, Biotechnology Annual Review, Vol 1, pp. 453-476. 
Rosendal, G. Kristin (1995b): ”Genbanker: Bevaring av biologisk mangfold”, in Nils Chr. 
Stenseth, Kjetil Paulsen and Rolf Karlsen (eds): Afrika –natur, samfunn og bistand, 
Oslo: Gyldendal, ad Notam, pp. 375-392. 
Rosendal, G. Kristin (1999): Implementing International Environmental Agreements in 
Developing Countries: The Creation and Impact of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. PhD dissertation in Political Science, Oslo: University of Oslo. 
Sauvé, Raphaël and Jamie Watts (2003): ”An analysis of IPGRI’s influence on the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, 
Agricultural Systems, Vol 78, pp 307-327. 
Shahid Qadir (2004) (ed): “Special Issue: After the Third World?”, Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 25, No.1. 


 
3
Stokke, Olav Schram (2000): ”Managing Straddling Strokes: The Interplay of Global and 
Regional Regimes”, Ocean and Coastal Management, 43.  
Strange, Susan (1987): ”The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony”, International Organization 
Vol.41, No. 4, pp. 551-574. 
Strange, Susan (1988): States and Markets, London: Pinter Publishers. 
Swaminathan, M. S. (ed) (1996): Agrobiodiversity and Farmers’ Rights. Madras: Konark 
Publishers PVT LTD. 
Swanson, Timothy (1997): Global Action for Biodiversity. An International Framework for 
Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity, London: Earthscan Publications 
Ltd. 
ten Kate, Kerry and Sarah A. Laird (1999): The Commercial Use of Biodiversity: Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.  
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (1998): “Rapport fra 5.ekstraordinære sesjon av 
FAOs kommisjon for genetiske ressurser for mat og landbruk, Roma 8. –12. Juni 
1998”. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (1999a): “Kommisjonen for genetiske ressurser. 
Rapport fra det åttende ordinære møtet, 19-23 april 1999”, 28.04.99/GHE/CES. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (1999b): “FAOs forhandlinger om plantegenetiske 
ressurser – Rapport fra møte i kontaktgruppen i Roma, 20-24. september 1999”, 
Saksnr.: 97/94307, 04.10.1999.  
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (2001a): “Rapport om status og forslag til norske 
posisjoner for forhandlingene i FAOs kontaktgruppe om en revidert overenskomst om 
plantegenetiske ressurser”, 30.01.2001. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (2001b): “Foreløpig rapport fra FAOs forhandlinger 
om plantegenetiske ressurser -sjette møtet i kontaktgruppen, 22-28.april 2001, 
Spoleto, Roma”, letter from Grethe Evjen to the leaders of Minstry of Agriculture, 
02.05.2001. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture (2001c): “Rapport fra siste forhandlingsmøte for den 
internasjonale avtalen for plantegenetiske ressurser for mat og landbruk, Roma 25.10-
3.11.2001”. 
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (1996): “Rapport fra møte i kommisjonen for 
genetiske ressurser i FAO, 22.-27. April 1996”, CGR96-5.Doc. 
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (1997a): “Møte i kommisjonen for genetiske 
ressurser (CGRFA) i FAO mai-97 –momenter til instruks”, notat 1997-05-05 from 
Ministry of Environment to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, written by Jan Borring. 


 
(
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (1997b): “Rapport fra 7.sesjon av FAOs 
kommisjon for genetiske ressurser for mat og landbruk, Roma 15.-23. mai 1997”, 
cgr97-rapp. 
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (1997c): “Rapport fra møte i kommisjonen for 
genetiske ressurser for mat og landbruk under FAO, 1.-5. desember 1997”. 
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (1999a): “Foreløpig rapport fra intersesjonelt 
møte om revidert internasjonal overenskomst (undertaking) for plantegenetiske 
ressurser, Montreux 19.-22.1.99”, report from Jan Borring to Ministy of Agriculture 
and Ministry of Foreigh Affairs, 22. January 1999. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999): “Formann i forhandlingene om en 
overenskomst om plantegenetiske ressurser”, letter from Norwegian Ministy of 
Foreign Affairs to the Norwegian Embassy in Rome, 23.02.1999. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001): Letter to the members of the Contact 
Group from the Norwegian Minister of International Development, Minister of 
Agriculture and Minister of the Environment, Oslo, 06.04.2001. 
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (2004): “2004 National Trade Estimate 
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers”, [online]. – URL: 
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2004/ 30.04.2004 
The Royal Norwegian Embassy, Rome: “FAO. Kommisjonen for genetiske ressurser for mat 
og landbruk”, letter from the Norwegian Embassy in Rome to the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 19.03.1999. 
Toledo, Alvaro (2002): ”Saving the Seed: Europe’s Challenge”, GRAIN: Seedling, April 
2002. 
Ukabc (2001): “International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources”, Civil Society 
Organisations react to outcome of IUPGR negotiations, [online]. – URL: 
http://www.ukabc.org/cgrfa6ex.htm: 19.01.2004. 
Underdal, Arild (1980): The Politics of International Fisheries Management: The Case of the 
Northeast Atlantic, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Underdal, Arild (1991): “Solving Collective Problems: Notes on Three Modes of 
Leadership”, pp.139-153 in Fridtjof Nansen Institute: Challenges o f a Changing 
World. Festschrift to Willy Østreng on his 50th birthday May 4th 1991, Lysaker: FNI. 
Underdal, Arild (1997a): Modelling the International Climate Change Negotiations: A Non-
Technical Outline of Model Architecture, CICERO Working Paper 1997:8, ISSN: 
0804-452X.  
Underdal, Arild (1997b): “Patterns of Effectiveness: Examining Evidence from 13 
International Regimes”, paper presented at the 38th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, Toronto, 19-22 March 1997. 


 
'
Underdal, Arild (1998a): “Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models”, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 5-30. 
Underdal, Arild (1998b): “Leadership in International Environmental Negotiations: Designing 
Feasible Solutions”, pp.101-127 in Arild Underdal (ed): The Politics of International 
Environmental Management, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Via Campesina (2001): “Open Letter Tegucigalpa, 24th of April 2001”, open letter from Via 
Campesina to the Contact Group negotiation the IUPGR. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959): Man, the State and War, New York: Colombia University Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. Reading (Mass.): Addison-
Wesley. 
Weldes, Jutta (1996): ”Constructing National Interests”, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol.2, No.3, pp. 275-318. 
Wertheim, Margaret (2001): “Seed banks”, Science and Society Column, March 2001. 
Wettestad, Jørgen (1999): Designing Effective Environmental Regimes, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Wolff, Franziska (2004): “Legal Factors Driving Agrobiodiversity Loss”, Environmental Law 
Network International (elni) Review, no 1/2004, pp. 25-36. 
Yearbook of International Co-operation on environment and Development (2002), Fridtjof 
Nansen Institute and Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
Yin, Robert K (1994): Case Study Research. Design and Methods. London: Sage 
Publications. Second Edition. 
Young, Oran (1989): ”The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment”, International Organization Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 349-
376. 
Young, Oran (1991): ”Political Leadership and regime formation: on the Development of 
Institutions in International Society”, International Organization Vol 45, No. 3, 
Summer 1991, pp. 281-308. 
Young, Oran and Gail Osherenko (1993): “The Formation of International Regimes: 
Hypotheses and Cases”, pp.1-21 in Oran Young and Gail Osherenko (eds): Polar 
Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Young, Oran (1996): “International Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives”, 
Global Governance, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-24. 
Young, Oran (1998): Creating Regimes. Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 


 
-
Young, Oran (1999): Governance in World Affairs. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
List of interviewees 
Anonymous Latin American delegate (2003): Interview with the author, November 5. 
 
Borring, Jan (2002), advisor, Ministry of Environment, Norway: Interview with the author 
November 26.  
 
Bretting, Peter (2003): National Program Leader Plant Germplasm and Genomes, United 
States Department of Agriculture: Interview with the author November 7. 
 
Egziabhar, Tewolde Berhan Gebre (2003), Environmental Protection Authority, Ethiopia: 
Interview with the author August 12. 
 
Engels, Jan (2003), director, Genetic Resources Science and Technology Group, IPGRI 
Interview with the author, November 11. 
 
Esquinas-Alcázar, José (2003), Secretary of the CGRFA, FAO: Interview with the author, 
November 10. 
 
Evjen, Grethe (2002), Senior Executive Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Norway: Interview 
with the author, December 4. 
 
Fowler, Cary (2002), Senior Adviser to the Director General, IPGRI/CGIAR: Interview with 
the author, December 12. 
 
Fraleigh, Brad (2003), Chief Negotiator for Canada, FAO: Interview with the author, 
November 10. 
 
Lim, Engsiang (2003), Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Malaysia: 
Interview with the author, November 7.  
 
Smith, Martin (2003), Senior Treaty Support Officer, Secretary of CGRFA, FAO: Interview 
with the author, November 7. 
 
Stannard, Clive (2003), Assistant Secretary of the CGRFA, FAO: Interview with the author, 
November 7. 
 
